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Abstract 
 
 
Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is a very influential piece of reasoning that seeks to 
show that colour experiences constitute an insoluble problem for science. This argument is 
based on a thought experiment concerning Mary. She is a vision scientist who has complete 
scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision but has never had colour experiences. 
According to Jackson, upon seeing coloured objects, Mary acquires new knowledge that 
escapes her complete scientific knowledge. He concludes that there are facts concerning 
colour experiences that scientific knowledge can neither describe nor explain. Specifically, 
these facts involve the occurrence of certain non-physical properties of experiences that he 
calls qualia.  
The present research considers whether a plausible formulation of the hypothesis that 
science can accommodate colour experiences is threatened by a version of the knowledge 
argument. The specific formulation of this problem has two motivations. Firstly, before 
investigating whether the knowledge argument raises a problem for the claim that science can 
account for colour experiences, we need a plausible formulation of this claim. I argue that the 
idea that science can accommodate colour experiences can be formulated as the modest 
reductionism hypothesis. Roughly speaking, this is the hypothesis that a science that can be 
explanatory interfaced with current physics of ordinary matter can account for conscious 
experiences.  
Secondly, an unintelligible premise figures in Jackson’s version the knowledge argument. 
Namely, it is assumed that Mary possesses a complete (future or possible) scientific 
knowledge. Nevertheless, the type of strategy involved in Jackson’s argument can be used to 
target modest reductionism. By considering contemporary psychophysics and neuroscience, I 
characterise Mary’s scientific knowledge. First, this characterisation is intelligible. In fact, it 
is elaborated on the basis of descriptions and explanations of colour experiences involved in 
current physics and neuroscience. Second, a supporter of modest reductionism can assume 
that the scientific knowledge ascribed to Mary might account for colour experiences. 
The main conclusion of the present research is that our version of the knowledge 
argument fails to threaten the modest reductionism hypothesis. In fact, I endorse what can be 
called the “two ways of thinking” reply to the knowledge argument. According to this 
response, the knowledge argument shows that there are different ways of thinking about 
colour experiences. One way of thinking is provided by scientific knowledge. The other way 
of thinking is provided by our ordinary conception of colour experiences. However, the 
existence of these two ways of thinking does not imply the existence of facts and properties 
that escape scientific knowledge. It might be the case that the ordinary way of thinking about 
colour experience concerns facts and properties described and explained by science. 
The principal conclusion of the research results from two investigations. The first line of 
research aims to reveal and evaluate the implicit assumptions that figure in the knowledge 
argument. The main body of the research is dedicated to this task. The principal result of this 
investigation is that the knowledge argument must rely on an account of introspective 
knowledge of colour experiences. I argue that an inferential model of introspection provides 
such account. On this model, Mary’s capacity to hold beliefs about her colour experiences 
when she sees coloured objects requires her mastery of colour concepts. The second main 
investigation seeks to justify the two ways of thinking strategy. As many opponents and 
supporters have recently started to realise, this strategy might be charged with being ad hoc. I 
offer a distinctive justification of this reply to the knowledge argument. Assuming the account 
of introspection mentioned above, the existence of visual recognitional colour concepts might 
justify this strategy. A person possesses these concepts when she is able to determine the 
colours of objects simply by having visual experiences.  
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 Introduction 
1 The Main Problem and its Solution 
A wide debate in contemporary philosophy of mind focuses on a general problem 
concerning conscious experiences. Many philosophers maintain that these mental 
states can be completely described and explained in scientific terms. Usually, this 
claim is related to the ontological statement that mental states are physical states, 
often understood as brain states. However, others argue that conscious experiences 
pose a fundamental problem for scientific knowledge. Specifically, some authors 
attack the epistemological claim that scientific knowledge can accommodate these 
mental states.1 According to these philosophers, when we perceive a yellow lemon 
or we endure a pain, certain properties are instantiated that can neither be described 
nor explained by science. 
Frank Jackson has offered a very influential argument for the claim that 
conscious colour experiences constitute an insoluble problem for science.2 This 
argument is based on a thought experiment concerning Mary. She is a vision 
scientist who has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision and 
who has never had colour experiences. According to Jackson, upon seeing coloured 
objects, Mary acquires knowledge that escapes her complete scientific knowledge. 
He concludes that there are facts concerning colour experiences that are beyond the 
scope of her scientific knowledge. Specifically, these facts involve the occurrence 
of certain non-physical properties of experiences called qualia.  
                                                 
1 Influential formulations of this criticism can be found in Chalmers 1996, McGinn 1991, Nagel 
1974.  
2 Jackson 1982, Jackson 1986.  
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The present research investigates whether a certain formulation of the 
hypothesis that science can account for colour experiences is threatened by a 
version of Jackson’s knowledge argument. There are two motivations for stating the 
problem in these terms. Firstly, let us clarify why we have to focus on a certain 
version of the claim that science can describe and explain colour experiences. In 
Chapter 1, I show that this claim needs to be formulated in a plausible and 
substantive manner. I suggest that the modest reductionism hypothesis offers such a 
formulation. Roughly, this is the hypothesis that a science, which can be 
explanatorily interfaced with current physics of ordinary matter, can account for 
conscious experiences.   
Secondly, we have to consider a certain version of the knowledge argument. In 
fact, Jackson’s argument involves the unintelligible premise that Mary has complete 
(future or possible) scientific knowledge.3 Therefore, we cannot judge the 
soundness of this line of reasoning. Nevertheless, the type of strategy offered by 
Jackson can still be used to target the hypothesis of modest reductionism. In 
Chapter 3, I characterise Mary’s scientific knowledge. First, this characterisation is 
intelligible. In fact, it is elaborated on the basis of descriptions and explanations of 
colour experiences involved in current physics and neuroscience. Second, modest 
reductionists can plausibly assume that the scientific knowledge delineated by this 
characterisation can account for colour experiences.  
The present research’s main conclusion is that our version of the knowledge 
argument does not threaten the modest reductionism hypothesis. I endorse what can 
be called the “two ways of thinking reply”.4 According to this response, the 
knowledge argument shows that there are different ways of thinking about colour 
                                                 
3 This criticism is advanced in Dennett 1991, pp. 399-403; Churchland 1986, pp. 331-334. 
4 This reply is also called the “new mode of presentation reply”, “conceptual dualism strategy”, “new 
knowledge and old fact reply”. Amongst the recent upholders of this strategy, see Peacocke 1989, 
Loar 1990, Papineau 2002, Sturgeon 2000, Carruthers 2000, Tye 2000, Perry 2001. Precursors of the 
kind of view involved in this reply can be found in Feigl 1960, Smart 1959, Place 1956. 
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experiences. One way is provided by scientific knowledge. The other way is offered 
by our ordinary conception of colour experiences. However, the knowledge 
argument is not successful in supporting its ontological conclusion. Such reasoning 
does not show that mental states have proprieties beyond the scope of scientific 
knowledge. 
The conclusion that our version of the knowledge argument is unsound is 
reached in virtue of two investigations. The first line of investigation, carried 
forward in Chapters 2 - 5, seeks to reveal and evaluate the implicit assumptions that 
figure in the knowledge argument. The second main investigation, which starts in 
Chapter 6 and continues in Chapter 7, assesses the knowledge argument. 
Specifically, I justify the two “ways of thinking strategy”. The remainder of the 
present introduction outlines these two investigations.  
2 The Implicit Premises of the Knowledge Argument 
The main body of this volume is dedicated to the elucidation of the implicit 
assumption that figure in the knowledge argument. The vast literature on this 
argument contains important insights about the structure of the argument and the 
nature of its premises.5 By considering and evaluating these different suggestions, I 
offer a comprehensive analysis of the structure and premises of the knowledge 
argument.  
The elucidation of the knowledge argument brings about an important result: 
namely, Mary, upon her release, can acquire new knowledge about colour 
experiences only if she acquires new knowledge about the colours that objects look 
to have to her. Let us see why this is the case. 
                                                 
5 Detailed analyses of the knowledge argument can be found in Alter 1995, Perry 2001, Lewis 1990, 
Churchland 1989 (especially the postscript).  
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According to a standard interpretation, Mary comes to know that experiences 
have qualia. This interpretation requires that, by seeing coloured objects, Mary can 
form beliefs about the type of colour experience she is having. Moreover, having 
colour experiences should enable her to have beliefs based on an ordinary 
classification of colour experiences. On this classification, colour experiences differ 
when they have different qualia. Thus, she can discover that a certain type of colour 
experience, as specified by her scientific knowledge, has a property that escapes 
scientific description and explanation. 
The knowledge argument does not explain how Mary can form the new beliefs 
that colour experiences have qualia. Such an explanation requires accounting for 
the transition from seeing coloured objects to acquiring these beliefs. Chapter 4 and 
5 consider how the upholder of the knowledge argument might offer this account. I 
deny that Mary’s supposed new beliefs could be based on her direct awareness of 
colour experiences or their properties. Neither perception nor introspection can 
provide this awareness.  
A more plausible account is that Mary forms these beliefs in virtue of certain 
other cognitive capacities. First, Mary must possess the capacity to have thoughts 
concerning the colours objects look to have to her. Second, she needs to know that 
certain relations hold between (i) having a colour experience of a certain type and 
(ii) the fact that something looks a certain colour to her. Therefore, establishing 
what she learns about colour experiences requires another investigation. Namely, 
we have to establish what she might learn about the colour of objects. 
3 Two Ways of Thinking About Colour Experiences 
Chapter 6 and 7 consider whether Mary, by acquiring new knowledge about colour 
experiences, comes to know facts that escape her scientific knowledge. Firstly, I 
show that an important objection against this ontological conclusion of the 
knowledge argument fails. Some have resisted this argument by means of the ability 
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reply. According to this strategy, upon seeing coloured objects, Mary simply 
acquires a new set of abilities. Nevertheless, she does not form any new belief that 
she could not have already formed in her room. Therefore, she cannot acquire new 
propositional knowledge about facts her scientific knowledge fails to consider and 
explain. I show that the promoter of the knowledge argument can resist this 
objection. However, conceding that Mary acquires new beliefs about colours does 
not imply that there are facts concerning colour experiences that escape her 
scientific knowledge. 
I endorse a reply to the knowledge argument that is becoming a standard move 
amongst many philosophers. This reply, which I dubbed the “two ways of thinking” 
strategy, assumes the consistency of the following claims. First, upon her release, 
Mary acquires new beliefs about her colour experiences. Second, these beliefs 
concern facts she already knew before her release. The central tenet of this response 
is the idea that Mary acquires new concepts, usually called phenomenal concepts, 
about colour experiences that she could not possess before her release. These 
concepts enable her to have new thoughts and thus new beliefs about colour 
experiences.  
My account of the two ways of thinking reply is distinctive in two respects. 
Firstly, I offer a motivation for this strategy. Many have advanced this response to 
block the knowledge argument. However, as some opponents and supporters have 
recently started to realise, this reply might be charged with being an ad hoc 
strategy.6 This means that the reply needs independent support. After outlining the 
central requirement that this strategy places on phenomenal concepts, I consider 
how this support can be provided.7 Preliminarily, I deny that this account can be 
based on the identification of phenomenal concepts with indexical concepts.  
                                                 
6 See, for this criticism Levine 2001, p. 86.  
7 Recent attempts to justify the two ways of thinking strategy can be found in Perry 2001, Papineau 
2002, Carruthers 2000, Tye 2003, Ayedede and Güzeldere 2003.  
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John Perry has recently provided a very articulated version of the two ways of 
thinking reply.8 The central idea in this view is that Mary acquires indexical 
knowledge about colour experiences that she could not have had before her release. 
Specifically, once she has colour experiences, she is able to think about them by 
means of the demonstrative concept [this]. Perry’s account is based on an 
independently motivated theory of the individuation of the content of beliefs where 
indexical concepts figure. Moreover, it satisfies the central requirements that the 
two ways of thinking strategy puts on phenomenal concepts. Nevertheless, I argue 
that this account proves to be unsatisfactory.   
The second distinctive element of my formulation of the “two ways of 
thinking” strategy derives form the view on introspection defended in this research. 
I argue that this strategy should be grounded on the existence of recognitional 
concepts of colours. In order to possess and apply these concepts there is no need to 
have other concepts or beliefs. Having colour experiences is sufficient. The novelty 
of Mary’s phenomenal concepts concerning colour experiences “is parasitic” on the 
novelty of these colour concepts. Therefore, by acquiring recognitional colour 
concepts, Mary acquires new ways of thinking about the types of colour 
experiences she is having.   
4 The Plan of the Volume 
In Chapter 1, I offer the modest reductionism hypothesis as a plausible formulation 
of the idea that science can accommodate conscious experiences. Chapter 2 begins 
with Jackson’s knowledge argument. After analysing this argument, I show that it is 
based on the unintelligible premise that Mary possesses a complete scientific 
knowledge. However, what emerges from this discussion is that that the general 
                                                 
8 Perry 2001. 
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strategy involved in this argument might still be viable to target the modest 
reductionism hypothesis.    
Chapter 3 is concerned with the formulation of an intelligible version of the 
knowledge argument. By considering contemporary psychophysics and 
neuroscience, I characterise Mary’s scientific knowledge. Specifically, this 
characterisation satisfies the general requirement of the modest reductionism 
hypothesis.  
In Chapter 4, I focus on the knowledge that Mary supposedly acquires by 
having colour experiences.  I first show that the standard account of the content of 
this knowledge needs justification. On this account, by seeing colours, Mary comes 
to believe that colour experiences have qualia. I show that the upholder of the 
knowledge argument should support this claim. However, I argue that this support 
cannot derive from the assumption that Mary is directly aware of her colour 
experiences and their features.  
Chapter 5 considers a more plausible explanation of how Mary can form beliefs 
about the types of colour experiences that she has in virtue of seeing coloured 
objects. This claim is based on an inferential account of introspective knowledge of 
colour experiences. A characterisation of the beliefs that figure in Mary’s 
supposedly new knowledge derives from this account. She has to discover 
something about the colour an object looks to have to her, in order to discover that a 
colour experience of a certain type has a certain property. 
Chapter 6 considers, firstly, an important challenge to the idea that Mary might 
acquire new beliefs about colour experiences. The promoters of the ability reply 
have argued that Mary does not acquire any new belief when she sees coloured 
objects. They claim that knowing what it is like to have a colour experience is just 
possessing a certain ability to imagine, remember and recognise the experience. 
Specifically, I will show that the supporter of the knowledge argument can 
challenge this reply by endorsing a certain principle for the individuation of beliefs. 
 
Introduction 8
Therefore, we can concede to such a supporter that Mary acquires new 
propositional knowledge about her colour experiences. 
In the final chapter, I consider whether Mary’s acquiring new propositional 
knowledge implies the existence of facts that escape scientific knowledge. Many 
philosophers have answered to this question in the negative by offering what is 
usually called the two ways of thinking reply. I will endorse this reply and show 
how it can be based on the existence of purely recognitional concepts concerning 
colours. 
 
 1 A Hypothesis about Conscious Experiences  
1.1 Introduction 
Physicalism has offered an influential version of the hypothesis that conscious 
experiences can be accommodated in scientific terms. Physicalists maintain that 
physics should have a fundamental role in the study of mind. They assume that 
physics will unify the science that will provide an exhaustive account of the mind. 
In the present Chapter, I investigate how such an idea can have a precise and 
substantive formulation.  
Section 1.2 considers a problem that appears to threaten the very possibility of 
formulating physicalism. Characterising the notion of being physical appears to be a 
central requirement for articulating this doctrine. Nevertheless, it has been argued 
that the physicalist who wants to use this characterisation faces a dilemma. I will 
illustrate this difficulty and how the physicalist can escape it. 
Section 1.3 investigates another problem that physicalists have to consider 
when articulating their position. A programme for scientific unification lies at the 
core of physicalism. A traditional version of this programme is classical reductive 
physicalism as exemplified in philosophy of mind by the type-identity theory. 
Reductive physicalists claim that the ordinary understanding of the mind and/or its 
scientific successors will be reformulated in neuroscientific terms and ultimately by 
physics. They think that this hypothesis is authorised by an observable trend in the 
evolution of contemporary science. Specifically, reductionists claim that types of 
mental states are identical to types of physical states in the brain. Thus, all the 
sound psychological explanations, once couched in neuroscientific and physical 
terms, will be derivable within neuroscience and physics. However, I will illustrate 
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effective criticisms of reductive physicalism. These objections attack the notion of 
intertheoretic reduction implicit in this form of physicalism.  
Section 1.4 will show that, although strong reductionism is untenable, 
physicalists can still promote a plausible programme for the unification of the study 
of the mind to physical science. Therefore, we can provide a plausible formulation 
of the hypothesis that science can give an account of conscious experiences. 
1.2 Defining “Being Physical”   
We need a precise formulation of the hypothesis that conscious experiences can be 
completely accounted for in scientific terms. Physicalism represents a very 
influential formulation of this claim. Physicalists adhere to a programme for the 
unification of the investigation of mind with the scientific study of the physical 
world. In their view, the mental can be completely described and explained in 
scientific terms. Specifically, psychology, biology and neuroscience can give such a 
scientific account. All these disciplines are regarded as potentially unifiable with 
physics. A wide debate concerns the issue of characterising this notion of unity.1 
However, before formulating such a unifying physicalist programme, one must first 
answer a more fundamental question.  
This section considers how physicalists can characterise the ‘physical’. Many 
have argued that physicalists have to face a dilemma when attempting to answer 
this question.2 According to this objection, articulating physicalism in terms of 
scientific knowledge renders it either false or unintelligible. I will show that this 
objection is resistible. Although certain strong formulations of physicalism are 
undermined by this criticism, a weaker version can withstand it. However, before 
                                                 
1 See at p.  25. 
2 This dilemma was originally offered by C. G. Hempel, see Hempel 1980. A similar line of 
reasoning can be found in Crane and Mellor 1990 and in Montero 1999. 
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addressing this issue, we need a preliminary characterisation of the main 
assumptions involved in physicalism. 
The physicalist thesis that mental states are part of the physical world is based 
on certain epistemological and ontological assumptions. These assumptions are 
expressed by a hypothesis that has shaped contemporary physicalism. Following 
David Lewis, we can call it the explanatory adequacy of physics hypothesis.3 This 
claim is: “The plausible hypothesis that there is some unified body of scientific 
theories, of the sort we now accept, which together provide a true and exhaustive 
account of all physical phenomena (i.e. all phenomena describable in physical 
terms).”4 Lewis expands on this as follows: 
They are unified in the sense that they are cumulative: the theory 
governing any physical phenomenon is explained by theories governing 
phenomena out of which that phenomenon is composed and by the way 
it is composed out of them. The same is true of the latter phenomena, 
and so on down to fundamental particles or fields governed by a few 
simple laws, more or less as conceived of in present-day theoretical 
physics. (Lewis 1966: 23) 
From the epistemological point of view, the main idea expressed in this passage is 
that all physical phenomena can be explained in terms of the laws regulating the 
behaviour of the fundamental particles posited by physics. This thesis is related to 
the ontological view that every phenomenon explained by a certain scientific 
theory, which differs from theoretical physics, is constituted by entities that 
ultimately are composed of the basic entities posited by physics.5
                                                 
3 For a history of this principle, see Papineau 2002, pp. 232-256.  
4 Lewis 1966, p. 23. 
5 For the different ways in which physicalists would weaken this formulation of physicalism, see 
section 1.3, p. 25.   
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The phenomenon of digestion can be used to illustrate the explanatory 
adequacy of physics hypothesis. Digestive phenomena are constituted by chemical 
phenomena involving interactions between the molecules of certain substances. 
Thus, chemistry can explain digestion in terms of chemical laws that regulate the 
behaviour of these molecules. Now, the explanatory adequacy of physics hypothesis 
requires that the chemical laws governing the behaviour of these molecules can be 
explained in terms of laws concerning the atoms that constitute these molecules. In 
turn, there are basic explanations of the behaviour of atoms. Eventually, this 
descending chain of decomposition toward more basic components and 
explanations will end with the entities (and the laws that govern their behaviour) 
that are posited by theoretical physics.  
The explanatory adequacy of physics hypothesis entails that if a physical 
phenomenon is explained by means of another phenomenon, then this latter 
phenomenon has to be physical.6 In particular, in Lewis’s account, the hypothesis of 
the explanatory adequacy of physics appears to amount to the assumption that only 
physical phenomena can be causally efficacious with respect to other physical 
phenomena.7 The explanatory adequacy of physics does not entail the thesis that 
everything is physical. Therefore, it does not imply directly that the mental is 
physical; another premise is required. 
Beside the explanatory adequacy of physics, physicalists suggest that the 
mental is causally efficacious with respect to the physical. Again, we can illustrate 
this premise by referring to Lewis. He argues that mental states cause physical 
effects and, thus, they figure in the explanation of physical facts.8 The explanatory 
                                                 
6 Lewis 1966, pp. 23-24. 
7 Some physicalists directly assume the thesis of the causal closure of the physical avoiding any 
reference to explanatory adequacy. See, for instance, Papineau 2002, pp. 17-18.   
8 See Lewis 1966, pp. 19-22. Lewis endorses and elaborates further the idea, suggested in Smart 
1959, that an a priori analysis of concepts concerning experiences reveals that these states play 
certain causal roles. Other physicalists maintain that the mental is casually efficacious with respect 
to the physical as a matter of fact, see Papineau 2002, pp. 38-39.    
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adequacy of physics hypothesis states that only physical phenomena can explain 
other physical phenomena. Therefore, mental states are physical phenomena. For 
example, he maintains that pain is a mental state that causes certain behaviours of 
avoidance. Such behaviours consist of movements that can be described in terms of 
sciences such as physiology. For instance, the movement consequent upon painful 
interactions with the environment can be described in terms of the activation of 
certain motor neurons and certain modification in determinate muscles. Thus, pains 
play a role in the explanation of certain physical phenomena. Therefore, given the 
explanatory adequacy of physics, pain is a physical phenomenon. More specifically, 
Lewis thinks that pains and other sensations are physical states of the brain.9  
So far, I have sketched two principal premises involved in an influential form of 
physicalism. First, physics is explanatorily adequate; meaning that only physical 
phenomena can explain other physical phenomena. Second, mental states figure in 
the explanation of certain physical phenomena. Now, I will investigate an implicit 
assumption involved in each of these premises.  
The physicalist view delineated above involves what can be called a theory-
based conception of being physical.10 Physical phenomena are defined by reference 
to physical science. According to the principle of the explanatory adequacy of 
physics, only phenomena composed of the fundamental particles posited by physics 
and explainable by means of the laws governing these particles are physical. 
However, this characterisation of being “physical” has been criticised. 
Formulations of physicalism that involve the theory-based conception of being 
physical face a difficulty usually known as Hempel's dilemma.11 This dilemma is 
taken to threaten the only two ways in which a theory-based conception of the 
physical can be formulated. Either the definition of “physical” is based on current 
                                                 
9 Lewis 1966, p. 24. 
10 I take the name of this account from Stoljar 2001.  
11 Hempel 1980, a similar type of criticism can be found in Crane and Mellor 1990. 
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physical theory or it is grounded in some ideally complete future (or possible) 
physical theory. Geoffrey Hellman describes effectively the dilemma emerging 
from these two options: 
… either physicalist principles are based on current physics, in which 
case there is every reason to think they are false; or else they are not, in 
which case it is, at best, difficult to interpret them, since they are based 
on a “physics” that does not exist - yet we lack any general criterion of 
“physical object, property, or law” framed independently of existing 
physical theories. (Hellman 1985: 609) 
Let us examine the horns of this dilemma in the case of the explanatory adequacy of 
physics. 
According to the first horn of the dilemma, if we characterise “physical” in 
terms of contemporary physics, then the thesis of the explanatory exhaustiveness of 
physics might turn out to be false. In this case, the principle requires that every 
physical phenomenon can be explained in terms of the ultimate particles and laws 
suggested by contemporary physics. This amounts to the assumption that 
contemporary physics provides a definitive inventory of physical reality. 
Nevertheless, as Barbara Montero puts it:  
… if the physical is defined over current microphysics, and a new 
particle is discovered next week, the particle will not be physical.  In 
addition, this is a consequence most philosophers want to avoid. 
(Montero 1999: 188) 
The central idea is that the possibility that physics might require the introduction of 
new particles, or even that it might undergo radical theoretical revolutions, cannot 
be excluded a priori. In particular, the historical evidence seems to point to the 
contrary. The history of physics has seen radical theoretical revolutions and the 
inclusion of new entities. For example, the physics of the eighteen-century 
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mechanics had to be supplemented by the theory of electricity and magnetism. 
Moreover, in contemporary physics the nature of the ultimate components that exist 
at sub-atomic level is still an open question. Thus, the claim that every physical 
phenomenon can be explained by reference to the particles posited by contemporary 
physics might turn out to be false.  
The other horn of the dilemma concerns formulating the theory-based 
conception of being physical by referring to a future (or possible) complete physics. 
In this case, two problems emerge. One difficulty is that the theory-based account 
cannot accomplish its main task. This conception does not give any precise content 
to the notion of “physical”. We cannot predict what entities or laws an ideally 
complete (future or possible) physics might refer to. The plausibility of the 
hypothesis of the explanatory adequacy of future physics is an empirical issue. 
Therefore, we cannot evaluate this claim before we possess such a scientific theory. 
At the present, we should be agnostic about the issue.   
There is a second problem with the appeal to future complete physics. This 
difficulty becomes apparent when we consider the physicalist solution to the mind-
body problem. The claim that mental entities can be completely explained in 
physical terms might just become a truism. We cannot exclude the possibility that a 
physical theory will involve reference to irreducible mental properties. Of course, 
stating this mere logical possibility is not a problem for physicalists. They might 
just claim that complete physics might not need reference to mental entities. 
However, some argue that completing the present theoretical physics might require 
reference to mental conscious states. 
At the core of contemporary quantum mechanics lies a fundamental problem. 
The mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics delivers accurate predictions in 
the realm of microphysics. The fundamental principle of quantum mechanics is the 
Schrödinger equation. This differential equation predicts the dynamics of wave 
functions that describe the basic particles. This principle requires that the properties 
 
A Hypothesis about Conscious Experiences 16
of basic particles, such as their position or momentum, may not always have well-
defined values. However, for instance, when we measure the position of a particle, 
we find a definite value and not the combination of values required by the 
Schrödinger principle. For this reason, what is called the measurement principle is 
introduced. This principle states that, when we observe particles, the wave function 
does not behave as predicted by Schrödinger principle. Instead, it “collapses” in a 
way that the determinate value of properties such as the position or momentum of a 
particle can be established. The central problem of the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics is to explain why both these principles are required. 
Many have argued that the solution to the problem of the interpretation of 
quantum mechanics requires referring to the conscious states of the observer. David 
Chalmers has recently advanced a proposal of this type.12 He has argued that in 
reality the only principle required for quantum mechanics should be the 
Schrödinger equation. In addition, the effects described in terms of the 
measurement principle find a better explanation if we assume the existence of non-
reducible conscious states. Of course, here I am not endorsing this solution to a very 
hard problem that lies at the core of contemporary physics. However, the fact that 
scientists and philosophers offer arguments for including consciousness in our 
present physical description of reality renders more pressing the problem that 
derives from formulating physicalism in terms of future developments of physics. 
If Hempel's dilemma cannot be evaded, endorsing the theory-based 
characterisation of being physical implies that the problem posed by conscious 
experience is unsolvable; for we cannot even coherently formulate it.13 Noam 
Chomsky presents clearly this idea in the general case of the mind-body problem. 
He points out that Descartes could formulate this problem meaningfully because he 
                                                 
12 Chalmers 1996, pp. 333-357. 
13 See Montero 1999 and Levine 2001.  
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had a determined notion of body to oppose to that of mind. Notoriously, he assumed 
that the body was extended and subject to the laws of contact mechanics. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the changes that have affected physics have left us with 
a less definite notion of the body, or of the physical: 
What is the concept of body that finally emerged? The answer is that 
there is no clear and definite concept of body. If the best theory of the 
material world that we can construct includes a variety of forces, 
particles that have no mass, and other entities that would have been 
offensive to the “scientific common sense” of Cartesians, then so be it: 
We conclude that these are properties of the physical world, the world 
of the body. The conclusions are tentative, as befits empirical 
hypotheses, but are not subject to criticism because they transcend some 
a priori conception of body. There is no longer any definitive 
conception of body. Rather, the material world is whatever we discover 
it to be, with whatever properties it must be assumed to have for the 
purposes of explanatory theory. (Chomsky 1988: 144) 
Finding Hempel’s dilemma convincing some have offered alternative accounts to 
the theory-based conception of the physical.14   
Some philosophers have suggested what can be called an object-based 
conception of the physical.15 They have maintained that an entity is physical when it 
is of the same type as some entity that is taken to be paradigmatically physical.16 
The central idea in this account is that the paradigmatically physical entities can be 
introduced without any reference to contemporary, future or possible science. 
                                                 
14 For reactions to Hempel’s dilemma see Hellman 1985, Melnyk 1997, Montero 1999 and Levine 
2001. See also the discussion in Poland 1994, Chapter 3, pp. 157 ff. 
15 I take this name from Stoljar 2001. 
16 See also Papineau 1993, p. 30. 
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Jackson illustrates how the object-based account characterises physical properties 
and relations: 
The physicalists can give an ostensive definition of what they mean by 
physical properties and relations by pointing to some exemplars of non-
sentient objects – tables, chairs, mountains, and the like – and then say 
that by physical properties they mean the kinds of properties and 
relation needed to give a complete account of things like them. (Jackson 
1998a: 7) 
Accordingly, physicalists can simply formulate the notion of physical property 
based on an ordinary understanding of the features of non-sentient ordinary objects. 
However, this account appears to be problematic. 
As Jackson acknowledges, the possibility of panpsychism threatens the object-
based account of “physical”.17 Panpsychists believe that every entity has a mind. On 
this view, the paradigmatically physical objects referred to in the object-based 
account of “physical” might have a mind. Nevertheless, the object-based account 
needs the existence of non-sentient objects. Therefore, the promoters of his view 
have to exclude the possibility of panpsychism. However, their theory does not 
seem to have any resource to specify further the nature of these non-sentient 
objects. It seems that they are just excluding the possibility of panpsychism by 
definition. Nevertheless, although panpsychism might strike us as completely 
implausible, its possibility cannot be ruled out just by stipulation. It seems that we 
need some substantive account of the nature of ordinary objects in order to exclude 
that they have a mind. This difficulty points to a more general one. 
The difficulty created by the possibility of panpsychism is just a manifestation 
of a deeper problem in the object-based conception. This account of “physical” 
                                                 
17 Jackson 1998b, p. 7. 
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depends on the idea that we can have an ordinary understanding of what type of 
properties might figure in a complete account of objects such as chairs and tables. 
Nevertheless, our ordinary understanding of these properties might turn out to be 
inadequate. We have seen that the possibility of panpsychism entails that amongst 
the features of chairs, or tables, might be included mental properties. Even without 
contemplating such a possibility, the problem emerges. It is enough to consider the 
image of reality provided by contemporary physics. The ultimate particles, 
properties and laws that this science invokes in providing a complete account of 
ordinary objects are very different from those we can contemplate in our ordinary 
experience.18 Thus, a form of physicalism based on the object-based account can 
even contrast with physics. Therefore, endorsing such a theory requires 
countenancing the possibility that many of the basic assumptions of contemporary 
physics are false. However, not many physicalists can be willing to develop an 
account of physical reality alternative to that provided by contemporary physics.    
The problem that afflicts the theory-based and object-based conceptions of 
being physical might be avoided by denying an assumption that they share. This is 
the idea that a formulation of physicalism needs an adequate characterisation of 
physical entities.19 Those who follow this strategy maintain that we have a better 
understanding of the mental than the physical. Joseph Levine, for example, claims 
that our mental life involves phenomenal and representational properties. Here it is 
sufficient to say that according to him, phenomenal properties characterise 
conscious mental states. Moreover, he assumes that mental states that represent the 
world as being in a certain way have representational features. Thus, he suggests 
that physicalism (in his words “materialism”) is the theory that gives ontological 
priority to non-mental properties: 
                                                 
18 A criticism of this type can be found in Levine 2001, p. 20.  
19 This account is suggested in Montero 1999. See also Levine 2001, pp. 20-21. 
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M’: Only non-mental properties are instantiated in a basic way; all 
mental properties are instantiated by being realized by the instantiation 
of other non-mental properties. (Levine 2001: 21) 
Even without explaining the notion of realisation involved here, it emerges that this 
statement is a formulation of physicalism that does not involve reference to any 
physical theory. Levine clarifies this formulation of physicalism as follows:  
It is not important for purposes of this thesis whether we have an 
adequate conception of what these basic non-mental properties are, so 
long we’re clear that they are not representational or phenomenal. If a 
future physics tell us that among the basic properties of elementary 
particles or fields are representing quantity x or feeling pain, then 
materialism is false. (Levine 2001: 20) 
Defining the physical via this negative approach clearly avoids the problems of the 
theory-based and object-based accounts. However, is this strategy satisfactory?  
The negative definition of being physical appears to be inadequate. Although 
this characterisation avoids Hempel’s dilemma, it renders physicalism completely 
independent of the practices and achievements of current sciences. In this case, the 
physicalist solution to the mind-body problem amounts to the claim that non-mental 
properties have an ontological and explanatory priority over mental properties. 
Therefore, physicalism does not imply the endorsement of any specific scientific 
research project. This means that the philosophical discussion of the mind-body 
problem should be independent of any current scientific attempt to explain and 
describe mental properties.20 Nevertheless, this appears to contrast with the general 
attitude of many physicalists within philosophy of mind. Specifically, such a way of 
                                                 
20 For example, Thomas Nagel characterises scientific knowledge in terms of a notion of objectivity 
understood as independence from subjective points of view Nagel 1974 and Nagel 1986.   
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defining the physical undermines one of the main reasons offered by physicalists for 
their position. 
Physicalists place confidence in the explanatory power of scientific knowledge, 
given the actual developments of contemporary science. In particular, many 
physicalists have been impressed by the results of biology and neuroscience that 
have explained many aspects of both normal and pathological human behaviour.21 
Thus, many physicalists want to offer a conception of the mind that is not only 
consistent with contemporary science, but that might aid scientific progress too.22 
Clearly, justifying physicalism by referring to the current scientific practice must 
involve a theory-based conception of physical. However, this leads us back to 
Hempel’s dilemma. Therefore, we have to see whether the physicalist can meet this 
difficulty without abandoning the theory-based conception of being physical.  
One of the horns of Hempel’s dilemma states that if “physical” is defined by 
reference to future physical science, we lack any substantive grasp of the 
explanatory adequacy of physics. This objection might be resisted by providing a 
philosophical account of scientific knowledge at a level of generality that can 
characterise it independently of its future changes.23 However, a less demanding 
enterprise is to see whether the other horn of Hempel’s dilemma can be met. 
If physicalism involves the thesis that all physical phenomena are explainable 
in terms of the entities and laws posited by current physics, then physicalism is 
false.24 For we cannot exclude that future physics might consider new fundamental 
                                                 
21 David Papineau illustrates how the idea of completeness of physics is not a methodological or 
metaphysical principle based on a priori considerations. He argues that advancements in the 
understanding of neurophysiology due to biochemistry in the first half of twentieth century are 
central in establishing this principle. See Papineau 2002, pp. 232-256.  
22 Fodor 1974, Smart 1959, Churchland 1986. 
23 One of these attempts is offered in Poland 1994.  
24 Another interesting defence of a theory-based account that refers to current physics is given in 
Melnyk 1997.  Melnyk argues that although defining physicalism in terms of contemporary physics 
might render it false, endorsing this doctrine is still rational.  
 
A Hypothesis about Conscious Experiences 22
particles governed by laws that we do not know presently. However, physicalism in 
the philosophy of mind might be detached from the general statement that 
contemporary physics provides the ultimate catalogue of physical entities. If so, 
then it might follow that the second horn of Hempel’s dilemma is not effective. Let 
us consider this option. 
Physicalism in philosophy of mind can be formulated as involving the thesis 
that mental phenomena can be explained in terms of properties of the kind 
recognised by current physical science. Frank Jackson has suggested this way of 
understanding physicalism. Dealing with the issue of defining physical properties 
and relations, he states that:    
… they will be broadly of a kind with those that appear in current 
physical science, or at least they will be as far as the explanations of 
macroscopic phenomena go, and the mind is a macroscopic 
phenomenon. (Jackson 1998a: 7) 
Let us consider a version of this view.   
J. C. C. Smart suggests tying physicalism, understood as a theory about the 
mind, to contemporary physics.25 A central assumption in this proposal is that 
current physics of “ordinary matter” is complete. This means that a class of 
macroscopic phenomena can be completely described and explained in terms of 
principles and properties of current physics. Smart illustrates this assumption by 
referring to the position of the physicist Gerald Feinberg. This scientist is reported 
to claim:26  
That the theory of the electron, proton, neutron, neutrino and photon and 
their anti-particles, when they have such, is enough to explain the 
properties of ordinary matter (Not what goes on inside neutron stars or 
                                                 
25 Smart 1978, Smart 1989.  
26 Feinberg 1966. 
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inside black holes, or the behaviour of the transitory particles created 
only with big cyclotrons). Feinberg thus holds that the “Thales 
Problem” (of what the world of familiar objects is made of) has 
essentially been solved. (Smart 1989: 81)  
Smart concedes that there will be changes in physics. However, he claims that these 
changes will affect only the physics of certain phenomena. We can expect changes 
in the theories concerning phenomena at sub-atomic level that are studied under 
special laboratory conditions. Moreover, we can expect transformation in those 
theories that consider the universe in the large. Nevertheless, similar changes will 
not affect the scientific descriptions and explanations of macroscopic phenomena 
that involve ordinary matter. For example, there will not be discoveries that alter the 
fact that the hydrogen atom contains one proton and one electron and that water is 
H20. 
The second tenet in Smart's position is that contemporary physics of ordinary 
matter can account for the mind. He assumes that: “The properties of mind depend 
on the properties of 'ordinary matter'“.27 Specifically, he claims that the properties 
of the mind depend on those of the brain. Moreover, he states that:   
The properties of the brain are those of assemblages of neurons, and the 
study of neurons requires only quite well known physics and chemistry. 
(Smart 1989: 80) 
Smart concedes that there are gaps in our understanding of the functioning of the 
brain and of the mind. However, they derive from difficulties we are facing in the 
detailed application of known principles of chemistry and physics.28 Therefore, we 
                                                 
27 Smart 1978, p. 341. 
28 Smart 1978, p. 349. 
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should not expect that “discoveries about quarks, black holes, theories of strings and 
superstrings” might affect our knowledge of the mind.29  
Smart suggests that the idea that scientific knowledge can accommodate the 
mind is a substantive doctrine that is not obviously false. This is achieved by 
formulating physicalism properly. Such a formulation requires detaching 
physicalism from the thesis that contemporary physics provides an account of all 
physical entities. A more plausible position is that current physics is explanatorily 
adequate for a class of macroscopic physical phenomena. This thesis is then 
coupled with the idea that the mind is one of these macroscopic phenomena. Thus, 
we have a plausible formulation of the main intuitions involved in the physicalist 
solution to the mind-body problem. However, this formulation might need some 
refinement in order to be completely satisfactory.  
One initial difficulty stems from the fact that many physicalists would deny that 
mental properties depend only on those of the brain. This is because they support an 
externalist account of the conditions that individuate mental states.30 On this view, 
certain relations of an individual to her environment figure in the conditions that 
specify her mental states. However, it seems that many of these authors appear to 
acknowledge that physics might be able to describe and explain these causal 
relations. Similarly, they appear to extend this hypothesis to the relevant features of 
external objects on which mental properties might depend. However, specifying this 
relation of dependence might create another difficulty.  
Philosophers such as Smart and Lewis have formulated physicalism as a 
reductionist doctrine. Reductionism involves interrelated ontological and 
epistemological theses. In philosophy of mind, reductionists state that types of 
mental phenomena are identical to types of physical phenomena. On the 
                                                 
29 Smart 1989, p. 80.  
30 In particular, externalist accounts of conscious experiences have been proposed in Dretske 1995 
and Tye 1995.  
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epistemological side, reductionists account for reduction as a relation between 
scientific theories. Consequently, they claim that all the scientific theories reduce, in 
this sense, to physics.  However, as we will see in the next section, there are reasons 
to reject this formulation of physicalism. 
1.3 The Limitations of Classical Reductionism 
In our quest for a precise formulation of the hypothesis that conscious experiences 
can be an object of scientific knowledge, we have investigated physicalism. It has 
emerged that one plausible version of physicalism is based on the thesis that mental 
states can be completely described and explained by a science that can be unified by 
the study of macro-phenomena, as investigated by contemporary physics. We have 
seen that physicalists in philosophy of mind do not need to endorse a general 
statement about the nature of all physical phenomena. They can just assert that 
mental phenomena can be exhaustively understood in term of the physics of macro-
phenomena involved in the biological processes of the brain. This weaker form of 
physicalism seems to constitute a substantive position that does not appear to be 
obviously false. However, it has to 
 be seen how the central notion of unification is be understood. Clearly, without 
such an understanding we cannot substantiate the claim that conscious experiences 
can be accommodated by scientific knowledge. 
In this section, I consider whether there is a plausible formulation of the project 
for unification involved in physicalism. Physicalists have articulated different 
versions of this project by endorsing different epistemological and ontological 
theses. From the epistemological point of view, physicalists differ in their accounts 
of the relation that should exist between the scientific theories studying the mind 
and the physical world. On the ontological side, they have promoted different views 
about the relation between mental and physical entities consistent with their 
epistemological assumption.  
 
A Hypothesis about Conscious Experiences 26
Firstly, I will illustrate reductive physicalism; a theory that can be regarded as a 
classical formulation of contemporary physicalism. The upholders of this version of 
physicalism formulate their project for unification by maintaining that scientific 
theories of the mind are reducible to physics. A certain model of inter-theoretic 
reduction has guided the formulation of this doctrine. Given this model, the project 
for unification amounts to the hypothesis that there are bridge laws that connect the 
vocabularies of the different sciences in a descending order with the language of 
physics as its first element. Usually, the defenders of this approach have maintained 
the ontological thesis that mental entities are identical to physical ones. 
Secondly, I will consider some influential attacks on this way of formulating 
the physicalist programme for scientific unification. I will outline the objections of 
those who have maintained that there cannot be bridge laws connecting 
psychological and neuroscientific vocabularies. Lacking such laws, the project of 
reduction cannot be carried forward. However, although these criticisms show 
certain limitations in the reductionist programme, they should not be taken as 
conclusive proof that the physicalist programme (for the unification of the study of 
the mind by physics) is misguided.  
An influential version of contemporary physicalism has expressed the 
physicalist programme in the context of reductionism. According to reductionists, 
there is a trend in contemporary science that justifies the idea that ideally all 
scientific knowledge is reducible to physical knowledge.31 Obviously, the notion of 
intertheoretic reduction is central in this position. 
                                                 
31 For a classical statement of this project, see Oppenheim and Putnam 1958. 
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An influential view on intertheoretic reduction focuses on the explanatory 
capacities of scientific theories.32 According to this account, a theory T2 is reduced 
to a theory T1 when, amongst other conditions, the data explainable by T2 are 
explainable by T1.33 Ernest Nagel has provided a classical account of such an 
explanatory subsumption of theories.34 In his formal analysis, a theory T2 is reduced 
to a theory T1 when all the statements of T2 are deduced from the statements of T1. 
When there are predicates and terms of T2 that do not appear in T1, Nagel’s model 
requires extra premises that connect the vocabularies of these theories. These 
additional assumptions, usually called bridge principles, are bi-conditional 
statements relating the statements of the reduced theory to certain statements of the 
reducing theory. For instance, let us consider two theories T2 and T1 that differ in 
their vocabularies. Theory T2 is reducible to T1, when the statements T2 are 
deducible from a theory obtained by adding bridge principles to T1. In Nagel’s 
account, the reducing theory explains the reduced theory because of a covering law 
model of explanation. According to this model, an explanation is an argument 
(deductive-nomological or inductive-statistical) whose premises include laws and 
conditions, and whose conclusion is a description of the phenomenon to be 
explained. According to Nagel’s model, all the laws of the reduced theory are 
logical consequences in the reducing theory; therefore, the explanatory power of the 
first theory is transferred to the latter. 
                                                 
32 It is important to signal a different attempt to characterise the idea of the unification of scientific 
knowledge by means of reductionism. This is a programme for semantic reduction. On this view, all 
the scientific sentences could be proved logically equivalent to observational sentences via the 
definition of scientific terms by means of observational terms. For this reductive programme, see 
Trout 1991, pp. 388-389. 
33 See Oppenheim and Putnam 1958. 
34 Nagel 1961, pp. 337-397. 
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Type identity theory exemplifies reductive physicalism in philosophy of mind.35 
The central thesis of this position is that types of mental states are identical to type 
of brain states. This ontological assumption implies that statements referring to 
certain mental facts are equivalent to certain statements expressing physical facts 
about the brain. For example, if the type mental entity pain is identical to the neural 
type C-fibres firing, we have the bridge principle stating that an individual is in pain 
if and only if she has her C-fibres firing.   
Type identity theory amounts to the idea that science of the mind, either as 
ordinary psychology or some scientific elaboration of it, will be completely 
formulated in neuroscientific terms. From the ontological point of view, this means 
that neuroscience refers to the mental entities posited by psychology. Similarly, at 
the epistemological level, the explanations couched in psychological terms can be 
reformulated as neuroscientific explanations. The strong reductive picture offered 
by type identity theory has been criticised even by philosophers who endorse a form 
of physicalism. Let us consider a criticism advanced by the supporters of 
functionalism.36  
Functionalists have argued that there cannot be bridge laws connecting mental 
and physical theories. Therefore, type identity theory is wrong. They maintain that 
each mental state is defined by a certain causal role. For instance, a functionalist 
analysis of pain might state that being in pain is being in a state that is caused by 
certain stimuli and that causes certain responses of avoidance and certain other 
mental states. Now, according to functionalism, different physical states can play 
the same causal role. Even physical systems as diverse as human brains, animal 
                                                 
35 This theory was promoted in Smart 1959, Place 1956, Feigl 1967. See also Feigl 1934 for a 
precursor of this doctrine. These authors did not mention explicitly any account of intertheoretic 
reduction. However, their position appears to imply such a model. Moreover, Fodor and Putnam 
mounted influential objections to type identity theory understood as involving this account of 
reduction; see Fodor 1974 and Putnam 1967. 
36 Donald Davidson, who endorses a form of physicalism, has provided other influential arguments 
against the type-identity theory. See Davidson 1970. 
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brains, and computers can realise the same causal role that defines a certain mental 
state. Given this multiple realisability of mental states in different physical states, 
there cannot be bridge laws connecting psychology and neuroscience. Therefore, 
the possibility of type identity between mental and physical entities is ruled out and 
reductionism is unattainable.37  
The main upshot of this type of criticism is that psychology is autonomous from 
physics. In fact, psychological laws and explanations concern certain kind of 
entities that cannot be type identical with physical kinds. It is important to add that 
despite these antireductionist theses, most functionalists endorse a weak form of 
physicalism as the doctrine that tokens of mental states are identical to tokens of 
physical states. However, it can be legitimately asked whether this antireductionist 
conclusion affects the physicalist programme for unification. First, let us consider 
how many reductionists responded to these objections. 
Many reductionists in philosophy of mind have reacted to the objection of 
functionalists. Some of these replies centre on the idea that causal analyses of 
mental states are compatible with the existence of bridge laws connecting sentences 
belonging to psychology to those belonging to neuroscience. One strategy is to 
argue that although in general there are not bridge principles that connect mental 
states, individuated by way of causal roles, to type physical states, there are, 
nevertheless, local reductions when we consider the psychology of certain species. 
According to these philosophers, although a mental state such as pain can have 
different realisations in different physical systems, when we consider the human 
species it can be maintained that there is only one type of brain state that realises 
                                                 
37 This type of argument can be found in Fodor 1974, Putnam 1967. More precisely, the core of this 
objection is the idea that the conjunctions of heterogeneous physical realisers that play the causal 
role that define mental states cannot figure in physical laws. See on this Fodor 1974, p. 123 and Kim 
1992, p. 318. 
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that mental state. Thus, for a human being having that brain state is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for having pain.38  
Antireductionists, in turn, have reacted by arguing that the mental states are 
multiply realisable within the same species, and even in the same individual at 
different times.39 Counter-replies have stressed that these arguments, if they show 
anything, point to the fact that reductions should be localised at the level of certain 
individuals or even at the level of individuals at certain times. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of bridge principles connecting types of mental states and types of brain 
states remains open and individuating these principles is a worthwhile scientific 
enterprise.40 Thus, it seems that reductionists in philosophy of mind might even be 
able to formulate their hypothesis against the objection of functionalists. However, 
by just focussing on this debate we might miss a more general problem that might 
afflict reductionism.  
A deeper problem for the kind of reductionism considered here derives from its 
connection with the Nagelian model of reduction. Many have advanced a reductive 
programme as a plausible hypothesis based on a trend empirically ascertainable in 
the development of science. Thus, it makes sense to ask whether this notion of 
intertheoretic reduction is supported by cases in the history of science. However, the 
development of philosophy of science has shown that Nagel’s account is less than 
satisfactory. In particular, there are two orders of reasons that can be offered to 
support this criticism.41 First, it can be argued that, amongst all the cases of 
historical scientific reduction, very few appear to approximate Nagel’s model. 
Second, even when a Nagelian reduction might be available, there is no requirement 
                                                 
38 This strategy is pursued in Lewis 1972 , Kim 1992, Enç 1983. 
39 Tye 1983 and Hornsby 1984. 
40 Jackson, Pargetter, and Prior 1982. See, for a reply, Hornsby 1984. 
41 These two lines of argument are pursued in Smith 1992, pp. 28-32. 
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for an ontological and explanatory absorption. Let us illustrate the first type of 
considerations.  
In the 1960s, when Nagel’s account of reduction was assuming a central 
position in philosophy of mind, many philosophers of science started to question 
it.42 These authors highlighted the fact that within the history of science, although 
many episodes can be regarded as successful cases of reduction, none in fact fit 
Nagel’s proposal. Some noticed that in many cases the reducing and the reduced 
theory were not logically consistent.43 For example, Galileo assumed falsely, that 
falling bodies have uniform vertical acceleration, whatever finite interval we 
consider. If Newtonian mechanics had derived this principle, according to Nagel 
model, it would have been false.44 Even the reduction of classical thermodynamics 
to statistical mechanics, used by Nagel as a paradigmatic illustration of his model, 
was shown not to fit his account of reduction.45 Moreover, others argued forcefully 
that the succession of scientific theories consisted instead of a total or partial 
replacement of the old theory’s ontology with a new one.46 Bridge laws do not 
come into this picture. The relation between modern chemistry and the phlogiston 
                                                 
42 The adequacy of this model in dealing with historical cases of successful scientific reductions has 
been questioned. Some criticisms came from Feyerabend 1962 and Hooker 1981. See, for a clear 
illustration of these objections and alternative models of intertheoretic reduction, Bickle 2003, and 
Bickle 1998. In addition, it is important to notice that Nagel’s theory of reduction is based on the 
covering law model of explanation. Thus, indirect criticism of his theory might come from the 
problems inherent in his account of explanation. See, for the debate generated by this account of 
explanation, Salmon 1990. 
43 Schaffner 1967. 
44 See Schaffner 1967.  
45 Hooker claims that the laws of equilibrium in thermodynamics can be derived from statistical 
mechanics only when certain limit conditions are realised. Moreover, those limits can never actually 
be realised. Therefore, he concludes: “In a fairly strong sense thermodynamics is simply 
conceptually and empirically wrong and must be replaced” (Hooker 1981: 4). 
46 In Feyerabend 1962 it is maintained that successive scientific theories are ontologically 
incommensurable and thus there is no way to find an illuminating formal relation between them. 
However, many considered his position extreme and tried to elaborate the model in the spirit of 
Nagel’s analysis that would illustrate some formal relation between successive theories. See Bickle 
1998, p. 27. 
 
A Hypothesis about Conscious Experiences 32
theory illustrates a case of complete ontological replacement. In this case, there is 
match between de-phlogisticated gas and oxygen. Thus, we can explain why the 
phlogiston theory worked as well as it did. However, there cannot be bridge laws 
that connect the ontologies of the two theories. Another example is given by 
relativistic mass. This mass is conceived as a relation of an object with countless 
frames of reference. However, in the case of the classical conception, mass is a 
monadic property of an object.47  
The upshot of these debates was the realisation that an account of reduction 
should accommodate a wide spectrum of cases. Paul Churchland has called bumpy 
and smooth reduction the two extremes of this spectrum.48 Bumpy reductions occur 
when many elements of the theory considered for reduction cannot be 
accommodated within the reducing one. In certain cases, bumpy reductions amount 
to complete replacements. This means that it is not possible to maintain the 
principles or the explanatory structure of the old theory. When a theory reduces 
smoothly to another one, it is possible to find some relevant correlation between 
their respective laws. When this mapping of the laws is perfect, the ontological 
result is the identification of the entities and the properties considered by the old 
theory with those of the new one. For example, in the case of physical optics and 
electromagnetic theory we have the identification of rays of light with 
electromagnetic radiation. As pointed out by Peter Smith, between these two 
extremes lie those cases where: 
The correspondence between old and new is neither so tight as to 
sustain unqualified cross-theoretic identification, nor so loose as to 
make straight elimination of the ontology a comfortable option. (Smith 
1992: 29) 
                                                 
47 Another important type of criticism of Nagel’s account of reduction is based on the idea that, in 
many cases, the reducing and reduced theories co-evolve, see Churchland 1986.  
48 Churchland 1985, p. 11.  
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Having seen the general requirement for an account of reduction, let us consider a 
model that appears to provide important insight into the nature of this relation 
between theories.  
The claim that bridge laws should connect the vocabularies and the ontologies 
of the reduced and the reducing theory is too strong.49 In fact, the resulting kind of 
reductionism appears to accommodate few episodes in the history of science. 
Instead, a model advanced by Clifford Hooker has been quite influential.50 This 
model of reduction is committed to Nagel’s idea that reduction involves deduction, 
but without requiring the existence of bridge laws. In this model of reduction, in the 
reducing theory Tb we have to construct an analogue T*r of the reduced theory Tr, 
adding to it a set of principles Cr. The set Cr contains various boundary conditions 
and some limiting assumptions, some of them counter to fact, that allow us to infer 
from Tb the theory T*r. Let us consider, for instance, the reduction of Galilean to 
Newtonian mechanics. Such a reduction requires adding to Newtonian mechanics a 
counterfactual condition. Namely: falling bodies' vertical acceleration is constant 
whatever their distance from Earth. In this case, there is a relation of deduction 
between Tb and T*r.  However, this model differs from the previous theories of 
reduction. The difference is in the relation assumed between Tr and its 
representation T*r in Tb. On this account, T*r is not construed from the vocabulary 
of Tr. In fact, the relation between T*r and Tr is not given in terms of bridge 
principles. Instead, the existence of an analogue relation between these two theories 
is required. Reducing theories preserve an equipotent image of reduced theories 
                                                 
49 For an account of the principal philosophical attempts at characterising intertheoretic reduction, 
see Bickle 2003. 
50 See Hooker 1981 and Smith 1992. 
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without a comprehensive mapping. Thus, what is reduced is a structure already 
within the vocabulary of the reducing theory Tb. 51
This model of reduction appears to account for the possible cases in the 
reductive spectrum, considered above. On this account, the cases of reduction in 
this spectrum are characterised by different degree of the correspondence AR 
between the image T*r embedded in the reducing theory and the reduced theory Tr. 
In the case of very bumpy intertheoretic reductions, this correspondence is minimal. 
On the other hand, in the case of very smooth reductions, the relation AR is so tight 
that we can assume that there is cross-theoretic identification of the entities 
postulated by the reduced theory with those postulated by the reducing one. Thus, it 
seems that there are reasons to accept a more general notion of reduction than the 
one suggested by Nagel. Moreover, philosophers have provided semiformal 
analyses of such a notion of reduction. However, we have seen that at one end of 
the reductive spectrum there are cases of reduction where the AR relation is very 
stringent. Then, we might assume that in these cases Nagel’s requirements are 
satisfied. Let us now consider whether this is the case. 
The cases of smooth reduction do not imply the absorption of one theory into 
the other. Peter Smith considers the case of elementary fluid mechanics.52 The basic 
laws of this theory can be obtained by the conjunction of those of classical 
                                                 
51 Paul Churchland, in Churchland 1985, illustrates in the following way this kind of reduction. Let 
us assume that T*r is a set of theorems of the restricted theory Tb, i. e. Tb plus the set of conditions 
Cr. Let us suppose that T*r contains these theorems:   
(1) ∀ x A ( x ) → B ( x ),   (2) ∀ x  ( B ( x ) ∧ C ( x )) → D ( x ). 
In addition,  Tr contains these theorems:  
(3) ∀ x  J ( x ) → K ( x ), (4) ∀ x  ( K ( x ) ∧ L ( x )) → M ( x ).  
The theorems in Tr appear, in their syntactical structure, relevantly isomorphic to those in T*r. Thus 
the relation of analogy AR is based on similarities expressed in terms of the syntactical complexity of 
the reduced theory and its image in the reducing theory. It is important to notice that this is not 
meant to be a precise definition of the notion of analogue relation but just a way to gesture to the 
idea involved in Hooker’s account. For a recent attempt at providing a precise characterisation of the 
notion of analogue relation, see Bickle 1998. 
52 Smith 1992. 
 
A Hypothesis about Conscious Experiences 35
Newtonian mechanics, the laws of thermodynamics, and the assumption that fluids 
are substances that deform continuously under application of shear stress (even for a 
very small amount). By using a molecular theory of the fluid state, we might prove 
this assumption. Thus, in a manner very close to a Nagelian reduction, we might 
deduce the basic laws of fluid mechanics within a theory that combines Newton’s 
laws, plus thermodynamics and the molecular theory of matter. However, this does 
not imply fluid mechanics is completely absorbed by the latter theories. 
Smith argues that recent developments in the study of complex fluids system 
show that elementary fluid mechanics retains its explanatory autonomy from the 
molecular theory of matter. Thanks to the discovery of Lorenz equations, it is 
possible to study the behaviour of certain chaotic systems in a way that:  
… is untouched by remarking that the underlying basic principles of 
fluid mechanics are themselves derivable from more fundamental 
theories. (Smith 1992: 31) 
The principles of fluid mechanics can be derived from theories that study 
phenomena that are more basic. However, this discipline studies systems whose 
complexity has required sui generis modelling techniques and explanations. In 
particular, given the autonomy of this discipline; it might even be the case that the 
assumption that fluids are substances that deform continuously under application of 
no shear stress has different molecular explanation in different substances. Thus, it 
could be the case that the explanation for why this principle holds is different in the 
case of water than the case of oil.  In other words, the actual scientific practice in 
the study of fluids could be consistent with the multiple realisability of the 
phenomena it investigates.53
                                                 
53 Smith 1992. 
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The scientific practice suggests that the relation that might obtain between 
psychology, neuroscience and ultimately physics is less determinate than the one 
proposed by reductive physicalists. In reality, there is a spectrum of options. At the 
one end of this spectrum, there are cases where there is a complete ontological 
replacement. At the other end, cases appear to satisfy Nagel’s requirements. 
However, even these latter cases do not support the strong conclusion that the 
reduced theory is superseded. Certain disciplines retain their explanatory autonomy.   
To recapitulate, philosophers of mind and of science object convincingly to the 
idea neuroscience will reduce psychology by absorbing it. In the philosophy of 
mind, functionalists have argued that psychology is autonomous from neuroscience, 
and other physical sciences, given the very nature of mental states. Many 
philosophers of science have argued that Nagel’s analysis does not capture the 
dynamic of actual episodes of successful reduction in science. Thus, it appears that 
physicalists who want to formulate their position in relation to scientific practice 
should avoid certain commitments. Namely, they cannot support their reductive 
programme in terms of the strong requirement of the ontological and explanatory 
absorption required by Nagel’s account of reduction. Shall we, then, conclude that 
the physicalist has to renounce any idea of the explanatory adequacy of physics? 
Moreover, should she abandon the programme for the unification of the study of the 
mind with the rest of the study of the physical world? 
The next section aims to show that a plausible form of physicalism can be 
formulated in terms of a weak reductionist programme that retains a plausible 
formulation of the aspiration to give centrality to physics and neuroscience. At the 
same time, such a form of physicalism does not require the strong and untenable 
commitments of the classical account of reduction provided by Nagel.  
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1.4 Modest Reductionism  
In the previous sections, I argued that a plausible formulation of physicalism should 
satisfy two requirements. First, physicalism should provide an account of the notion 
of being physical in the context of philosophy of mind. This can be done if it is 
assumed that the study of the mental should be unified to the account of the “bulk 
matter” offered by contemporary physics. In particular, physicalists should not 
connect this thesis to a far stronger claim, namely, that contemporary physics 
provides the account of the ultimate physical reality at the subatomic level. Second, 
physicalists should avoid the strong commitments of reductive physicalism.  
The previous two requirements appear to generate an inconsistency. How can 
physicalists maintain a project for the unification of the study of the mind to physics 
without endorsing a form of reductionism? The scope of this section is to illustrate a 
form of physicalism that might keep these two assumptions together. My main 
claim is that there is a way of formulating physicalism that is substantive and that 
preserves the central intuition of the prominent role that physics should have in the 
study of the mind.  
We have seen that the hypothesis that psychology will reduce to neuroscience 
and eventually to physics, because mental entities are type identical to physical 
states, is too demanding. However, the general requirement for having intertheoretic 
reduction can be less stringent than having an ontological relation that supports 
bridge laws. As pointed out by Nagel himself the general idea is that inter-
theoretical reduction: 
… is the explanation of a theory or a set of experimental laws 
established in one area of inquiry, by a theory usually though not 
invariably formulated for some other domain. (Nagel 1961: 338) 
This passage offers a general characterisation of inter-theoretic reductions that 
might not require to be spelled out in terms of bridge laws. Moreover, such an 
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account might not require the ontological identification of types of the entities of 
the reducing doctrine with those of the reducing one. The only requirement is that 
the reducing theory is able to explain why the reduced one works as well as it does. 
Let us see whether we can spell out this suggestion in more detail. 
Peter Smith has articulated the general requirement for intertheoretic reduction 
in terms of the notion of explanatory interfacing. According to this proposal, a 
certain theory can provide explanations in terms of certain regularities discerned by 
using a taxonomy that is autonomous from that of sciences that are more 
fundamental. He assumes that explanation has a contrastive character; thus the 
fundamental form of an explanation is: “that p (rather than q1, q2…) explains why r 
(rather than s1, s2…)”.54  Thus, it can be that the phenomenon r that has to be 
explained and the phenomenon p that explains it and the alternatives q1, q2, …  s1, 
s2, … are described and individuated in ways that are not reducible to those of some 
other science.   
Smith illustrates the notion of explanatory interfacing with the example of the 
explanation why a certain person wrote a certain cheque in a certain situation. Now, 
psychology can explain this by maintaining that the person’s desire to pay her bill 
and her belief that using cheques is a way of paying (and not her desire to see her 
bank account decreasing) causes her writing the cheque (and not using cash). This 
explanation requires certain patterns of events that are discerned by using 
psychological notions such as desires and beliefs. Now neuroscience cannot pretend 
to explain the patterns that psychology discerns because there it might no way to 
reduce the theory of beliefs and desires to neuroscience. However, Smith argues 
that this does not mean that neuroscience has no explanation to provide in this case. 
We already know that neuroscience can explain why the person wrote the cheque. 
                                                 
54 This assumption does not appear to play any important role in his argument. The argument applies 
to any account of explanation that involves the idea that an explanation in a certain theory requires 
that the theory provides a description of its phenomena. 
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Physiological mechanisms explain the movements of the arm and the fingers that 
are required in writing the cheque. Thus, neuroscience is able to provide a 
description and explanation of the occurrence of an event that psychology re-
describes and re-explains at a different level. This illustrates the kind of reductive 
relation that can be endorsed in a physicalist programme. 
To sum up, the project for the unification underlying physicalism should not be 
articulated in terms of strong reductionism. Physicalists might endorse the more 
modest assumption that we might expect and try to provide interfacing explanation 
between psychology and neuroscience, which in turn might lead to explanatory 
interfacings of the study of the mind to contemporary physics.   
1.5 Conclusion 
Many philosophers think that phenomenal consciousness represents a problem for 
anyone attempting to account for the mental scientifically. However, before 
addressing the question whether there is such a problem we have to formulate the 
issue clearly. This requires a preliminary understanding of the hypothesis of those 
supporting the idea that science can provide a complete account of mental life. 
I have investigated how we can characterise such a hypothesis in a plausible 
way. I have suggested that modest reductionism might provide a plausible 
formulation of this assumption. This is the idea that a scientific understanding of the 
mind can be provided by means of a science that can be explanatorily interfaced 
with the current physical study of macro-phenomena as explained by chemistry, 
biology and, ultimately, physics.  
Given this characterisation of the idea that conscious experiences might be 
completely knowable in scientific terms, we have to consider whether we can 
provide a substantive account of the problem that phenomenal consciousness can 
present to such a thesis. In the next chapter, I will consider an extremely influential 
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argument that, if sound, would show that even the hypothesis of modest 
reductionism might be threatened by conscious experiences.  
 
 2 The Knowledge Argument  
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced a central issue within contemporary philosophy of 
mind, namely, the problem of whether or not we should accept the hypothesis that 
science can account for conscious experiences. I suggested a plausible formulation 
of this statement, which I called the hypothesis of modest reductionism. This is the 
claim that conscious experiences can be completely accounted for in terms of a 
science that can be explanatorily interfaced with contemporary physics of 
macroscopic phenomena. In order to proceed, then, we must next determine what 
problems, if any, might afflict the hypothesis of modest reductionism. 
This chapter illustrates the knowledge argument offered by Frank Jackson.1 
This is one of the most influential contemporary criticisms of the idea that 
conscious experiences can be accounted for in scientific terms.2 My aim is to 
investigate whether Jackson’s argument raises a difficulty for the hypothesis of 
modest reductionism. The main conclusion of the chapter is that, in order to carry 
forward this investigation, we should accomplish two tasks. First, we should 
provide a suitably revised version of the argument suggested by Jackson. Second, 
we should clarify further the hypothesis of modest reductionism. 
Section 2.2 introduces the most influential presentation of the knowledge 
argument. This account involves Mary, a vision scientist who has a complete 
scientific knowledge of colour and colour vision but who has never seen colours. 
According to Jackson, if she experiences a colour she will learn what it is like to 
                                                 
1 Jackson 1982 and Jackson 1986.  
2 The bibliography Chalmers 1999 lists fifty papers dedicated to this argument. Just to mention the 
most recent philosophical books on consciousness, extensive discussions of the knowledge argument 
can be found in Carruthers 2000, Papineau 2002, Perry 2001, Levine 2001, and Tye 2000. 
The Knowledge Argument 42
have a colour experience and thus her scientific knowledge is incomplete. Before 
establishing whether the knowledge argument can determine a problem for the 
hypothesis of modest reductionism, we have to consider a criticism of this line of 
reasoning.  
In section 2.3, I illustrate and endorse this objection as voiced by Daniel 
Dennett and Patricia Churchland.3 They have argued convincingly that we cannot 
grasp the complete scientific knowledge that Jackson ascribes to Mary.  
In section 2.4, despite this criticism, I will maintain that the general strategy 
used in the knowledge argument might still be useful to test the hypothesis of 
modest reductionism. This requires reformulating a version of the knowledge 
argument that can target modest reductionism and resists the objection raised by 
Dennett and Churchland. However, I will argue that providing such a reformulation 
requires a more accurate characterisation of the hypothesis of modest reductionism. 
2.2 A Thought Experiment about Mary  
With a formulation of the hypothesis that science can accommodate conscious 
experiences in place, we can now start investigating whether such an assumption is 
problematic. Contemporary philosophers of mind have offered different arguments 
against the idea that consciousness can be studied in scientific terms. These 
arguments target different ways to spell out such a supposition.4 Amongst these 
objections, Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is one of the most influential.  
The first aim of this section is to introduce Jackson's argument. Specifically, I 
will show the structure of the argument and offer a preliminary clarification of its 
premises. The remainder of the section will show that this argument appears to 
target the hypothesis of modest reductionism.    
                                                 
3 Dennett 1991, pp. 399-403; Churchland 1986, pp. 331-334. 
4Amongst these, the Modal Argument, Kripke 1972, pp. 148-155, the Explanatory Gap argument, 
Levine 1986, Levine 2001 the Zombies argument, Block 1978, Chalmers 1996, Chapters 3-4. 
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Jackson illustrates the knowledge argument with different thought 
experiments.5 The most discussed concerns Mary, a vision scientist: 
Who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a 
black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She 
specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us 
suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes 
on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and uses terms like 'red', 
'blue' and so on. She discovers for example just which wavelength 
combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this 
produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal 
chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of 
the sentence 'The sky is blue'. (Jackson 1982: 471) 
Jackson’s conclusion follows by answering certain questions about Mary’s 
knowledge after her release. 
What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room 
or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It 
seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and 
our visual experience of it. It is inescapable that her previous knowledge 
was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is 
more to have than that, and physicalism is false. (Jackson 1982: 471) 
Before considering in detail the argument involved in this thought experiment, a 
clarification is needed. 
Although in the formulation of the argument given above Jackson talks of 
“physical information”, in a subsequent paper he says that Mary in her lab “knows 
                                                 
5 In Jackson 1982 and Jackson 1986.  
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the physical facts about us and our environment”.6 Moreover, he claims that the 
conclusion that physicalism should deny, and presumably that the knowledge 
argument is implying, is that: “there is more to know than every physical fact”.7 
Therefore, we can analyse the structure of the knowledge argument in terms of 
facts. 
The knowledge argument moves from the two following epistemic premises 
about what Mary knows before her release and what she comes to know by seeing 
coloured objects. 
(1) Mary, before her release, has a complete scientific knowledge of 
facts concerning colours and colour vision without having conscious 
experiences of colours.  
(2) Mary, after her release, by seeing a coloured object acquires new 
knowledge about colour experiences. 
From these premises, Jackson derives the following ontological conclusion: 
(3) There are facts that are not physical.  
Let us clarify these claims. 
In premise (1), Mary's complete scientific knowledge is about the kinds of facts 
that according to different strands of physicalism exhaust all the facts concerning 
colour experience. Firstly, Jackson states that: 
She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a 
wide sense of 'physical' which includes everything in completed physics 
chemistry and neurophysiology. (Jackson 1986: 567) 
                                                 
6 Jackson 1986. 
7 Jackson 1986. 
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In addition, he claims that Mary knows facts concerning “functional roles” played 
by the states of the nervous system.8 As we saw in the previous chapter, physicalists 
assume that facts concerning colour experiences belong to these two classes. 
The second premise of the knowledge argument concerns knowledge that Mary 
allegedly acquires by having chromatic colour experiences.9 We have seen that he 
claims that by seeing colours Mary comes to know about the “world and our 
experience of it”. Here, I will be concentrating on conscious experiences.10 Jackson 
claims that this knowledge concerns the occurrence of qualia. With the expression 
“qualia”, he intends to refer to: 
… certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain 
perceptual experiences. (Jackson 1982: 469) 
According to Jackson, this suggests that, by seeing coloured objects, Mary comes to 
know facts about her colour experiences that involve the occurrence of qualia. For 
instance, when Mary sees a red object, she will learn that her experience of a red 
object has a certain feature. This property is a quale that she did not know about 
before her release. I will refer to this knowledge as knowledge of what it is like to 
have a colour experience.11  
The conclusion of the knowledge argument is that there are facts about colour 
experiences involving the occurrence of non-physical properties. According to 
                                                 
8 Jackson 1986, p. 567. 
9 Jackson assumes that, before her release, Mary can see black and white objects. Presumably, this 
means that she can also see shades of grey. Thus, she should already know about the qualia of the 
relative achromatic colour experiences. The point of the argument is that by seeing, say, a red object 
she learns something new about the visual experience of red. On the following, I will omit the 
specification “chromatic colour”. 
10 Many commentators appear to agree that, according to Jackson, Mary’s supposed new knowledge 
concerns colour experiences. See, for instance, Carruthers 2000, Papineau 2002, Perry 2001, Levine 
2001, Tye 2000. 
11 Thomas Nagel introduced the notion of “knowing what it is like” in the philosophical debate in his 
seminal paper Nagel 1974. Here I use the expression to refer to Mary's supposed epistemic progress 
without making assumptions about its existence, nature and content. 
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Jackson, given that Mary learns about the qualia of her colour experiences only 
upon her release, these properties cannot be physical properties. Otherwise, she 
would know about them while she was still in her black and white laboratory. Thus, 
knowing what it is like to have a colour experience is about a non-physical fact 
concerning the experience that involves the occurrence of a non-physical property 
or quale. 
The thought experiment concerning Mary illustrates the knowledge argument as 
applied to colour experiences. Jackson maintains that similar thought experiments 
support the conclusion that perceptions in the different modalities and pains have 
non-physical qualia.12 However, even without such a generalisation, if his argument 
is sound in the case of colour experiences, the hypothesis that science can 
accommodate conscious states is undermined. Thus, we can focus our attention on 
just what the knowledge argument proves about colour experiences. Having 
illustrated the main structure of the knowledge argument, we have to consider 
whether it determines a problem for the hypothesis of modest reductionism.  
The knowledge argument appears to be directed against a very general 
formulation of the physicalist thesis about colour experiences. Jackson assumes that 
Mary knows all the facts of the type studied by physics, chemistry and neuroscience 
and all the facts concerning causal roles. The argument targets every doctrine based 
on the thesis that all the facts about colour experiences belong to these two classes. 
Now, physicalists have formulated this thesis differently. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, some differences depend upon the ways of understanding the relations 
between causal roles that define conscious experiences and facts studied by physics 
and other sciences. It appears that Jackson criticises an assumption shared by these 
forms of physicalism. 
                                                 
12 Jackson 1982, pp. 471-472. 
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Jackson’s knowledge argument involves a precise characterisation of physical 
facts. He denies that his argument requires any definition of “'physical information' 
and the correlative notion of physical property, process, and so on”.13 Despite this, 
the argument’s logic requires some constraints on the notion of physical fact. From 
the claim that Mary comes to know a fact she did not know before her release, we 
have to derive that this is not a physical fact. This appears to require the assumption 
that if a fact is physical, then it is potentially knowable or known by Mary when she 
is still in the black-and-white laboratory.14 In the following, I will refer to this 
assumption as the epistemic constraint. 
The knowledge argument seems to have the resources to target modest 
reductionism. In fact, this argument addresses those physicalist doctrines that 
involve a theory-based conception of being physical. The reasons for this are as 
follows. According to these positions, an entity is physical if it can be contemplated 
by physical science. Clearly, this implies the epistemic constraint that is central to 
the knowledge argument.15 Moreover, modest reductionism involves a theory-based 
conception of being physical.16 Thus, it seems that Mary’s thought experiment 
might illustrate a philosophical perplexity about a plausible version of the 
hypothesis that colour experiences can be studied scientifically.  
To sum up, it seems that we have made some progress in our investigation of 
the problem that conscious experience might create for a scientific account of the 
mind. The plausible formulation of this hypothesis provided by modest 
reductionism appears to be targeted by a famous argument proposed by Frank 
                                                 
13 Jackson 1982, p. 469. 
14 The importance of this assumption in the knowledge argument is stressed and discussed in Alter 
1995, pp. 17-20. 
15 Certain physicalist doctrines can imply the epistemic constraint without recurring to a theory-
based conception of being physical. In fact, the epistemic constrains states only a necessary 
condition for being a physical fact. 
16 See Chapter 1, at p. 10. 
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Jackson. Nevertheless, such progress might be only apparent. The next section will 
show that Jackson's argument has to face a serious difficulty. 
2.3 Knowledge Beyond our Understanding 
Many philosophers have discussed the merits of the knowledge argument by 
considering what Mary supposedly learns once she leaves the black-and-white 
laboratory. However, Patricia Churchland and Daniel Dennett have shown that a 
critical assessment of the argument should start from what Mary knows before her 
release.17 Specifically, they have argued that Jackson's assumptions about Mary's 
scientific knowledge render his argument ineffective. 
In this section I illustrate both Dennett and Churchland's objections, and 
endorse their conclusion. The main point of their criticism is that we lack a clear 
idea of what Mary’s complete scientific knowledge would be. Therefore, we are in 
no position to establish whether Mary acquires new knowledge about colour 
experience when she sees a coloured object. Besides, they have argued for the 
conclusion that we cannot exclude that the knowledge argument might be unsound. 
I will maintain that this conclusion is plausible given our lack of understanding of 
Mary's scientific knowledge. However, I will argue that such a conclusion does not 
receive any independent support from a reformulation of Mary’s story provided by 
Daniel Dennett.  
The very possibility of evaluating the knowledge argument appears to be 
threatened by the assumption that Mary has complete scientific knowledge of 
physical facts.18 Clearly, in order to evaluate an argument we should be in the 
position to understand its premises. However, as Dennett has pointed out, 
understanding Mary's scientific knowledge is a task: 
                                                 
17 Dennett 1991, pp. 399-403; Churchland 1986, pp. 331-334. 
18 This interpretation is suggested in Montero 1999. 
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… so preposterously immense, you can't even try. The crucial premise 
is that “She has all the physical information.” That's not readily 
imaginable.... (Dennett 1991: 399) 
In a similar way, Patricia Churchland, who thinks that Mary's complete knowledge 
might concern the brain, asks: 
How can I assess what Mary will know and understand if she knows 
everything there is to know about the brain? Everything is a lot and it 
means, in all likelihood, that Mary has a radically different and deeper 
understanding of the brain than anything barely conceivable in our 
wildest fights of fancy. (Churchland 1986: 332) 
It might be objected that our understanding of Mary's complete scientific 
knowledge could be based on what we know about contemporary science. 
However, we cannot be confident that a complete (future or possible) scientific 
knowledge is going to be similar to the present one in any significant respect that 
can be intelligible to us. As Patricia Churchland has rightly pointed out, the history 
of science gives evidence for this.  
For to know everything about the brain might well be qualitatively 
different, and it might be to possess a theory that would permit exactly 
what the premises says it will not. Utopian neuroscience will probably 
look as much like existing neuroscience as modern physics looks like 
Aristotelian physics. So it will not be just more of the same. 
(Churchland 1986: 332) 
An unbridgeable qualitative distance might separate contemporary scientific 
knowledge and Mary’s knowledge. 
Given the plausible interpretation of Jackson's knowledge argument provided 
by Patricia Churchland and Daniel Dennett, it emerges that such line of reasoning 
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cannot be used to evaluate the hypothesis that science can accommodate conscious 
experiences. In fact, the argument fails to provide an intelligible account of what 
Mary might know before her release. Moreover, these authors have suggested that 
Mary might know what it is like to have a colour experience before her release.   
Besides promoting an agnostic stance about the plausibility of the knowledge 
argument, Patricia Churchland and Daniel Dennett have suggested that we cannot 
exclude possibilities that might render the knowledge argument unsound. Dennett 
suggests that we cannot exclude a possibility concerning the consequences of 
possessing complete scientific knowledge. Namely, this knowledge might enable 
Mary to recognise that the colour experiences she has upon her release fall under 
the scientific descriptions she already knows. On the other hand, Patricia 
Churchland maintains that possessing a complete scientific knowledge might cause 
the sort of experience required for knowing what it is like to have a colour 
experience. Therefore, Jackson's description of Mary’s situation before her release 
might be inconsistent.  
Without understanding what Mary knows before her release, many cases are 
possible. Dennett's criticism of the knowledge argument involves a story about 
Mary. He appears to think that if before her release Mary lacks knowledge of 
certain features of colour experiences, then, upon her release, she will not be able to 
recognise by looking at a blue banana that it has the wrong colour.19 However, 
Dennett thinks that the following story shows that this might not be the case: 
And so one day, Mary’s captors decided it was time for her to see 
colors. As a trick they prepared a bright blue banana to present as her 
first color experience ever. Mary took one look at it and said ‘Hey! You 
tried to trick me! Bananas are yellow but this one is blue!’ Her captors 
were dumfounded. How did she do it? ‘Simple,’ she replied. ‘You have 
                                                 
19 Churchland 1986, p. 333. 
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to remember that I know everything – absolutely everything – that could 
ever be known about the causes and effects of color vision. So of course 
before you brought the banana in, I had already written down, in 
exquisite detail exactly what a physical impression of a yellow object or 
a blue object …would make on my nervous system. So I already knew 
exactly what thoughts I would have (because, after all, the “mere 
disposition” to think about this or that is not one of your famous qualia 
is it?). I was not in the slightest surprised by my experience of blue… I 
realize that it is hard for you to imagine that I could know so much 
about my reactive dispositions that the way blue affected me came as no 
surprise. Of course it’s hard for you to imagine. It’s hard for anyone to 
imagine the consequences of someone knowing absolutely everything 
about anything!’. (Dennett 1991: 399-400) 
Let us evaluate what this story shows about the knowledge argument. 
Some maintain that Dennett uses his story to deny that Mary upon release 
learns anything.20 Nevertheless, his aim in this passage is more modest. As he says: 
My point is not that my way of telling the rest of the story proves that 
Mary doesn't learn anything, but that the usual way to imagining the 
story does not prove that she does. It doesn't prove anything.... (Dennett 
1991: 400) 
Dennett is not proving that Mary does not undergo an epistemic progress. Rather, 
he tries to disqualify the intuition that supports the conclusion that she might learn 
something. To achieve this, he shows that we can imagine a situation in which Mary 
does not learn anything new by having conscious experiences. In particular, he 
suggests that Mary's complete knowledge might comprise laws stating causal 
                                                 
20 See Alter 1999 and Chalmers 1996, p. 145. Probably, this reading is suggested by the fact that in 
other places Dennett has argued for the elimination of qualia, see Dennett 1988. 
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correlations between types of experiences and types of thoughts. In particular, Mary 
knows that if a certain subject is presented with a blue banana he will have a 
thought expressible as “this is blue”. Thus by seeing the blue banana she comes to 
know that people who have this kind of experience think “this is blue”. Therefore, 
we can have intuitions about Mary’s case that do not support the knowledge 
argument. However, does this story add anything to the observation that we cannot 
grasp Mary’s scientific knowledge? 
Dennett’s account of Mary’s case exploits the same lack of understanding of 
her scientific knowledge that he denounces in Jackson’s version. Let us assume, for 
the sake of the argument, that there can be scientific laws connecting experiences 
scientifically described and thoughts.21 In addition, although Dennett does not 
explain how this might be the case, we can concede that Mary’s ability to recognise 
the colour of the object she sees enables her to know what it is like to have a certain 
colour experience. Still, in order to judge whether Mary passes the blue banana test 
we need a more substantial understanding of her scientific knowledge.  
A central assumption in Dennett's story is that Mary is able to apply the law 
correlating conscious experiences and the appropriate thoughts just by looking at 
the banana.22 As Dennett puts it: “Mary took one look at it and said ‘Hey! You tried 
to trick me!’”. This requires that Mary can recognise the colour experience involved 
in seeing the blue banana as a certain “physical impression” in her nervous system. 
However, how does she acquire such a recognitional capacity?  It seems that we are 
not in the position to say. On the other hand, it might be maintained that a relevant 
ingredient for our coming to decide that Mary is not fooled might be based on our 
grasp of Mary's notion of “physical impression”. However, our decision cannot be 
                                                 
21 Some have argued that thoughts cannot enter into any nomological correlation; see, for example, 
the very influential Davidson 1970. 
22 Howard Robinson shows how this assumption is implicit in Dennett's story, Robinson 1993, p. 
175. 
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based on Dennett's sketchy model of Mary's scientific knowledge. A more 
substantial account of her knowledge is needed. 
We cannot exclude the possibility that just by seeing a coloured object Mary 
might be able to know that the experience she is having satisfies some scientific 
description. This simply derives from the fact that we cannot grasp Mary’s 
complete scientific knowledge. Dennett’s elaborate story has little to add. Given our 
ignorance about Mary’s scientific knowledge, we cannot exclude that possessing 
this knowledge might cause in her the relevant recognitional capacity. However, no 
evidence for the fact that she might have such a capacity derives from Dennett’s 
account. We have the same amount of reason (or lack of it) to accept his story as we 
do the one told by Jackson. Let us now consider another possibility we cannot 
exclude about Mary. 
Patricia Churchland has argued convincingly that Mary might be able to know 
what it is like to have a colour experience before her release. For having complete 
scientific knowledge might produce colour experience or other appropriate mental 
states supposedly required for the knowledge of what it is like to have a colour 
experience. In particular, when Mary is still in her laboratory, she might imagine 
colours with the aid of her scientific knowledge. As pointed out by Patricia 
Churchland: 
For all I know, she might even be able to produce red in her imagination 
if she knows what brain states are relevant. One cannot be confident that 
such an exercise of the imagination must be empirically impossible. 
(Churchland 1986: 333) 
How can we exclude that her complete scientific knowledge might create in Mary, 
when she is still in the laboratory, the right mental states required for knowing what 
it is like to have a colour experience? This empirical question cannot be solved 
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before we have such a complete scientific knowledge.23 It follows that Jackson's 
account of Mary's situation while she is still in her room might be inconsistent. 
Mary might not have complete scientific knowledge without having colour 
experiences and thus knowledge of what it is like to have them.  
To conclude, it seems that Jackson's account of Mary’s case escapes our 
understanding. In particular, lacking the knowledge of empirical facts about the 
development of science, we cannot establish the soundness of his version of the 
knowledge argument. Jackson’s knowledge argument cannot help in our quest for a 
difficulty that conscious experiences might create for modest reductionism. Does it 
follow, then, that the type of strategy involved in Jackson’s argument is of no use 
for us? The next section will take the first steps towards answering to this question. 
2.4 Revising the Knowledge Argument 
Articulating a problem for the hypothesis of modest reductionism in terms of 
Jackson's knowledge argument faces a serious difficulty. Although at first it 
appeared plausible that this line of reasoning might target such a hypothesis, we 
now realise that the knowledge argument involves a premise about Mary's 
knowledge that is beyond our understanding. Therefore, it seems that our initial 
objective cannot be achieved. 
This section suggests a way out of the difficulty. Instead of considering 
Jackson's version of the knowledge argument, which is aimed at a highly abstract 
version of physicalism, we should consider whether his thought-experiment could 
be reformulated to pose a problem for the hypothesis of modest reductionism. It will 
emerge that pursuing this strategy might be viable only if we provide a more 
detailed account of the latter hypothesis. 
                                                 
23 For a similar observation that future (or possible) scientific knowledge might cause knowledge of 
what it is like to have an experience, see Lewis 1990, p. 580. 
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A line of reasoning of the type of the knowledge argument might illustrate 
problems that colour experience raise for modest reductionism. As we have seen, 
Jackson’s version of the argument appears to fail. However, this happens because 
his argument involves the strong assumption that Mary possesses a complete (future 
or possible) scientific knowledge of colour and colour experiences. Conversely, the 
hypothesis of modest reductionism is formulated with reference to a science related 
to a contemporary physics of ordinary matter. This is the claim that conscious 
experiences can be described and explained in terms of a science that can be 
explanatorily interfaced with a theory of the type that currently underlies the study 
of macroscopic physical phenomena. Thus, if we ascribe to Mary this type of 
knowledge, we might be able to understand the nature and extent of what she knows 
before her release. Consequently, we could have an intelligible version of the 
knowledge argument that might raise a problem for modest reductionism.   
My suggestion is to use a suitably modified version of the thought-experiment 
about Mary to pose a problem for modest reductionism. We are now no longer to 
assume that Mary knows all the physical facts contemplated by a complete (future 
or possible) science. Instead, we need to assume that her knowledge is of the kind 
that the physicalist hope will provide unification with a physical science of ordinary 
matter. Specifically, this body of knowledge should conform to the requirements of 
modest reductionism.  
Following this suggestion would lead to a version of the knowledge argument 
weaker than Jackson's. His argument is directed against a general metaphysical 
version of physicalism, and is meant to prove the existence of non-physical facts 
and properties. The suggested reformulation of Mary's thought experiment should 
provide an argument directed against physicalism understood as a methodological 
strategy. The argument would be used to test the hypothesis that completing a 
science of colour experience of the type we possess presently, and that can be 
explanatorily interfaced with physics of ordinary matter, can provide an exhaustive 
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account of these mental states. Thus, what might be lost in terms of the generality 
and strength of the conclusion derivable from Mary's case, might be acquired in 
terms of specificity and intelligibility of the knowledge argument. Nevertheless, are 
we in the position to formulate such a version of the argument?  
The formulation of modest reductionism that has been offered so far is too 
vague to provide an intelligible version of the knowledge argument. In fact, this 
formulation does not characterise what Mary might know before her release. On 
this view, she should possess a scientific account of colour experiences that can be 
explanatory interfaced with a contemporary physics of macroscopic phenomena. 
Surely, we can grasp the nature of a contemporary physics of ordinary matter. 
Nevertheless, we have no indication of what kind of scientific knowledge of colour 
experiences Mary might possess before her release. This does not mean that we 
should abandon the project of reformulating the knowledge argument.  
Our understanding of Mary’s scientific knowledge might be based on a 
contemporary scientific investigation of colour experiences. It appears worth 
considering whether currently there is a plausible scientific programme for the 
description and explanation of colour experiences that can be explanatory interfaced 
with a current physics of macro-phenomena. Without such an account, we cannot 
formulate an intelligible version of the knowledge argument. 
To conclude, despite the limitations of Jackson’s line of reasoning, the 
knowledge argument’s general strategy might be still useful for our project of 
investigating the tenability of modest reductionism. However, ascertaining whether 
this is the case requires formulating modest reductionism in more detail. 
2.5 Conclusion 
We started with the task of formulating the problem that conscious experiences 
might create for modest reductionism. The knowledge argument is a very influential 
formulation of a difficulty that these mental states might create for any scientific 
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account of the mind. However, given a plausible reading of the knowledge 
argument, this line of reasoning appears to be based on the unintelligible premise 
that Mary has a complete scientific knowledge of colour and colour vision. Despite 
this negative conclusion, the next section will attempt to offer an intelligible version 
of the knowledge argument that targets modest reductionism about colour 
experiences. 
 
 
 3 Mary's Scientific Knowledge 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that Frank Jackson's knowledge argument does not 
challenge the hypothesis of modest reductionism. This failure depends on the 
knowledge argument’s unintelligible premise that Mary has complete scientific 
knowledge of colours and colour vision. 
This chapter aims to present an intelligible argument in the style of the one 
offered by Jackson that might target a plausible version of the modest reductionism 
hypothesis. Specifically, I will outline Mary's complete scientific knowledge by 
referring to contemporary disciplines such as psychophysics, sensory 
neurophysiology and psychometric. 
Section 3.2 illustrates how contemporary science describes colours. Section 3.3 
presents the centrality of these descriptions in a contemporary scientific programme 
for the study of colour experiences. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 show that ascribing to 
Mary scientific knowledge based on this programme, leads to a version of the 
knowledge argument that might challenge modest reductionism. 
3.2 Colour Spaces 
Advancing a version of the knowledge argument that can target modest 
reductionism requires characterising the type of knowledge that Mary might possess 
before her release. This characterisation might be achieved by considering a 
contemporary science of colour vision. 
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This section illustrates the notion of colour space used to describe the colours 
we discriminate.1 Specifically, I will present the empirical and computational 
procedures that lead to the determination of quality spaces. The relevance of these 
models for the scientific description and explanation of colour experiences will 
emerge in the next section. 
In contemporary science, spatial models are used to describe how we categorise 
different types of stimuli. Here we will be interested in colour spaces that describe 
our categorisation of colours.2 The colour solid is an example of colour space. The 
colour solid represents the ordering of colours that we discriminate by means of 
three dimensions: hue, saturation and lightness or brightness (See Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 - The Colour Solid
 
Hue is the dimension we normally associate with the basic colours of surfaces. 
In the colour solid, the hue is represented by the angular direction in the horizontal 
plane comprised from the central axis of the solid to the position of the point that 
                                                 
1 The central role of quality spaces in contemporary colour vision science has been explored in detail 
in Clark 1993 and Clark 2000. See also Palmer 1999a. 
2 The use of qualitative spaces in not restricted to colour vision. See Clark 2000, Chapter 5, for an 
illustration of quality spaces that are used to describe other sensory modalities. 
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represents that colour. Saturation is the “vividness” of a colour. Chromatic colours 
of the same hue can differ in the strength of the hue. Less saturated colours are 
closer to grey than the more saturated ones. In the colour solid, the saturation of a 
certain colour is represented by the distance of the point that represents that colour 
to the central axis of the colour solid. The third dimension of colour is brightness. 
Brightness is the relative lightness or darkness of a particular colour, from black to 
white.3 In the colour solid, the brightness of a certain colour is represented by the 
height of the point that represents that colour. 
The colour solid encodes information about the colours that subjects 
discriminate. Points in this space are taken to represent colour shades. For these 
points are individuated by specific values in the axes representing hue, saturation 
and lightness. In addition, the relative distances of points standing colour shades 
represent the relative similarities between these shades. For example, orange would 
be situated between red and yellow, given that subjects find it more similar to these 
two colours than to, say, blue.4 Let us consider how colour spaces are determined. 
There are experimental psychophysical procedures to determine how 
individuals categorise colours. These procedures consist in stimulating the subjects' 
visual system and registering their discriminatory responses. The stimuli are lights 
characterised physically in terms of the wavelength and intensity of the 
electromagnetic waves that compose them. The discriminatory responses are 
observable behaviours; usually scientists consider verbal reports, but other kinds of 
                                                 
3 Usually brightness is used to indicate a feature of colours seen through apertures or of the colours 
of self-luminous objects like the sun or lamps. Instead, the term lightness is used to refer to a feature 
of the colours of objects that are not seen through apertures or perceived as self-luminous. 
4 The colour solid also encodes information about relations of composition between colours. Certain 
hues can be analysed in terms of hues that are more basic. Orange, for instance, appears to contain 
both redness and yellowness. For this reason, a certain shade of orange will be represented by a 
location between red and yellow. In contrast, particular shades of red, green, blue and yellow do not 
appear to be composed of any colours. The colour solid also represents relations of opponency 
between colours. For example, the space shows that there are no hues that appear reddish and 
greenish. In fact, there is no point in the colour space that might represent those hues.  
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behavioural clues can be employed. In particular, psychophysicists use a notion of 
indiscriminability that satisfies some statistically refined conditions. Thus, 
establishing whether two stimuli are indiscriminable requires reiterated 
presentations of pairs of stimuli of the same type. For example, if different 
individuals with normal visual systems fail to notice any difference between two 
stimuli in any statistically significant way, then the two stimuli are said to be 
indiscriminable. These procedures determine classes of indiscriminable stimuli.  
The colour solid is obtained by mathematical procedures applied to classes of 
indiscriminable stimuli. These methods have to determine the number of the 
dimensions of the colour solid and the structure of the relations of similarity 
between its points. Different methods have been investigated to this end.5 A family 
of statistical procedures, known as multidimensional scaling (MDS), has been 
successfully employed in psychophysics.6 Let us illustrate these techniques with an 
example.  
In colour science, a procedure of multidimensional scaling can be applied to 
similarity matrices representing a relation of similarity between stimuli. For 
instance, Table 1 shows a matrix representing similarity ratings of monochromatic 
light stimuli described in terms of their wavelength.7 For each pair of stimuli a 
numeric value represents their degree of similarity. These latter values have been 
determined experimentally by registering subjects' responses. 
 
                                                 
5 Some philosophers investigated these procedures. Rudolf Carnap, for instance, in his attempt to 
provide a method for the constitution of all scientific concepts from an observational base, faced the 
problem of determining colour classes starting from classes of couples of certain primitive 
particulars, Carnap 1967, pp. 107-136 and pp. 178-182. Nelson Goodman has subsequently shown 
some limitations in Carnap's methods and has developed an alternative approach. See Chapter 5 of 
Goodman 1977. For a comparison of these two approaches, see Clark 1993, pp. 101-112. 
6 The use MDS for the determination of the colour space was advocated in Shepard 1962a. An 
introduction to MDS is offered in Clark 1993, pp. 210-221, a more exhaustive and technical 
presentation can be found in Shifman, Reynolds, and Young 1981. 
7 Monochromatic stimuli are those characterised by a single wavelength. 
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Wavelength 445 465 504 537 584 600 651 674 
445 - 9 7 6 2 2 7 8 
465  - 8 7 2 2 6 7 
504   - 9 6 5 2 2 
537    - 7 6 3 2 
584     - 8 4 3 
600      - 5 4 
651       - 9 
674        - 
Table 1 A similarity Matrix for the Observers based on Ekman 1954. 
 
Given matrices of this type, a spatial model is determined by applying the 
algorithms of multidimensional scaling.8 For instance, Figure 2 shows a map 
obtained by applying MDS to the colour similarity data in the Table 1. The MDS 
procedure determines that the similarities between stimuli concern only two 
dimensions: saturation and hue. This is because the initial matrix is not complete 
and does not contain enough information to derive the dimension of brightness. 
However, in principle, if a complete matrix of similarity is available, the structure 
and dimensionality of complete colour space is obtainable in the same way. 
 
                                                 
8 The procedure here illustrated is an instance of metric multidimensional scaling. In fact, the matrix 
under consideration presents the degree of similarity between the responses evoked by two colour 
stimuli in terms of a specific numerical value. However, it is possible to generate a colour space by 
applying non-metric MDS procedures. In this case, the matrix does not contain values concerning the 
degree of similarity between stimuli. Specifically, it is possible to obtain a colour space by applying 
non-metric MDS to matrices representing judgements involving the triadic relation “x is more similar 
to y than z”. See Clark 1993, pp. 220-221. 
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Yellow
•504 • 446 
• 600 •584 
Green 
•537 • 651 Red 
Blue
Figure 2 Multidimensional scaling map based on the colour similarity data in Table 
1. (Coren, Ward, and Enns 1999: 46) 
 
To sum up, we have seen that, in principle, from classes of discriminatory 
responses to light stimuli it is possible to determine the dimensions of variations 
that are involved in our classification of colours. In particular, we have seen that 
each colour can be individuated and described as a certain position in the colour 
space. However, we have to determine how contemporary science can describe 
colour experiences by means of a colour space. 
3.3 The Scientific Account of Colour Experiences 
Illustrating the colour solid does not appear by itself to advance our understanding 
of how contemporary science aims to account for colour experiences. Thus, we are 
left with the problem of providing a substantive account of how Mary might 
describe and explain colour experiences. 
The aim of this section is to address this problem. First, I will illustrate how 
colour spaces might be taken to provide a description of different types of colour 
experiences. Second, I will outline the type of scientific explanations as to why we 
have these different types of colour experiences.  
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One might maintain that colour spaces describe colour experiences because 
colours are properties of colour experiences that individuate these mental states. For 
example, the cognitive scientist Stephen Palmer claims that colour spaces are: 
… multidimensional spatial representation (or model) in which different 
colour experiences correspond to different points in the model. (Palmer 
1999a: 924) 
Probably, the justification for this view derives from Palmer’s position on the nature 
of colours: 
Color is a psychological property of our visual experiences when we 
look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those objects and 
lights. (Palmer 1999b: 95)  
Although this explains how the colour solid describes experiences, nevertheless it 
involves a very strong claim about the nature of colours. 
Such a commitment to a theory of colour should be avoided. Views on the 
relation between colours and colour experiences vary. Similarly to Palmer, some 
take colours to be properties of experiences or other mental items.9 Others, in 
contrast, regard colours as properties whose instantiations in an object amount to 
the power of the object to produce colour experiences of a certain type.10 Finally, 
some take colours to be kinds of objective properties of external objects.11 The 
question is whether there is a way to correlate colour spaces and colour experiences, 
which is relatively neutral with regard to these theories of colour. Investigating this 
issue requires introducing some notions. 
                                                 
9 Arguments against the identification of colours with physical properties can be found in Hardin 
1988. 
10 See McGinn 1991, Peacocke 1984. 
11 See Byrne and Hilbert 2003, Tye 2000.  
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Coloured objects look to subject in certain ways. Let us consider, for instance, 
the case that a subject sees a red patch. This patch appears to her to have certain 
features like its shape or colour. In particular, it looks red to her. Seeing an object of 
a certain colour and seeing an object that merely looks to have that colour involve 
some similarity. For instance, there are colour illusions caused by changes in 
illumination or by simultaneous contrast. An example of illusions of the first type is 
given by seeing a red patch under a yellow light. In this case, the patch visually 
appears to be blue. The patch looks the same colour to the subject as a blue one. In 
one standard demonstration of simultaneous contrast, a grey square on a red 
background appears greenish. The same square seen against a green background 
appears reddish.12 In these two cases, we can say that the square looks, respectively, 
the same colour as a greenish square or as a reddish square.13 Therefore, even in 
cases of illusory perception, the object appears to have certain colour. 
The colour space describes the colour that objects look to have. The previous 
section showed that colour spaces are determined by considering discriminatory 
responses to colour stimuli. A central assumption in psychophysics is that if certain 
individuals cannot discriminate two stimuli, then these stimuli will look the same 
colour to them.14 Moreover, from matrices that arrange colour stimuli in accordance 
with the discriminatory responses they elicit, it is possible to determine the 
dimensions along which these discriminations are performed. For example, in the 
case of colour solid, these dimensions are saturation, hue, and brightness. Being 
                                                 
12 See Palmer 1999b. 
13 Assuming such a similarity does not involve taking a position on the nature of colour. We are not 
saying whether the colour of an object is the colour it appears visually to have in certain condition. 
In addition, we do not need to assume that colours are properties of colour experiences.  
14 More precisely, it is assumed that if two stimuli are globally indiscriminable (by certain 
individuals in certain conditions) then they look the same colour (to those individuals in those 
conditions). A certain stimulus x is globally indiscriminable from a stimulus y, if and only if for any 
stimulus z, x is indiscriminable from z if and only if y is as well. The reasons for adopting the notion 
of global indiscriminability in order to characterise the relation of looking the same colour are 
discussed in Clark 1993, pp. 56-62. 
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derived from discriminatory responses taken to correspond to relations of looking 
the same colour, these dimensions can be interpreted as dimensions of variations in 
colour. In particular, specific values in these dimensions individuate a location in 
the colour space. This location can be regarded as a description of the colour that an 
object visually appears to have.15
Besides the colours objects appear to have, we can also assume that there are 
qualitative properties of colour experiences. These latter are properties of colour 
experiences.16 Specifically, qualitative properties individuate colour experiences. 
Thus, if two colour experiences differ, they have different qualitative properties. 
However, it seems that we can establish an important relation between qualitative 
properties and phenomenal properties.   
Some authors have argued that colour experiences can be categorised in terms 
of their typical causes.17 A colour experience is of a certain type, or in our 
terminology has a certain qualitative property, if a certain paradigm object under 
certain conditions would produce it. For example, we can say that a red-type colour 
experience is the type produced by a certain paradigmatically red thing in certain 
suitable circumstances.  
It has also been suggested that when something looks to be a certain colour to a 
subject, either in the perceptual case or in the illusory one, then the subject has a 
certain type of colour experience. Thus, a subject can undergo a colour experience 
that is not produced by the paradigm object involved in the characterisation of that 
type of colour experience. In such cases, that type of colour experience is ascribed 
                                                 
15 Introducing the notion of a colour that an object visually appears to have does not involve any 
philosophical stance on this appearance. Whatever this appearance might turn out to be, here I am 
just showing that we can have a way to provide a description of it by analysing the discriminatory 
responses of subjects. 
16 This terminology is provided in Strawson 1989. See also Sellars 1963, pp. 93-94, 192-93 and  
Clark 2000, p. 6.  
17 A typology of this kind is suggested in Peacocke 1984, pp. 349-350, and further elaborated in 
Millar 1991b, pp. 25-31. 
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because, to the subject, the stimulus looks as the paradigm object. For example, in 
the case in which a subject sees a grey patch in a yellow background, we would say 
that he has the type of experience that a reddish patch would produce in certain 
circumstances.  
The typology I have just described suggests a correspondence between the 
colour that an object looks to have and the qualitative property that specify a type of 
colour experience. On this account, if a stimulus looks to a subject the same colour 
as a certain paradigm stimulus, then such a subject has the type of colour experience 
that would be produced by the paradigm stimulus. Thus, an individual S has a 
colour experience with a certain qualitative property, when something looks to S to 
have the same colour as the paradigm stimulus.   
The descriptions provided by a colour space can be used to categorise colour 
experiences. In fact, the points in the colour space represent the colours that objects 
look to have. Thus, to every colour described by the colour space one can associate 
a corresponding description of a certain type of colour experience. For instance, let 
us assume that a certain shade is represented by the position XYZ in a colour 
space.18 The description XYZ specifies values of hue, saturation and brightness in 
terms of a system of relations of similarity with the other colours. The relative type 
of colour experience will, then, be described as the type of experience someone has 
when something looks XYZ to him.  
We have seen how quality spaces can be interpreted as descriptions of the 
different type of colour experiences. These models provide the explanandum for the 
neuroscience of colour vision. In particular, this suggests a substantive general 
scientific approach to colour experiences that is consistent with the requirements of 
                                                 
18 Each term that refers to a shade can be defined by a description that refers only to the relations of 
similarity (and those of opponency and composition) represented by the colour space. This can be 
achieved with the logical technique involving “Ramsey sentences”. For more details, see Clark 2000, 
pp. 256-257. 
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modest reductionism. Thus, we have to determine that such a specific research 
project, outlined by reflecting on the practices of contemporary colour vision 
science, can be the target of the knowledge argument. 
The final aim of the scientific study of colour vision is to explain the data 
collected by psychophysics in terms of neurophysiological mechanisms.19 Although 
this neuroscientific knowledge is far from complete, we can still be said to have an 
idea how neuroscience explains the structure of the colour quality space, and thus of 
the related colour experiences, by considering a widely accepted theory of colour 
vision.  
We have seen that in the case of the colour solid every shade can be identified 
in terms of its hue, saturation, and brightness. Combinations of values in the 
dimension of variations of the colour solid can specify the qualitative properties of 
experiences. In fact, each type of colour experience is defined as the experience that 
someone has when something appears to him a certain shade of colour. Moreover, 
the colour solid describes the colours that objects look to have. Thus, the relative 
ordering of similarity between colours has to be reflected in an ordering of 
similarity between types of colour experiences. 
The structure of the quality space is then explained by finding 
neurophysiological mechanisms that stand to each other in the same pattern of 
relations as the points in the quality space. An example of how this might work is 
provided by a physiological account of the three axes of the colour solid.  
According to the opponent processors theory, for example, it is possible to 
explain the structure of the colour solid and thus the location within it of any colour 
                                                 
19 In the ordinary scientific practice, the phenomena described by psychophysics are often used for 
postulating the relative neural mechanisms. See on the general logical structure of these inferences, 
Teller 1984. 
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shade in terms of the activity of certain neural mechanisms.20 These groups of 
neurons compare, given their excitatory and inhibitory connections, outputs of three 
different types of photoreceptors in the retina. These opponent processors have a 
positive response to stimuli in a certain part of the spectrum and a negative response 
to those in other parts of the spectrum. 
It is assumed on the basis of certain empirical evidence that there are two 
chromatic opponent processors: blue-yellow and red-green, and an achromatic one: 
white-black. These three opponent processors generate the three axes of the colour 
solid. In fact, the different activation of each of these processors, given a certain 
stimulus, determines the position of the evoked shade with respect of each of the 
solid's axes. A very bright orange, for example, will result from the combined 
activation of the neural processes correlated with the experience of red and of 
yellow and white, and the inhibition of the correlates of green, blue and black. 
To conclude, I have provided a model of contemporary scientific study of 
colour experiences. Moreover, it seems that such a model might satisfy the 
requirements of modest reductionism. Now, it remains to be considered whether 
this account can provide a model that can be adapted to Mary's case. 
3.4 Mary's Complete Knowledge 
In this section, I investigate the plausibility of a version of Mary's thought 
experiment that ascribes to her a scientific knowledge of the type delineated in the 
previous sections. Firstly, I analyse the type of understanding that such descriptions 
provide of colour experiences. Then, I argue that we can reasonably assume that 
Mary, before her release, has an understanding of this type. So, although we lack all 
the details involved in the complete colour space that Mary might use to classify 
                                                 
20 Hurvich 1981 is a comprehensive and detailed presentation of this theory by one of its most 
important advocates. See also De Valois and De Valois 1975, pp. 100-110. Simplified accounts of 
the theory can be found in Hardin 1988 and Clark 1993. 
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colour experiences, we nevertheless know the type of description she might use. 
Moreover, a subject who has never had colour experiences can understand this 
description. 
Now, in order to formulate the knowledge argument, we have to be able to 
grasp the way in which a scientific account of colour experience, based on 
contemporary colour science, might develop. If we want to formulate the 
knowledge argument in terms of our comprehension of contemporary science, then 
we need to understand some features that define this project. However, these cannot 
be given in terms of the empirical details that characterise the project. In particular, 
we cannot say that we already know all the empirical details that would be required 
for the completion of such research programme. It is enough to consider the 
determination of the colour solid.  
The determination of the colour solid is presently far from complete. One 
reason is that the set of discriminatory judgements required to achieve this 
enterprise is very large. For example, if we consider just 20 stimuli, 190 rankings of 
similarities among pairs are required to fill out the data matrix needed to determine 
a relative quality space. Each such ranking judgement may require many trials. It is 
assumed that human subjects can discriminate 10 million of colours, therefore, the 
determination of only 1 percent of this space would require 5 billion similarity 
rankings.21 This is something that has not yet been achieved and at the present is 
technically impossible. However, we cannot exclude that a future science might 
overcome this difficulty. Nevertheless, even if we could overcome these limitations, 
the colour solid might not be a satisfactory description of colours. 
There is no guarantee that a three-dimensional space such as the three-
dimensional colour solid would provide an exhaustive description of colour 
experiences. In fact, a complete colour space would be obtained by considering 
                                                 
21 See Clark 1993, p. 118. 
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discriminatory responses of a limited range of stimuli in very specific experimental 
conditions. As Austen Clark has pointed out:  
… a model that suggests that hue, saturation, and brightness exhaust the 
dimensions of variations in visual appearances would be true only in a 
world in which there is one sentient subject, confined to a pitch-black 
room, allowed to see just one visible point, whose colour qualities are 
varied in just those three ways. (Clark 2000: 39) 
However, in many situations, the colours objects appear to have cannot be 
completely described in terms of these dimensions of variations.  
Glossy surfaces, reflections, translucency, transparency, shadows, and 
mists all require dimensions of variations in appearance beyond the 
three sufficient for coloured surfaces or lights presented in the lab. 
(Clark 2000: 7) 
Nevertheless, the general nature and methods that might be used to offer complete 
description of the colours that objects look to have are clear enough.   
The scope of this approach is to determine from a set of discriminatory 
judgements the sensory dimensions along which subjects can discriminate. Once 
these dimensions are determined, it is possible to derive a qualitative space. We can 
assume that Mary knows how colours look to subjects in terms of positions in a 
completed qualitative space. Such a space models all the possible dimensions of 
variations amongst colours. These models are obtainable by the application of a 
multidimensional scaling technique to a complete table of the discriminatory 
judgements subjects can have about colour stimuli. Surely, we are not able to 
predict the number of dimensions that will be involved in this space or its structure. 
Nevertheless, we can assume that Mary will refer to colour experiences by means of 
relational descriptions modelled by such a qualitative space. 
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Similarly, the neuroscientific details involved in interfacing explanations of the 
structure of quality spaces are not complete and the empirical details have to be 
worked out. However, given the contemporary scientific understanding of the brain, 
we might expect that these explanations would refer to populations of neurones, and 
patterns of activation between them, that can be described at the biochemical level 
by resorting to a contemporary physics of ordinary matter. Thus, we can ascribe to 
Mary a type of intelligible scientific knowledge that might implement a modest 
reductive programme. Let us consider whether this ascription can be used to 
formulate a plausible version of the knowledge argument.  
It seems that one of the requirements that the knowledge argument places on 
Mary's scientific knowledge can be satisfied. Jackson assumes that Mary can have 
her complete scientific knowledge without having had colour experiences. Thus, we 
have to establish whether in fact someone who has never had colour experiences 
can possess the scientific knowledge of the type so far delineated. 
The main notions that are involved in the psychophysical categorisation of 
colour experiences are provided by a colour space that is obtained by certain 
statistical procedures from discriminatory judgements concerning certain stimuli. It 
seems that none of these notions requires undergoing colour experiences to be 
completely understood. Let us consider them one by one.  
A colour space is a geometrical representation of the dimensions along which 
subjects discriminate colours. In the case of the colour solid, we have three 
dimensions: hue, saturation and brightness. Nevertheless, we can concede that Mary 
has an n-dimensional model of the different colours. Moreover, she knows the 
typology of colour experiences derivable from such a colour space. This model will 
give her information about the dimensions in which light stimuli are categorised by 
the visual system. Understanding that the visual system enables certain 
discriminations along these dimensions does not seem to require having colour 
experiences. Mary will know that these dimensions result from the application of 
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certain statistical methods to sets of discriminatory responses, or judgements of 
similarity, elicited by certain physical stimuli. In particular, similar procedures can 
tell scientists about the dimensions along which a certain species' sensory system, 
that we do not possess, categorises certain stimuli. 
Understanding the notion of discriminatory response involved in psychophysics 
does not require having colour experience. In fact, Mary understands that these 
responses are observable behaviours such as a subject’s verbal reports about 
similarities and differences between certain physical stimuli. In particular, she 
might know that these responses have to satisfy certain statistical conditions in 
order to count as a reliable registration of the discriminatory capacities of the 
subjects. Nevertheless, none of these requirements implies that she cannot observe 
exhaustively these responses in a black-and-white screen. 
Finally, we have to see whether Mary can understand the notion of stimulus 
without having colour experiences. Given the statistical nature of the 
psychophysical investigation of colour categorisation, stimuli have to be repeatable 
types. Mary, in keeping with the line of contemporary science, can consider them as 
classes of presentations that have in common a certain physical property described 
by the electromagnetic theory of light. In particular, stimuli are characterised in 
terms of the intensity and wavelength composition of the light that is imaged on the 
retina. Mary can have an understanding about these features from reading physics 
books. In addition, she can detect and measure them with instruments, of the type 
we already possess, the use of which does not require having colour experiences. 
To sum up, we can characterise Mary's scientific understanding of colour 
experiences as related to the ways in which normal individuals discriminate visual 
physical stimuli, according to the dimensions and the ordering modelled by a 
complete quality space. We have seen that the concepts involved in this 
understanding can be possessed without having colour experiences. However, we 
 
Mary's Scientific Knowledge 74
now have to consider two types of worries, first encountered in the previous 
chapter. 
3.5 Patricia Churchland and Daniel Dennett Revisited 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Patricia Churchland and Daniel Dennett have 
offered a conclusive criticism to Jackson’s knowledge argument. On their view, we 
cannot grasp what Mary knows before her release. Therefore, the knowledge 
argument cannot be evaluated. The previous sections showed that a weaker form of 
the knowledge argument escapes this objection. This version assumes that Mary’s 
complete scientific knowledge is of the type involved in contemporary 
psychophysics and neuroscience. However, these authors have offered other attacks 
on Jackson’s argument that might affect our version of his line of reasoning.  
In this section, I will consider these two objections. Patricia Churchland has 
claimed that Mary's complete scientific knowledge might cause mental states that 
are required for knowing what it is like to have colour experiences. Dennett has 
argued that Mary, in having complete scientific knowledge, acquires the ability to 
recognise the colour experiences she has as falling under certain scientific 
descriptions she possesses. I will argue that both hypotheses are implausible once 
we consider the new version of the knowledge argument.  
Patricia Churchland maintains that possessing complete scientific knowledge 
might enable Mary to imagine colour experiences before her release.22 Clearly, such 
a possibility cannot be excluded a priori when we consider a complete colour 
science without further qualification. However, what about the type of knowledge 
we have ascribed to Mary by considering contemporary science? It seems that now 
we are in a better position to answer. Our understanding of Mary’s knowledge 
might help in establishing what she knows before her release. In particular, we have 
                                                 
22 See at p. 49. 
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to establish whether her knowledge of colour experiences enables her to imagine 
what it is like to have these mental states.  
Our problem has instructive similarities with the following problem discussed 
by David Hume:  
Suppose…a person to have enjoyed his sight thirty years, and to have 
become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds, excepting 
one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his 
fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except 
that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the 
deepest to the lightest; 'tis plain, that he will perceived a blank, where 
that shade is wanting, and will be sensible, that there is a greater 
distance in that place betwixt the contiguous colours, than in any other. 
Now I ask, whether 'tis possible for him, from his own imagination, to 
supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular 
shade, tho' it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe 
there are few but will be of the opinion that he can… (Hume 1978: 6) 
Certain commentators think that Hume can conclude that imagination can perform 
such an extrapolative task because he assumes that colour experiences (simple 
impressions in his terminology) figure in a system of degrees of resemblance to 
each other.23 In particular it seems that: 
Hume also takes it for granted that these internal relations form the 
linear ordering of a spectrum: each hue occupies a determinate location 
within a color space composed of distinct (and presumably finitely 
many) hues. (Fogelin 1984: 267) 
                                                 
23 Fogelin 1984. Hume's passage concerning the missing shade of blue has been extensively 
discussed, given that it seems to threaten the consistency of his empiricism about the origins of 
ideas.  
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In the case considered by Hume, the subject can imagine the missing shade of blue, 
because she is in the condition to access certain relational features of similarity 
between shades she has experienced. These relations provide her a kind of formal 
understanding of a certain shade in relation to other shades she can see. This allows 
her imagination to give substance to this formal notion. 
It might be maintained that the relational information that Mary possesses, like 
the information involved in the case of the missing shade of blue, provides 
knowledge that supports a successful exercise of imagination about an experience 
of a certain shade. In fact, Mary knows all the relations of similarity between colour 
shades. However, the two cases present a crucial difference. 
In the case of the individual imagining the missing shade of blue, the relations 
of similarity are between determinate colour shades that she can see. Thus, in 
addition to understanding the relation of similarity between the shades she can see, 
she has information about the attributes that ground these similarities. Instead, Mary 
refers to different types of colour experience with descriptions concerning the 
colours object look to have. These colours are specified in terms of relations of 
similarity with other colours. Nevertheless, she cannot access the specific attributes, 
such hue, saturation and so on whose degree in each colour is expressed by these 
relations of similarity. In fact, although she has information about relative position 
in an ordering, she cannot get the absolute value of any of the dimensions (such as 
hue, saturation, or brightness) that specify each colour.  This point can be illustrated 
with an analogy. 
The situation of Mary appears to be similar to that of a person who knows the 
ordering, and thus the relation of relative similarity, between the heights of the trees 
in a forest. Although this person has enough information about the relative heights 
of the trees, he cannot infer on the basis of this information the exact or 
approximate values of the heights of the trees. Only if he knows the height of a 
sufficient number of trees (how many depends on the number of trees, the structure 
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of the order and the approximation desired) will this person be able to infer the 
height of a certain tree. Having shown that Mary cannot determine, via imagination, 
what an experience is like, we can turn to the objection offered by Dennett. 
Dennett uses the “blue banana trick” thought experiment against Jackson’s 
knowledge argument.24 As we saw in Chapter 2, this possible case relies on an 
implicit assumption. Dennett assumes that Mary can recognise the experience she is 
having of a blue banana as a certain “physical response” that can enable her to 
recognise that the colour of the object is wrong. The plausibility of this assumption 
can be evaluated given our understanding of Mary's scientific knowledge. 
Mary knows how blue and yellow things look in terms of the positions of 
looking yellow and blue in the system of relations of similarity embedded in the 
complete colour space. However, in seeing the blue banana, Mary can have very 
limited relational information about the colour of the object. The only relations of 
similarity and difference she might actually discriminate are those between the way 
in which the banana looks and the background.25  
It could be argued, however, that Mary might know which relational property is 
involved in the type of experience she is having given her knowledge of its neural 
correlates. This requires that she can recognise just by seeing the blue banana that 
she is in a certain brain state. How does she perform this task? Patricia Churchland 
has maintained that “introspective use of her utopian neuroscience” can help her.26 
Unfortunately, the evaluation of a reply that mentions utopian neuroscience is 
clearly beyond our understanding. Thus, let us consider contemporary neuroscience. 
It is clear that in order to describe our occurring colour experiences in 
neuroscientific terms we need a certain learning process. We need to have colour 
                                                 
24 See at p. 50. 
25 Churchland 1986, p. 333. 
26 Patricia Churchland is endorsing a position defended by Paul Churchland in Churchland 1985, p. 
576. This conception is related to a general view on scientific conceptual change expounded in 
Churchland 1979.  
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experiences and learn how to describe them in scientific terms. However, Mary, 
before her release, does not have colour experiences and she cannot undertake this 
learning process.27
It can be maintained that Mary recognises the type of colour experience she is 
having, as described by her scientific knowledge, by means other than introspection. 
In this case, she does not need to have colour experiences.28 However, such 
assumption creates a problem for Dennett. His argument is based on the assumption 
that if there is knowledge of what it is like to have a colour experience, then Mary 
cannot pass the blue banana test. However, even the upholder of the knowledge 
argument can admit that she can pass such a test when she is still in her laboratory. 
As pointed out by Dale Jacquette: 
The colour scientist can easily know from a third-person perspective 
that the banana has the wrong natural colour, even while she remains 
inside her black and white bunker, or indeed, even if she is blind but has 
access to appropriate Braille readouts from light-monitoring equipment. 
(Jacquette 1995: 225) 
It is part of her complete knowledge that bananas are yellow, that yellow things 
have certain physical features or produce certain effects in the visual system. 
Suppose she sees the blue banana in one of her black and white monitors. 
Moreover, she can measure the light emitted from it or its effects on her brain. She 
will, then, conclude that:  “this banana has the wrong colour”. 
In conclusion, Patricia Churchland and Daniel Dennett's worries do not threaten 
the consistency of our version of the knowledge argument.  
                                                 
27 A similar reply is in Robinson 1993, p. 175.  
28 See on this Jacquette 1995, p. 227. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, two strands of our investigation that concern whether colour 
experiences raise an insoluble problem for science came together. The first strand 
derives from the need to offer a plausible formulation of the hypothesis that science 
can account for colour experiences. I have suggested that, in general, such a 
hypothesis can be elaborated in accordance with modest reductionism.  
The second strand is determined by the need to articulate the philosophical 
worries about this hypothesis. Many consider Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument 
a plausible way to raise such worries. Relating these two strands has required 
clarifying Mary’s scientific knowledge when she is still in her black and white 
laboratory.  
The result is that intuitions of the type involved in Frank Jackson’s knowledge 
argument might raise a difficulty for modest reductionism. What now remains to be 
investigated is whether our version of the knowledge argument is successful. 
Establishing this will require considering in detail the knowledge that Mary 
supposedly gains by seeing colour experiences.  The next chapter will begin to 
address this issue. 
 
 4 Knowing Colour Experiences 
4.1 Introduction 
The last chapter presented a revised version of the knowledge argument. This line 
of reasoning appears to raise a problem for a plausible formulation of the hypothesis 
that science can account for colour experiences. In particular, if Mary’s scientific 
knowledge of colour experiences is of the type that we possess presently, upon her 
release, she will not recognise the colour experiences she is having in scientific 
terms. This claim is weaker than the knowledge argument’s conclusion that Mary 
learns about facts that her scientific knowledge cannot accommodate. Therefore, the 
plausibility of this conclusion remains to be established. 
This chapter examines the thesis that upon her release Mary comes to know 
what it is like to have colour experiences. Before considering the truth and the 
implications of this claim, we have to clarify it. Section 4.2 illustrates that this is the 
thesis that Mary acquires new propositional knowledge about types of colour 
experiences. Section 4.3 focuses on Jackson's claim that this knowledge concerns 
the fact that colour experiences have qualia. Specifically, such a claim appears in 
need of justification. The upholder of the knowledge argument should explain how 
Mary discovers that a certain type of colour experience has a certain quale. She 
might claim that this knowledge derives from the fact that Mary is directly aware of 
the colour experience and its quale. In sections 4.4 and 4.5, I will argue that neither 
perception nor introspection can deliver such a direct awareness.  
4.2 The Fundamental Question about Mary 
The central intuition of the knowledge argument is that, by having colour 
experiences. Mary comes to know something that science can neither describe nor 
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explain. In particular, Mary comes to know what it is like to have a colour 
experience.   
This section illustrates assumptions that are plausibly involved in the 
knowledge argument. As a result of this clarification, it will emerge that evaluating 
this argument requires answering a fundamental question.  We have to establish 
whether, by seeing a coloured object, Mary acquires new propositional knowledge 
concerning a type of colour experience.  
This section clarifies firstly the notion of knowledge of what it is like to have a 
colour experience that figures in the knowledge argument. It seems that the revised 
version of the knowledge argument presupposes three requirements for such 
knowledge. First, knowing what it is like to have a colour experience requires 
having that experience (or experiences of the appropriate type). Second, this 
knowledge is propositional. Finally, knowing what is like to have colour 
experiences should concern types of mental states sharable by different individuals. 
Given this characterisation of knowing what it is like to have a colour experience, 
the remainder of this section will show which assumptions should be involved in 
the knowledge argument.    
The knowledge argument assumes that one cannot know what it is like to have 
a certain colour experience without having that colour experience. We can call this 
the etiological constraint on knowing what it is like to have a colour experience. 
Many commentators on the knowledge argument have recognised this requirement. 
For instance, David Lewis maintains that the knowledge argument shows that: 
Experience is the best teacher in this sense: having an experience is the 
best way or perhaps the only way, of coming to know what the 
experience is like. (Lewis 1990: 579) 
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Similarly, Michael Tye thinks that the knowledge argument points to the problem of 
the perspectival subjectivity of conscious experiences. He states this problem as 
follows: 
What accounts for the fact that fully comprehending the nature of pain, 
the feeling of depression or the visual experience of red requires having 
the appropriate experiential perspective (that conferred by being oneself 
the subject of these or closely related experiences)? (Tye 1995: 15) 
Tye's talking of “closely related experiences” invites a further clarification of the 
etiological thesis.  
Besides perceiving coloured objects, Mary might acquire knowledge of what it 
is like to have a colour experience in other ways. For example, as Jackson has 
pointed out, false memories might provide this knowledge: 
Seeing red and feeling pain impact on us, leaving a memory trace which 
sustains our knowledge of what it is like to see red and feel pain on the 
many occasions where we are neither seeing red nor feeling pain. This 
is why it was always a mistake to say that someone could not know 
what seeing red and feeling pain is unless they had actually experienced 
them: false 'memory' traces are enough. (Jackson 1998b: 77) 
Similarly, imagining colours we have never seen might ground the knowledge of 
what is like to have a certain colour experience. In addition, such knowledge might 
result from odd stimulation. We can see colours by rubbing one’s eyelid. Moreover, 
subjects report that they see colours when they are placed in magnetic fields or are 
stimulated by electric currents of appropriate voltages flowing through their head.1 
Finally, the direct stimulation of areas of the visual cortex prompts these reports.2  
                                                 
1 Barlow, Kohn, and Walsh 1947. 
2 See Penfield 1958. 
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I will discuss the knowledge argument by focussing the attention on a restricted 
formulation of the etiological thesis. This claim states that: 
(1) Knowing what it is like to have a colour experience requires seeing 
coloured objects. 
This decision does not appear to prejudge the accuracy of the resulting 
interpretation of the knowledge argument. In fact, we can safely assume that before 
her release Mary has never had any of the mental states supposedly required for 
knowing what it is like to have a colour experience. Note that neither the mental 
states resulting from odd stimulation nor false memories about colours appear to be 
required to possess scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision.    
A second requirement in our version of the knowledge argument is that 
knowing what it is like to have a colour experience is propositional knowledge.3 
Before establishing that this is the case, let us clarify this type of knowledge. 
According to a familiar philosophical view, a central type of knowledge is 
propositional insofar as it involves beliefs construed as attitudes towards 
propositions. For instance, it is assumed that knowing that the snow is white 
requires, as one of its necessary conditions, believing the proposition expressed by 
the sentence “the snow is white”. The proposition is often said to be the content of 
the belief. Another necessary condition for having propositional knowledge is that 
the belief one has is true. For example, knowing that the snow is white requires 
believing that the snow is white. Moreover, it requires that the proposition 
expressed by the sentence “the snow is white” be true. This condition can be spelled 
out by saying that a proposition is true if and only if a certain fact obtains. In this 
case, knowing that the snow is white implies that it is the case that the snow is 
                                                 
3 Many philosophers think that this assumption should figure also in Jackson’s version of the 
argument. See Churchland 1989, Lewis 1990, Tye 2000, Perry 2001.  
 
Knowing Colour Experiences 84
white.4 Let us now consider why, when Mary sees a coloured object for the first 
time, she forms new true beliefs she could not have otherwise formed before her 
release. 
In the knowledge argument, knowing what it is like to have a colour experience 
must amount to propositional knowledge. This can be argued for from two 
assumptions. First, Mary’s scientific knowledge is propositional. Mary can refer to 
colour experiences in terms of a description modelled in colour spaces. Now, these 
descriptions are expressible in linguistic terms. A colour space represents a structure 
of relations of similarity (composition and opponency) between the ways in which 
coloured objects look to subjects. Sentences can describe this system of relations.5 
Second, the logical structure of the knowledge argument requires that the meaning 
of the term “knowledge” in the two premises is not equivocal. In fact, the 
knowledge argument can be regarded as involving the following inference:  
(1) If it is a physical fact concerning colour vision that f, then, before 
her release, Mary knows that f. 
(2) Before her release, Mary does not know that that a colour experience 
of the type of the one she is going to have has a certain quale.  
Therefore: 
(3) The fact that her colour experience has a quale is not physical. 
Thus, knowing what it is like to have a colour experience must constitute 
propositional knowledge. Let us now consider another constraint that the 
knowledge argument puts on Mary’s supposed new knowledge.  
                                                 
4 The nature of propositions and their relations with facts, linguistic meaning and psychological 
content are highly debated issues in philosophy. See for an introduction Loux 1998, pp. 133-164. 
5 Austen Clark illustrates how these descriptions are obtained by means of a logical technique known 
as “Ramsification”, Clark 2000, pp. 255-258. 
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It might be maintained that the peculiar nature of knowing what it is like to 
have an experience is related to the logical privacy of colour experiences. 
According to this view, necessarily only the individual who has a colour experience 
can know about its occurrence and nature. Fred Dretske expresses well the problem 
generated by this conception: 
How can we know what a neighbour's experience - not to mention the 
experience of aliens and animals - is like unless we can somehow get in 
their head and experience what they are experiencing? (Dretske 1995: 
81) 
In particular, if experiences are logically private, scientific knowledge cannot 
accommodate them. For scientific knowledge is taken to concern facts in principle 
accessible to different individuals. However, it does not seem that the knowledge 
argument relies on the privacy of colour experiences. 
The knowledge argument is not meant to raise the problem of logical privacy of 
experiences. Instead, this argument hinges on a comparison between scientific 
knowledge that can be possessed without having colour experiences and knowledge 
of colour experiences sharable by those who have these mental states.6 As pointed 
out by Jackson: 
The knowledge Mary lacked which is of particular point for the 
knowledge argument against physicalism is knowledge about the 
experiences of others, not about her own. […] The trouble for 
physicalism is that, after Mary sees her first ripe tomato, she will realize 
                                                 
6 In addition, the knowledge argument requires that we understand what a certain hypothetical 
subject like Mary knows about colour experiences when she has them. The doctrine of logical 
privacy of mental states denies exactly the possibility of such an understanding. 
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how impoverished her conception of the mental life of others has been 
all along. (Jackson 1986: 567-568)7
If Mary upon her release acquires knowledge about colour experiences of others, 
she needs to think about her colour experiences as types. When Mary first sees 
colours, she discovers that the features of her occurring experiences are features of 
other people's experiences as well. 
Thus, a third constraint on knowing what it is like to have an experience 
emerges. Knowing what it is like to have colour experiences concerns types of 
mental states sharable with other individuals. Now, it is worth considering how this 
requirement rules out an interpretation of Mary's new knowledge.  
It might be maintained that what Mary supposedly learns when she sees a 
coloured object concerns the occurrence of her colour experience. In this case, it is 
clear that she did not have this knowledge before her release because the occurrence 
of her experience did not exist. However, this knowledge will not suit the purpose 
of the knowledge argument. In particular, the physicalist can argue that she comes 
to know something physical. As pointed out by Jackson: 
When she is let out, she has new experiences, color experiences she has 
never had before. It is not, therefore, an objection to physicalism that 
she learns something on being let out. Before she was let out, she could 
not have known facts about her experience of red for there were no such 
facts to know. That physicalists and nonphysicalists alike can agree on. 
After she is let out, things change; and physicalism can happily admit 
that she learn this; after all, some physical things will change, for 
                                                 
7 John Perry illustrates this point clearly. He says that Mary can express her discovery as follows: 
“this is what it is like to see red now, and what it would have been for me to see red before, and what 
it is and has been and will be for others to see red, in normal conditions with normal eyesight.” 
(Perry 2001: 95). 
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instance her brain states and their functional roles. (Jackson 1986: 567-
568) 
We have, then, a reading of Mary's new knowledge compatible with physicalism. 
This interpretation misses the point and so does the physicalist’s reply that is 
based on it.8 For if Mary learns about the experiences of others, she comes to know 
about facts that obtained before and after the moment she is having a certain colour 
experience. In particular, given this requirement, Jackson can claim that these are 
facts that, if her scientific knowledge about colour experiences were complete, she 
should have known before her release.  
So far, we have seen that knowing what it is like to have a colour experience 
constitutes propositional knowledge of types of colour experience that Mary can 
share with other individuals. Let us consider how this characterisation of Mary’s 
supposed new knowledge affects our understanding of the knowledge argument. 
 The crucial step in the knowledge argument can be described as a passage from 
an epistemic premise to an ontological conclusion. The epistemic premise is that by 
seeing colours Mary learns that colour experiences have qualia. The ontological 
conclusion is that there are facts concerning qualia that cannot be dealt with by her 
scientific knowledge.  
The main inferential move in the knowledge argument appears to depend on 
two main assumptions.9 The first assumption is that upon her release Mary acquires 
new propositional knowledge about colour experiences. This implies that she 
acquires new true beliefs she could not have had before her release. In particular, 
when she sees a coloured object she acquires the new true belief that her colour 
experience has a certain quale. The second assumption is that having these new true 
beliefs implies that there are new facts she did not know before her release. Namely, 
                                                 
8 A criticism of this interpretation can be found in Lewis 1990, p. 582. 
9 For a discussion of these two assumptions, see section 3.2. 
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she comes to know that colour experience have qualia.  Let us examine this latter 
assumption.  
Inferring the existence of new facts, from the assumption that Mary acquires 
new knowledge, requires some principles that connects having knowledge to the 
existence of facts. Such a passage appears to involve some principle that bridges 
true beliefs and facts. The upholder of the knowledge argument might use two ways 
to connect true beliefs and facts. First, she might advert to what can be called a 
Russellian account of the content of beliefs.10 According to this view, the contents 
of true beliefs should be regarded as collections of actual entities making up facts or 
states of affairs. Thus, believing the true belief that “Plato is a philosopher” is being 
related to an ordered pair composed of the individual Plato and the property of 
being a philosopher. This account of belief content provides the connection between 
true beliefs and facts required by the knowledge argument. If Mary has the true 
belief that her colour experience has a quale, it follows that there is the fact that the 
colour experience has a quale. 
Alternatively, the upholder of the knowledge argument can support the 
inference from true beliefs to facts with a correspondence theory of truth. Such a 
theory states that facts are what make beliefs true.11 The main difference with the 
previous strategy is that, in this case, facts are thought of as “mirror images” of true 
proposition involved in true beliefs. Therefore, if Mary acquires a new true belief 
about what is like to have a colour experience, then there is the fact that renders her 
belief true.  
In particular, it appears reasonable to assume that in the knowledge argument 
the notion of correspondence between beliefs and facts that makes these belief true 
is characterised as a relation between structured entities. The ontological conclusion 
                                                 
10 Russell 1912, Chapter 12. 
11 See, for an introductory presentation of this doctrine, Pitcher 1964, and Kirkham 1992, Chapter 4. 
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of the knowledge argument appears to suggest that the fact concerning what it is 
like to have an experience is a complex structured entity involving the experience 
and a certain quale. Now, this can be derived by if this fact mirrors the structure of 
Mary’s belief that this fact renders true. This belief can be taken to be composed of 
the concept [experience] and [quale], the experience and the quale to which these 
concepts refer compose the corresponding fact.12  
It seems that we are now in the position to realise what is in effect the central 
question underpinning the evaluation of the knowledge argument. Namely, whether 
by seeing a coloured object, Mary acquires new propositional knowledge about her 
colour experience. We have illustrated how the supporter of the knowledge 
argument might justify the truth of the conditional such that: if Mary acquires 
knowledge of what it is like to have a colour experience, then there is a fact that 
renders true the belief that is involved in this knowledge. Clearly, we have to 
investigate whether he can support the antecedent of this conditional. 
To recapitulate, I have illustrated certain assumptions concerning the 
knowledge of what it is like to have a colour experience. Moreover, I have 
considered the main inferential step in the knowledge argument. This clarification 
has shown that the main question that has to be investigated is whether Mary, by 
                                                 
12 This connection could be spelled out in more detail in a formulation of a correspondence theory of 
truth that regards the relation of correspondence as a form of isomorphism. An isomorphism is a 
function between two structures that preserves the relations between their elements. Given the belief 
that P (a) its content that P (a) can be regarded as a structure involving the concept [P] and the 
concept [a] and a certain syntactical relation. Now, let us consider a function r that can be regarded 
as an assignment of reference. The arguments of r are the components of the content of the belief, 
and its values, the components of a fact; r(P) is a certain property and r(a) is a certain thing. Now, in 
a version of the correspondence theory of truth, P(a) is true if and only if  r (Pr(a)).  P (a) is a relation 
between concepts (or words) and r(Pr(a)) is an ontological relation, for example instantiation, 
between a property and a thing. Clearly, when P (a) is true the function r maps related constituents of 
the content of the belief into related constituents of the fact that renders the belief true. Therefore, the 
function r is an isomorphism. See on this version of the correspondence theory of truth, Kirkham 
1992, Chapter 4.  
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seeing coloured objects, acquires new propositional knowledge concerning types of 
colour experiences that she could not have had before her release. 
4.3 A Problem Concerning the Content of Mary’s Belief 
Assessing whether Mary comes to know what it is like to have colour experiences 
upon her release requires clarifying the content of the belief involved in this 
knowledge.  
This section investigates Jackson’s claim that Mary comes to know that the 
colour experience she is having has a certain quale. In particular, I will consider the 
account of how Mary acquires this belief. My discussion of this account will be 
divided in two stages. First, I will argue that such an account is not detailed enough 
to avoid an ambiguity in the interpretation of the content of Mary’s new belief. 
Second, I will illustrate the kind of assumptions that might be used by the upholder 
of the knowledge argument to dispel this ambiguity. 
The knowledge argument involves the thesis that by seeing a coloured object 
Mary acquires the new belief that the type of colour experience she is having has a 
certain feature. In fact, her supposed new knowledge of what it is like to have a 
colour experience is taken to be propositional. Propositional knowledge is usually 
regarded as involving beliefs that something is the case. Specifically, Jackson and 
many who have commented on his argument maintain that Mary’s new belief 
concerns the fact that colour experiences as the same type of the colour experience 
that she is undergoing have a certain quale. For instance, if she sees the sky, she 
might express her new belief as:  
(1) The experience involved in seeing blue has this property Q. 
In (1) “the experience involved in seeing blue” stands for a type of colour 
experience, and “this property Q” refers to its quale that contributes to what it is 
like to have that type of colour experience. 
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Ascribing to Mary the belief (1) appears to require two main explanations. First, 
it has to be explained how Mary can recognise that she is having a colour 
experience of a certain type. Providing this account is not difficult. Mary knows 
before her release that seeing a tomato in certain conditions involves the experience 
of seeing a red object.13 Thus, once she recognises that she is seeing a tomato in 
certain conditions she can form the belief that she is having a colour experience of a 
certain type. Alternatively, someone can tell her that she is having a certain type of 
experience. Both suggestions are consistent with the knowledge argument. 
However, a second and more important explanation has to be given. It has to be 
explained how she might form the belief that experience of this type has a certain 
quale. 
In the knowledge argument, the assumption that Mary comes to believe that 
colour experience of a certain type has a quale appears to be related to the fact that 
she sees a coloured object. Thus, the following might be the implicit account of how 
she acquires her supposed new belief: 
(2) Mary comes to believe that the colour experience of seeing blue has 
property Q by seeing a blue object r.   
Therefore, claim (2) should have a role in justifying the idea that the content of 
Mary’s belief about colour experience is expressed by (1). Thus, there should be 
some kind of transitions from seeing a coloured object to Mary’s beliefs about 
qualia, understood as properties of colour experiences.  
The account (2) appears to be threatened once we realise that there are two 
different interpretations of what qualia might be. Philosophers have proposed 
                                                 
13 This account is suggested in Perry 2001, p. 96. 
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different notions of qualia.14 On the one hand, qualia can be taken to be features of 
experiences. On the other hand, qualia might be regarded as properties that the 
objects of experience look to have. A passage by Daniel Dennett illustrates, perhaps 
unintentionally, these two senses:  
'Qualia' is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more 
familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us … Look at a glass of 
milk at sunset; the way it looks to you - the particular, personal, 
subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual 
experience at the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is 
another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an 
auditory quale. These various 'properties of conscious experience' are 
prime examples of qualia. (Dennett 1988: 619) 
At the beginning of the passage, qualia are “the ways things seem to us”. The milk 
looks sounds or tastes a certain way. In the last line, Dennett says that qualia are 
“properties of conscious experiences”. Now, when Mary sees an object it seems 
intuitively plausible to say that the object will look a certain way to her. Why 
should we then assume that she comes to know about properties of her experience? 
It seems that the upholders of the knowledge argument need to support claim (2) by 
providing a more accurate account of how seeing coloured objects renders available 
beliefs about qualia understood a properties of experiences. To explore how they 
can achieve this we need some preliminary clarifications. 
                                                 
14 An influential discussion of these two different senses in which we can talk about the qualitative 
features of experience is offered in Sellars 1963, pp. 93-94, pp. 192-3. On how the equivocation of 
these two readings affects some contemporary discussion on the nature of experience see Martin 
1998. In recent years, many philosophers have endorsed a representationalist doctrine of colour 
experience. One of the tenets of representationalism is that the only features we come to know by 
having experiences are the properties that the objects of perceptual experience are represented to 
have; see for instance Harman 1990, Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, Tye 2000. 
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According to statement (2), Mary’s supposed new beliefs appear to be based on 
the awareness of something that she acquires in virtue of seeing a coloured object. 
This notion of beliefs based on awareness can be illustrated in the case of visual 
awareness. We can distinguish between beliefs that depend on awareness of 
something and those that do not. My judging that there is a computer screen in front 
of me might depend on my being visually aware of the computer and its position. If 
I am blind, I can still believe that there is a computer screen in front of me. 
Nevertheless, in this case the belief does not depend on my visual awareness of it. 
Clearly, thesis (2) requires that Mary’s supposed new belief depends on what she 
sees. Let us consider how this idea of dependence can be made more precise.  
It is plausible to assume that Mary's belief is directly based on the awareness 
she has in virtue of seeing a coloured object. The difference between beliefs directly 
and indirectly based on awareness can be illustrated with an example. I can believe 
that someone is at the door, by seeing him and thus by being visually aware of him. 
This appears to be a belief directly based on awareness. This can be contrasted with 
the case in which I believe that someone is at the door when I am aware that the bell 
is ringing. In this case, the belief is not directly based on my visual awareness of the 
person at the door. In particular, to form that belief I need to know certain facts 
about the function of doorbells and that this bell is not malfunctioning. Now, thesis 
(2) does not explain in detail how Mary forms her supposed new belief. Therefore, 
we are entitled to explore whether this belief is directly based on her awareness that 
derives from seeing a coloured object.  
We can be aware of different types of entities. First, we can be aware of objects. 
For example, when we see a cat we are visually aware of an object. Second, we can 
be aware of properties. Thus, when we see a furry cat we can be aware of the 
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property of being furry. These two types of perceptual awareness can be indicated 
as o-awareness and p-awareness respectively.15  
Beliefs can depend in different ways on what we are aware of. Let us consider 
the belief that that an object o has a certain property P.  Having such a belief might 
require both awareness of the object o and of its property P.16  For example, if I see 
a furry cat, my belief that the cat is furry might depend on the fact that I am o-aware 
of the cat I see, and p-aware of its property of being furry.  However, someone can 
believe that a certain object o has a certain feature P, by being just aware of o or of 
P.  As an example of the first case, consider someone who by seeing a table with 
the naked eye comes to believe that “this table is composed of atoms”. While the 
person is visually aware of the table, she is not visually aware of its being composed 
of atoms. As an example of the second case, consider someone who sees a certain 
coloured patch and believes “John’s car is this colour”. Although the person is not 
aware of John’s car, she can have a belief about this car’s colour by being aware of 
another object’s colour.  
There is an intuitive difference between direct and indirect o-awareness. For 
instance, the belief that “The building is new” can be taken to depend on our visual 
awareness of the building. However, we might say that our awareness concerns the 
part of the building we are seeing. Thus, our awareness of the building is indirect 
and depends on the awareness of its part. With these preliminary remarks in place, 
we can turn to the problem of interpreting Mary’s supposed new belief. 
It is plausible to maintain that the upholder of the knowledge argument might 
endorse what can be called the thesis of the direct awareness of qualia.  This thesis 
states that: 
                                                 
15 These different notions of awareness are spelled out in Dretske 1999. 
16 This idea can be regarded as a generalisation of a thesis concerning visual awareness. In certain 
circumstances, to be visually aware that something is the case we have to see things and their 
properties. For arguments in support of this latter thesis, see Jackson 1977, pp. 153-164.  
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(3) Mary comes to believe that experience e has quale Q because, in 
virtue of seeing coloured object r, she is directly aware of Q. 
In fact, the knowledge argument does not contain any detailed account of how Mary 
acquires her new belief. Claim (3) appears to formulate such an account in the most 
direct way. In this case, the reticence of the upholder of the knowledge argument 
might appear to be justified. We do not need to be told anything about how Mary 
forms her new belief about her colour experience. In fact, this belief is based on a 
transition as direct as the one involved in forming a belief about a certain object that 
we perceive. However, it seems that account (3) is in need of further improvement. 
To endorse (3), the upholder of the knowledge argument should assume that 
Mary becomes directly aware of the colour experience she is having. This claim can 
be supported as follows. When we judge, in virtue of what we see, that something 
has a certain property, we cannot be directly aware of that property without being 
equally aware of the object that has that property. For instance, in the case of vision, 
in order to be visually aware of the circular shape we need to see the circular thing. 
Therefore, if Mary becomes directly aware of a property of her experience she 
needs to be aware of the experience in which it is instantiated.  
It might be objected that in many cases we believe that something has a certain 
property, by being aware of that property, without, at the same time, being aware of 
the object in question. For example, if I believe that John and Fred own cars of the 
same colour, then I can believe that John’s car is a certain colour in virtue of being 
aware of the colour of Fred’s car. Thus, it might be maintained that Mary might be 
aware of a property of her experience without being aware of the experience. 
Instead, she is aware of something else that has that property.17  
                                                 
17 Some argue for the claim that we can be aware of a property without being aware of any object. 
See Dretske 1999.  
 
Knowing Colour Experiences 96
There is a reply to this objection. In fact, in the case of the cars it is 
presupposed that I know that colours are properties of cars. However, in Mary’s 
case we want to explain how on her release she comes to know about qualia as 
properties of her colour experiences. Thus, if we assume that Mary is not aware of 
her colour experience, it would remain to be explained how she comes to know that 
the quale is a feature of her colour experience.  
To recapitulate, when facing the claim that Mary comes to know that colour 
experiences have certain qualia we cannot ignore the fact that there are different 
ways of understanding what these “qualia” properties might be. In particular, some 
regard qualia as properties of experience and others as properties of their objects. I 
have shown that the knowledge argument in itself cannot support one reading or the 
other. However, the upholder of the knowledge argument has a way to justify the 
claim that Mary acquires new beliefs about the qualia of her experiences. In the 
next section, I will investigate whether we should endorse this explanation.  
4.4 Direct Awareness of Experiences and Perception 
In the previous section, I considered how the upholder of the knowledge argument 
might defend the idea that Mary comes to believe that experiences have qualia. He 
might assume that by seeing coloured objects she becomes directly aware of her 
experiences and their properties. Given this awareness, she can then judge that her 
experience has a certain quale.    
This section aims to show that this account is not tenable if we assume that 
perceiving coloured objects can provide such awareness. In fact, the principal 
philosophical accounts of perception do not support the idea that perception 
provides awareness of experiences. Moreover, the only account of perception that 
supports this idea is untenable. 
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As we saw in the previous section, the upholder of the knowledge argument 
might endorse the following account of how Mary acquires her new belief about 
colour experiences.  
(1) Mary comes to believe that experience e has quale Q because, in 
virtue of seeing coloured object r, she is directly o-aware of e and she is 
directly p-aware of Q. 
One plausible interpretation of this account is that it is solely in virtue of the 
perception of a coloured object that we are directly aware of our experiences. 
Specifically, the upholder of the knowledge argument might argue that the previous 
interpretation of (1) might be based on a certain philosophical account of 
perception. Therefore, we have to consider which account of perception she might 
endorse. 
It is not open to the upholder of the knowledge argument to defend (1) by 
endorsing direct realism. This is the doctrine that perception provides direct 
awareness of physical objects (or their parts) that exists independently of our mind. 
This excludes the possibility that in perception we can be at the same time directly 
aware of our experiences. However, the upholder of the knowledge argument can 
protest that direct realism is not the only account of perception available. 
It might be assumed that claim (1) derives from a sense datum account of 
perception. This family of theories, traditionally opposed to direct realism, can be 
characterised by two main theses. The first one is a negative, revisionary, claim 
against direct realism. In perceiving, we are not directly aware of external objects 
that exist independently of our mind. Different arguments have been offered to 
support this conclusion; the resulting debate is lengthy and still lively.18 However, 
another central tenet of sense datum theory is relevant for our present concern. The 
                                                 
18 Howard Robinson presents these arguments, the relative debate, and a defence of a sense-datum 
theory of perception in Robinson 1994. 
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positive thesis often advanced by sense datum theorists is that in our perception we 
are directly aware of sense data. Therefore, the upholder of the knowledge argument 
might maintain that colour experiences are identical to sense data. Nevertheless, the 
latter identification is problematic. 
The identification of colour experiences with sense data is not consistent with 
the traditional formulation of sense datum theory of perception. The promoters of 
this doctrine have argued for a distinction between the act of sensing, the 
experience, and the thing directly sensed, the sense datum. For example, G. E. 
Moore, surely one of the main proponents of sense datum theory, maintains that: 
I shall always talk of sense-data, when what I mean is such things as 
this colour, size, and shape, which I actually see. And when I want to 
talk of my seeing of them I shall expressly call this the seeing of sense-
data; or, if I want a term which will apply equally to all the senses I 
shall speak of the direct apprehension of sense-data. (Moore 1953: 49) 
Therefore, identifying experiences with sense data would be committing a fallacy of 
composition. This sort of mistake stems from the assumption that a part is identical 
to the whole. 
Another option available to the upholder of the knowledge argument is to 
maintain that, in perception, we are directly aware of our colour experience. 
However, it seems that this proposal can be rejected from an ordinary 
phenomenological point of view. This type of phenomenological observation can be 
found in authors that have endorsed very different accounts of experience.19 
Leaving aside their positive account of what we are directly aware of when having 
colour experiences, these authors have pointed out that we are not directly aware of 
the colour experiences involved in seeing coloured objects. Instead, it appears that 
                                                 
19 Moore 1903, Tye 2000, Harman 1990. 
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we are directly aware of these objects. If we see a red rose, I am aware of the way in 
which the rose looks to me. However, what we perceive does not make us aware of 
our experiences. In analogy with a glass polished perfectly, it seems that our 
ordinary way of considering perception shows that our experiences are transparent. 
We do not “see”, or otherwise become aware of, our experiences just in virtue of 
perceiving physical objects.  
The upholder of the knowledge argument might support claim (1) by endorsing 
an adverbial account of perception. Some philosophers, not sympathetic to sense 
data, have maintained that what primarily leads us to posit these entities are 
erroneous ways of understanding certain sentences used to ascribe mental states 
such as illusions, afterimages and pains. The grammatical form of these statements 
might suggest that there are objects of experience. These philosophers maintain 
that, in reality, such expressions concern ways in which people experience. For 
example, let us consider the grammatical form of “John hallucinates a red circle”. 
This claim suggests that there is an object that is circular, red and to which John is 
related by his hallucination. The suggested reconstruction of this ascription is “John 
hallucinates redly-circularly” (or in a red and circular manner). This adverbial 
analysis involves the predication of a property to John and no existential 
quantification over the object of his hallucination.20 The upholder of the knowledge 
argument might suggest that a proper rendering of the ascription “S is seeing a red 
thing” is that “S is seeing red-thingly”. However, this seems not to help in 
supporting the account expressed in (1). 
An adverbial account of experience does not support the conclusion that seeing 
a red object delivers direct awareness of the experience. According to adverbialism, 
when we see a colour, we sense in a certain way. Therefore, the experience does not 
                                                 
20 Here I am taking adverbs to be operators that, when are applied to predicates, determine other 
predicates. Moreover, I assume that predicates are linguistic counterparts of properties. Many 
adverbial theorists assume that adverbs are predicates that apply to events. See, Tye 1984, p. 201. 
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put us in relation with a certain object. A fortiori, having the experience cannot be 
sufficient for having direct o-awareness of itself as required by account (1). Of 
course, this does not exclude that an adverbial account of experience might be 
consistent with the possibility of having direct awareness of experiences. However, 
such awareness has to be delivered by a different faculty from those directly 
involved in perception. For instance, introspection might have such a role. 
To sum up, we have seen that the upholder of the knowledge argument must 
account for how Mary comes to know that experiences have qualia. One proposal 
might be based on the assumption that she is directly o-aware of her experiences. I 
have argued that such awareness cannot be derived solely from seeing coloured 
objects. However, perception does not exhaust all the modes in which we might 
come to know about our experiences. The next section will consider whether 
introspection can deliver direct awareness of our experiences. 
4.5 Introspection and the Direct Awareness of Experiences 
The upholder of the knowledge argument cannot claim that perception provides 
direct awareness of colour experiences. Given that introspection has been 
traditionally considered the principal source for knowing our mental states, it might 
be maintained that Mary forms the belief that colour experiences have certain 
qualia in virtue of such a faculty. In particular, the upholder of the knowledge 
argument might claim that by seeing coloured objects and then introspecting she 
becomes directly o-aware of her experiences. 
The present section shows that the upholder of the knowledge argument cannot 
maintain that introspection requires (or consists in) being directly aware of colour 
experiences. I will argue that central intuitions exploited in the knowledge argument 
are not consistent with this model of introspection. To support this claim, I will 
proceed as follows. 
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First, I draw a distinction between the objects of experience and the acts of 
experiencing. In particular, the experiencing involved in having a colour experience 
is an act of p-awareness of the colour that an object appears to have. Colour 
experiences relate us to the colours that the objects of experience have or look to 
have. Second, I argue that the assumption that Mary is directly o-aware of her 
experiences requires an explanation of how she picks out her colour experience. 
Finally, I will argue that the upholder of the knowledge argument cannot provide 
such an account. 
Philosophers and psychologists have provided different models of the 
knowledge of mental items such as experiences, beliefs and the self.21 Here I am 
considering whether there is an account of introspection that can be used by those 
sympathetic to the knowledge argument to maintain that Mary learns that 
experiences have certain qualia. This is the problem of investigating whether the 
following assumption is true: 
(1) Mary comes to believe that experience e has quale Q because she is 
directly o-aware of e and p-aware of Q in virtue of her introspective 
awareness of what is going on while she sees a coloured object r. 
Let us consider a criticism of this account of how Mary can form her supposed new 
belief about her colour experience. 
Many philosophers would maintain that the account (1) is inconsistent with the 
deliverance of introspective reflection. They have claimed that, in trying to achieve 
introspective knowledge of our perceptual experiences, we can only be aware of the 
objects of these experiences and the properties of these objects.22 In particular, they 
                                                 
21 A survey of these accounts can be found in the first part of Lyons 1988.  
22 Famously G. E. Moore (Moore 1903, p. 25) used similar observations to dismiss the idealists' 
claim that we are only aware of mental states. Similar observations against the idea that we are 
aware of our experiences (or their properties) can be found in contemporary advocates of the 
representationalist theories of the mind, see Tye 1992, p.160 or Harman 1990, p. 667. 
 
Knowing Colour Experiences 102
have thought that ordinary phenomenological observations support their claim. For 
instance, let us assume that I am seeing a red patch in front of me and I intend to 
determine the features of the experience I am having of it. These philosophers 
maintain that, whatever I might end up thinking or knowing about the colour 
experience I am having; my direct awareness can only concern the red patch and its 
features. Therefore, introspective knowledge requires the same or is nothing over 
and above the awareness involved in perception. The previous conclusion, in 
conjunction with the plausible assumption, discussed in the previous section - that 
perception involves awareness of the objects of experiences - implies also that in 
the introspective case, we are not directly aware of our experiences. 
One objection to the previous argument is that by appealing to introspective 
evidence we are in fact committing an error in philosophical method. Ned Block has 
recently denounced as inappropriate the use of introspective reflection in 
philosophy: 
When I look at my blue wall, I think that in addition to being aware of 
the color I can also make myself aware of what it is like to be aware of 
the color. I am sure others will disagree. The one thing we should agree 
on is that this is no way to do philosophy. […] Looking at a blue wall is 
easy to do, but it is not easy (perhaps not possible) to answer on the 
basis of introspection alone the highly theoretical question of whether in 
doing so I am aware of intrinsic properties of the experiences. (Block 
1990: 73) 
Block is criticising those who claim that introspection shows that properties of 
experience are representational or extrinsic properties of experience.23 However, it 
seems that the appeal to introspection is equally methodologically suspicious in the 
                                                 
23 In this passage Block is considering the position advanced in Harman 1990. 
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case here under discussion. What is preliminarily required is some clarification of 
two notions. First, we have to spell out clearly the notion of direct o-awareness. 
Second, we need a clear idea of what a colour experience might be. Let us consider 
the first issue.   
By adapting a characterisation of direct perception offered by Paul Snowdon, 
we can characterise direct awareness.24 According to him, the direct perception of 
an object appears related to the ability to have certain true demonstrative thoughts 
about the object that are independent of other demonstrative thoughts. For example, 
if a subject directly perceives a dog in front of her, then the perceptual contact with 
the dog allows that person to judge that “this is a dog”.25 In addition, such a thought 
should not depend on any other demonstrative thought.26 This rules out that we have 
direct perception of an object in cases such as the following. For example, in a case 
of deferred ostension, I can say “this is my dog” by seeing a picture of my dog. 
However, it seems that in this case the contact with the dog is indirect. In particular, 
my demonstrative thought about the dog presupposes the truth of the more basic 
demonstrative thought “This is a picture of my dog”. Thus, we can assume that 
direct awareness can be characterised as follows: 
S is directly o-aware of y if and only if S stands, in virtue of S's 
awareness, in such a relation to y that, if S could make demonstrative 
judgements, then it would be possible for S to make the true and 
independent demonstrative judgement 'That is y'. 
                                                 
24 Snowdon 1992. Whether we perceive directly objective entities or mental ones is a central 
question in philosophy of perception. Clearly investigating this question requires a preliminary 
clarification of the notion of direct perception. For a discussion of the principal way to spell out this 
notion and a positive account alternative to that of Snowdon, see Jackson 1977, Chapter 1. 
25 This example uses a demonstrative that involves the concept [dog]. There is no need to assume 
that every case of direct awareness involves the use of a specific concept. The person might be 
directly aware of a certain object, even when her successful demonstrative reference involves a 
generic concept such as [object]. 
26 This condition of independence is illustrated in Snowdon 1992, pp. 58-59.  
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We have clarified what is required for being directly aware of something. Now, we 
have to account for the nature of colour experiences. 
Many philosophers have regarded colour experiences as internal states that 
place us in some kind of relation with certain entities.27 In particular, it might be 
suggested that in a colour experience we can distinguish between the act of 
awareness that grounds this relation and the property to which we are related.28 For 
example, if I perceive a red apple, my colour experience relates me to the colour the 
apple looks to me to have. On the other hand, if I perceive a yellow lemon I am 
related by the colour experience to the colour the lemon looks to have. Thus we can 
say that experience involve an act of p-awareness, which enters into every colour 
experience, from the specific colour we are aware of.  
To be directly aware of her colour experience, Mary needs to identify her 
experience. In fact being directly aware of an object would require being in the 
position to have a demonstrative thought about that object. As many philosophers 
have pointed out, this in turn requires that the subject should be able to collect 
“identification information” about that object.29 This can be illustrated in the 
perceptual case. When we refer with a demonstrative to an object we perceive, we 
are capable of distinguishing it from other objects simultaneously present in a 
certain space or from a background. The subject should possess the discriminatory 
capacities to pick out the object from other objects. In particular, it seems that these 
abilities require discriminating features of the objects demonstrated. Moreover, the 
                                                 
27 See the quote by E. G. Moore, reported at p. 98. The classical defence of such a distinction is 
given in Moore 1903. Theories of experience containing this distinction differ, principally, in dealing 
with two issues. First, there are dissimilar ways to explain how experiences can makes us aware of 
something. Second, there are different assumptions on the nature of the entity to which we are 
related. The main difference is between those that assume that we are aware of external physical 
objects and those that think that our awareness concerns mental entities such as sense-data.  
28 This analysis is suggested in Dretske 1999.  
29 The necessity of such a perceptual contribution to successful demonstrative reference has been 
defended in Evans 1982, p. 107, and p. 149.  See also Clark 2000, pp. 131-136, and Millikan 1990.  
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subject should be able to discriminate relations that hold between the demonstrated 
objects and other objects or the background. The distinction of the two components 
in colour experiences might suggest to the upholder of the knowledge argument an 
account of how Mary can pick out her colour experience. 
It might be maintained that it is the act of awareness involved in Mary's colour 
experience that grounds her ability to pick out the experience she is having. Then 
Mary’s introspective direct o-awareness of her colour experience does not require 
her to attend to the properties of which this experience makes her aware. Therefore, 
Mary can have the demonstrative thought about her experience by noticing that she 
is undergoing an act of awareness. 
To this it can be objected that Mary cannot determine the act of awareness 
involved in her experience without noticing the colour that the object of this 
experience looks to have. But it might be replied that the knowledge argument 
might be taken to show that it is awareness, as involved in all colour experiences, 
that has features that science cannot explain. After all, the knowledge argument is 
taken to show the limits of our scientific understanding of consciousness. Thus, it 
can be maintained that the conclusion of the knowledge argument concerns the 
phenomenon of being aware. In this case, what renders consciousness scientifically 
intractable are certain properties of awareness. 
 Perhaps, the nature and workings of awareness are serious problems for 
science. However, the knowledge argument cannot raise these difficulties. 
Presumably, by reading her black and white books or watching her instruments, 
Mary has many different visual experiences. For example, she can experience a 
shape or a grey surface. Thus, she might attend to the acts of awareness involved in 
these experiences independently of the awareness of the properties of which she is 
p-aware in having these experiences. However, then, how can this knowledge differ 
from knowing what it is like to have a colour experience? It seems that we cannot 
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point to any difference. Therefore, we might be entitled to conclude that, before her 
release, Mary knows also what it is like to have colour experiences. 
To sum up, Mary cannot become o-aware of her colour experiences without 
being aware of the properties of which she is aware in virtue of having such 
experiences. Thus, we have to consider whether another possibility is open to the 
upholder of the knowledge argument. I have shown that the upholder of the 
knowledge argument cannot maintain that Mary comes to know that her colour 
experiences have qualia by being directly aware of them in virtue of introspection. 
Of course, there might be different ways to come to know about our experiences. 
Moreover, these models might be compatible with the intuitions involved in the 
knowledge argument.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter began by examining what is involved in the acquisition of the 
knowledge of what it is like to have a colour experience. The knowledge argument 
puts precise constraints on this knowledge. Namely, it is assumed that by seeing 
coloured objects Mary acquires propositional knowledge. This is the knowledge 
that colour experiences have qualia.  
Specifically, I have investigated how the upholder of the knowledge argument 
can support the assumption that upon her release Mary acquires beliefs that colour 
experiences have qualia. I have argued that such an assumption cannot be based on 
the thesis that she has direct awareness of her experiences and their features. 
In the next chapter, I will consider whether there are other accounts that the 
upholder of the knowledge argument could use to explain how Mary might acquire 
such beliefs. 
 
 5 The Content of Mary’s Belief  
5.1 Introduction 
We are investigating whether Mary acquires new propositional knowledge about 
types of colour experiences when she sees coloured objects. Establishing this claim 
requires that we first clarify the content of the belief that is involved in this 
knowledge. The previous chapter considered how Mary might come to believe that 
colour experiences have qualia. It emerged that Mary cannot acquire this belief by 
being directly aware of her colour experiences. Neither perception nor introspection 
can provide this direct awareness. 
This chapter suggests an alternative explanation of how Mary might acquire 
beliefs and knowledge that colour experiences have qualia. Thus, the upholder of 
the knowledge argument might endorse this account. In particular, such an account 
will be elaborated by using a model of introspective knowledge offered by Fred 
Dretske.1  
Section 5.2 illustrates Dretske’s account of introspection. Section 5.3, considers 
the central claim of this proposal. Namely, the capacity to have introspective beliefs 
about types of colour experience requires having certain perceptual beliefs and 
certain connecting beliefs. Section 5.4 shows that Dretske’s account of introspection 
is an instance of a more general doctrine. Specifically, this account is independent 
of Dretske claims concerning the nature of conscious experience and the content of 
introspective beliefs. Finally, section 5.5 shows how adopting this general account 
of introspection illuminates our discussion of Mary’s case. 
                                                 
1 Although there are differences in the details, the general lines of this account of introspection are 
shared by Evans 1982 pp.  224-235, and Shoemaker 1996. 
The Content of Mary’s Belief  108
5.2 An Account of Introspection 
A central question remains to be answered. We have to determine whether the 
upholder of the knowledge argument can explain how, by seeing coloured objects, 
Mary comes to believe that colour experiences have qualia. 
This section shows that an account of introspection offered by Fred Dretske 
might suggest an answer. First, I outline the requirements that an account of how 
Mary acquires her supposed new beliefs about experience should satisfy. Then, I 
consider Dretske’s account of introspection. Finally, I will show that this account 
satisfies these requirements. However, I will show that using this account for the 
evaluation of Mary’s case faces two problems.  
Explaining how Mary acquires her supposed new beliefs should be consistent 
with certain requirements concerning these beliefs. In the previous chapter, we saw 
two of these conditions. First, these beliefs are acquired by seeing coloured objects. 
Second, the transition, from seeing coloured objects to having these beliefs, cannot 
involve direct awareness of colour experiences. A third requirement should now be 
added.  
Mary’s supposed new beliefs concern the occurrence of properties of colour 
experiences that supposedly figure in our ordinary categorisation of these mental 
states. The reasons for this are as follows. First, Mary comes to know something 
about the type of colour experience she has when seeing an object of a certain 
colour. For example, she learns that the experience of a red object has a certain 
quale. In fact, we can exclude that she comes to know a characteristic common to 
all colour experiences; otherwise, she might know about it by seeing white and 
black objects before her release. Second, the knowledge argument seems to appeal 
to our ordinary understanding of what we know about colour experiences when we 
have them. Thus, it appears that within the knowledge argument resides an idea of 
qualia as properties of colour experiences that can determine a categorisation of 
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these mental states. Let us consider an account of our knowledge of colour 
experiences that might satisfy these requirements. 
Fred Dretske’s view on introspective knowledge of colour experiences is 
condensed in the following passage:2  
What one comes to know by introspection are, to be sure, facts about 
one's mental life - thus (on a representational theory) representational 
facts. These facts are facts, if you will, about internal representations. 
The objects and facts one perceives to learn those facts, however, are 
seldom internal and never mental… One becomes aware of 
representational facts by an awareness of physical objects. (Dretske 
1995: 40) 
Let us illustrate the main assumptions of Dretske’s account. 
According to representationalism, the character of an experience is completely 
specified by its content - the ways in which the world appears to be to the subject in 
virtue of having that experience.3 In particular, Dretske thinks that experiences have 
the indicating function of providing information about the properties of external 
physical objects.4 By endorsing a form of externalism, he thinks that the 
representational content of veridical experiences is constituted, in part, by factors 
that are external to the subject. In addition, he maintains that the indicating function 
of sensory systems can be accounted for naturalistically. In fact, this function is 
acquired in virtue of evolutionary history of the organisms.5 In this account, our 
experiences provide awareness of physical objects and their properties in virtue of 
representing them. 
                                                 
2 One version of the account is offered in Dretske 1995, pp. 41-44. A slightly different version has 
been given in Dretske 1999. 
3 This doctrine is endorsed by Harman 1990, Tye 1995, Carruthers 2000.  
4 Dretske 1995, p. 2. 
5 Dretske 1995, p. 15. 
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Another assumption central to Dretske's account is that introspective beliefs that 
figure in introspective knowledge of experiences are metarepresentations. These 
metarepresentations, then, are beliefs that represent experiences as representations. 
Using an analogy, Dretske illustrates what distinguishes metarepresentations from 
other representations of representations. A photograph is a pictorial representation. 
As such, we can have beliefs about the weight or the geometric shape of the 
photograph. Although these beliefs are representations of features of an object that 
is itself a pictorial representation, they are not metarepresentations. Conversely, if 
we think about the object as a photograph of something, then we are representing it 
as a representation.6 For example, if I believe that the piece of paper in front of me 
is a photograph of a certain person, then I am regarding the object as a 
representation of that person. Analogously, the content of introspective belief about 
an experience is that such an experience is a representation of certain features of the 
external world.  
Another assumption in Dretske’s account is that introspection is a case of 
displaced perception.7 In certain cases, we can come to know the fact that a certain 
object k has the feature F, what Dretske calls a displaced or target fact, by being 
aware that an intermediary object g has a feature G.  For example, we come to 
know that we have a certain weight by perceiving that the scale's pointer points to a 
certain numeral. Similarly, I come to know that the petrol tank in my car is empty 
by observing that the fuel gauge is pointing to “Empty”. In particular, displaced 
perception is an inferential form of knowledge that requires connecting beliefs that 
relate what we are directly aware of to the displaced fact. For instance, I come to 
know that I have a certain weight by perceiving the scale's pointer. This requires 
                                                 
6 Dretske 1995, pp. 43-44. 
7 Dretske 1995, pp. 41-44. 
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that I have beliefs about the scale's function and how the pointer's position indicates 
my weight. 
According to Dretske, our introspective knowledge about the type of colour 
experiences that we have is based on beliefs about the coloured objects that we see. 
For instance, someone who sees a red object is in the position to believe that she is 
having colour experience of red. Clearly, this account is grounded on an explanation 
of the connection between (i) beliefs that certain objects look a certain colour to a 
subject and (ii) introspective beliefs that concern the type of colour experience that 
the subject is having.  
Dretske’s account offers useful insights into the type of capacities required by 
the subject before being able to hold beliefs about colour experiences in virtue of 
seeing coloured objects. A subject’s ability to hold beliefs about the type of colour 
experiences that she is having requires her to further possess the ability to have 
beliefs concerning the colours of the objects she sees. Let us now consider whether 
this account satisfies the main requirements we have delineated at the beginning of 
this section. 
The displaced perception model (DPM) of introspection explains Mary’s ability 
to have beliefs about her colour experience in virtue of seeing a coloured object, 
without assuming that she is directly aware of her experiences and their properties. 
According to DPM, introspective beliefs about experiences function in the same 
way as the beliefs about displaced facts. We are directly aware of the facts and 
properties represented by the experiences; and on the basis of this awareness and 
appropriate connecting beliefs, we acquire introspective beliefs about our 
experiences. Let us now consider whether DPM offers an account of what is 
required by our ability to categorising colour experiences introspectively. 
The DPM account clarifies introspective categorisation of colour experiences 
by revealing that two types of property are involved in one’s ability to have 
introspective beliefs. The properties of the first type are required by the analysis that 
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DPM provides of the content of introspective beliefs concerning experiences. As 
Dretske suggests, introspective knowledge involves metarepresentations about our 
mental experiences. This means that we think about our experiences as states that 
represent the world in a certain way. Let us consider the introspective belief that: 
(1) I am having an experience that a certain object is red. 
The content of this belief is analysed as self-ascribing a state that has the property 
of being the representation, or awareness, that something is red.8 Therefore, we 
ascribe to an experience the property of making us aware of something. 
According to DPM, there are also properties of another type that play an 
important role in the introspective categorisation of colour experiences. Our 
experiences make us aware of these properties. For example in seeing red, we are 
aware of redness. As we have seen, by being directly aware of properties of redness 
we categorise our experience as an experience of red. 
These two types of property appear to satisfy different conditions usually 
associated with the notion of quale. According to a common use, qualia are 
properties of experiences. Therefore, we might assume that properties such as 
“being a representation, or awareness, of red” are qualia. On the other hand, some 
assume that qualia are features of which we are directly aware and as such ground 
our introspective classification of experiences. In this case, it seems that the 
properties of which our colour experiences makes us aware should be called qualia. 
Choosing between these two interpretations of qualia is a question of terminology. 
What it is important is that the DPM reveals that there are two types of property 
involved in our introspective knowledge and classification of colour experiences. 
The DPM appears to elucidate some central features of the transition occurring 
between seeing a coloured object and having a belief about the quale of the 
                                                 
8 The idea that colour experiences are states of p-awareness of properties can be found in Dretske 
1999. 
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experience. Therefore, the upholder of the knowledge argument might endorse the 
following account: 
(3) Mary comes to believe that experience e has quale Q because, in 
virtue of seeing coloured object r, she believes that the object r looks a 
certain colour to her and she has some appropriate connecting belief. 
However, the viability of this suggestion depends on answering two important 
questions. 
The upholder of the knowledge argument needs to show that Mary's supposed 
new beliefs about colour experiences amount to knowledge. In determining how 
this can be done, we have to consider the DPM in more detail. We have to 
investigate how the connecting beliefs required by DPM warrants beliefs about the 
qualia of experience. 
A second problem might derive from the DPM's connection to 
representationalism. Dretske's view on introspection is based upon three 
assumptions. First, colour experiences are typed exhaustively by their 
representational content. Second, given the meta-representational nature of the 
content of introspective beliefs about colour experience, introspection provides a 
categorisation of colour experiences in terms of their representational content.9 
Third, the representational properties of experience can be accounted for in 
naturalistic terms. Clearly, the upholder of the knowledge argument cannot endorse 
this latter claim. Thus, we might think that he might endorse the idea that the 
representational features of experiences are non-physical properties. However, even 
if such a doctrine is tenable, there might still be a problem stemming from the other 
assumptions.  
                                                 
9 The upholder of the knowledge argument might even assume that experiences are completely 
individuated by their representational content. Moreover, he can also concede that introspective 
beliefs are metarepresentations.  Clearly, what he has to reject is Dretske’s naturalistic account of 
this content.  
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 As Ned Block has pointed out, whether conscious experiences have features 
that go beyond their representational or intentional content is at the core of “The 
greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind -- maybe even all of philosophy --”.10 
Moreover, representationalists have different views on how the notion of 
representational content should be spelled out. Thus, it might appear that assuming 
DPM in the clarification of how Mary acquires her new beliefs about colour 
experiences might require the demanding defence of representationalism. 
To sum up, it seems that Fred Dretske's account of introspection might offer 
some insight into how Mary acquires beliefs about colour experiences.  
Nevertheless, before assessing whether this is the case, two main issues remain to 
be investigated. First, we have to determine in detail how these beliefs amount to 
knowledge. Second, we have to consider whether accepting DPM involves 
endorsing Dretske's representationalism. These questions will be addressed 
respectively in the following two sections. 
5.3  Connecting Beliefs 
The DPM appears to offer a promising account of the way in which, upon her 
release, Mary acquires her beliefs about colour experiences. The central assumption 
in DPM is the existence of certain connecting beliefs. These beliefs are supposed to 
ground the transition between beliefs concerning the coloured objects we see and 
the types of colour experiences we can self-ascribe. Moreover, these transitions are 
supposed to deliver knowledge about colour experiences. 
This section aims to investigate the nature and role of these connecting beliefs. 
Specifically, I will suggest that these beliefs concern the relation of an ordinary 
notion of a certain type of colour experience with that of an object looking a certain 
colour. 
                                                 
10 Block 1996. 
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According to Dretske, in knowing a fact by displaced perception we are not 
directly aware of that fact, instead we come to know about it in virtue of an 
inference that involves a connecting belief. In consulting a scale, for instance, we do 
not perceive ourselves having a certain weight, but we perform an inference of the 
following type.11 For example, let us assume that we know that: 
(1) The scale points to a certain numeral n. 
(2) The scale would not point to numeral n, unless we weighed n kilos. 
From these premises, we conclude that: 
(3) We weigh n kilos. 
Whilst assumption (1) specifies what we are directly aware of, (2) gives the content 
of a connecting belief, and the conclusion (3) is what we come to know about the 
displaced fact. In order to see that we have a certain weight by seeing the scale, we 
need to believe that the position of the pointers is a “sign” of our weight. In such a 
case we need to know that the position of the pointer is causally determined by our 
weight and thus that a principle like (2) holds.12 Let us now consider how this 
model might be applied to introspective beliefs. 
Dretske does not present explicitly the inference involved in introspective 
knowledge of colour experiences. Thus, he does not give an example of the 
connecting belief involved in this inference. However, some of his passages suggest 
how this principle might be. In fact, he claims that: 
One comes to know (the fact) that one is experiencing blue by 
experiencing, not the experience of blue, but some displaced object. …, 
this displaced object is (typically) the object the experience of blue is an 
experience of – i.e. the blue object one sees. (Dretske 1995: 44) 
                                                 
11 Dretske 1995, p. 42. 
12 Dretske 1995, p. 92 
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Moreover, he states that: 
If you “see” k as blue and infer from this “fact” – the “fact” that k is 
blue – that you are representing k as blue, you cannot go wrong. As long 
as the inference is from what you “see” k to be (whether this is veridical 
or not) the conclusion must be true: blue must be the way you are 
representing k. (Dretske 1995: 61) 
Let us outline the inference that might be involved in the introspection of a colour 
experience. 
Some authors have offered an interpretation of Dretske’s account.13 They 
assume that the DPM requires an inference from what we are aware of to the belief 
that we are having a certain type of colour experience. Specifically, they assume 
that the starting point of this inference is the content of a perceptual belief. This 
belief is acquired in virtue of having the experience. Let us assume that I see a red 
object. According to this interpretation, the first premise of the introspective 
inference is the content of the belief that: 
(1) This object is red. 
Now, following the analysis of the displaced perception of our weight, I should 
have the connecting belief that: 
(2) This object would not be red unless I were having the experience 
that this object is red. 
Given these two premises, I can infer: 
(3) I am having the experience that the object is red. 
                                                 
13 Lycan 2003 and Aydede 2000. 
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The plausibility of this account, of course, depends on the assumption that the 
content of the connecting belief is expressed by (2). However, this account appears 
to have some problems.14
If we endorse an objectivist account of colour properties, the connecting belief 
(2) is clearly false. According to the objectivist, colours are physical properties of 
the external objects (or their surfaces) whose occurrence and existence is 
independent of our sensory responses. In this case, an object can be red even if no 
one perceives it. Therefore, principle (2) turns out to be false and it cannot support 
the inferential introspective knowledge of colour experiences.  
The connecting belief (2) might appear to be more plausible if we endorse a 
subjectivist account of colour properties. According to this metaphysical view on 
colour properties, an object has a certain colour property only if it elicits a certain 
response or experience in a subject. In this case, the statement “this object is red” is 
true only if the object determines a certain colour experience in a subject. However, 
it does not seem that a subject S, who believes that something is red, is justified in 
concluding that she is having a certain colour experience. In a subjectivist account 
of colour, a certain object has a certain colour when it determines a type of response 
defined over a range of subjects. Thus, an object might be red in virtue of the 
response of some subject different from S. Therefore, S cannot be justified in 
thinking that: “This object would not be red unless I were (probably) having the 
experience that this object is red”.  
If the present interpretation of Dretske’s account is correct, his view is not 
tenable. Clearly, the correctness of this interpretation might be questioned. 
However, we can put this issue aside.15 What is relevant here is to see whether there 
                                                 
14 Criticisms of this account of introspective connecting beliefs are advanced both in Lycan 2003 and 
Aydede 2000.   
15 It is important to notice that in the subsequent paper Dretske 1999, although Dretske defends the 
idea that we have indirect knowledge of colour experiences, he makes no mention of connecting 
principles.  
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is another way to spell out the general intuition involved in the DPM of 
introspection.   
There is an alternative account of how we form the introspective belief that we 
have a colour experience of a certain type by seeing a coloured object. Let us 
assume that subject S sees a car. Given what she sees, S might come to believe: 
(1) This car looks blue to me. 
In the proposed account the connecting belief would be: 
(2) This car would not look blue to me unless I were having a colour 
experience of a certain type. 
S can reach the introspective belief: 
(3) I am having a colour experience of a certain type. 
Let us clarify this account, starting with the belief that (1). 
Perceptual beliefs of the form “this object is P”, where P stands for a colour 
predicate, are not the only type of beliefs we might endorse in virtue of seeing a 
coloured objects. Another class of beliefs we can have when we see coloured 
objects have the form “this object looks P to me”. An important difference between 
these two types of belief is that we might be ready to endorse the latter without 
endorsing the former. Let us assume that, given all my past experiences, I believe 
that my car is red. If I see the car under a sodium-arc streetlight, that produces a 
distinctive yellow light, I might be in the position to believe that the car is blue. 
However, given that I have evidence that the car is red, I will not be ready to 
believe that the car is blue. In this case, I will maintain that the car looks blue. Let 
us consider now the connecting principle (2). 
It seems that beliefs concerning the colours object look to have, contrary to 
those concerning the colour they do have, are connected in some systematic way 
with the notion of colour experience. It makes sense, then, to explain to a subject 
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that a car looks blue to her because she is having an experience of it under certain 
conditions. The connecting beliefs that, according to DPM, are required in indirect 
introspective knowledge of colour experiences might concern these connections.  
In particular, it might be suggested that principle (2) is grounded in what is 
required for the possession of the concept of colour experience. The knowledge of 
certain inferential patterns, where the concept of experience might figure, is a 
necessary condition for possessing the concept.16 Possessing the concept of colour 
experience requires knowing that colour experiences figures in the explanations of 
why, under certain circumstances, things look to have certain colours to one. In 
particular, this would require that something look a certain colour to someone 
because she has a colour experience of a certain type. Therefore, let us assume that 
someone does not know how to use the notion of colour experience to explain why 
a certain object looks to be a certain colour to him. Under such circumstances, this 
subject can be said to lack the notion of colour experience. For example, someone 
cannot be said to possess the concept of the experience of red, if he does not know 
that a certain object would not look red to him unless he had that experience. Thus, 
the connecting belief, which figures in a subject’s introspective classification of a 
type of colour experience, derives from his mastery of the concepts of that type of 
colour experience. 
It might be objected that this version of DPM provides a circular account of the 
inference involved in introspection. In fact, it might be claimed that someone cannot 
believe that an object looks blue unless he believes that he is undergoing an 
experience of blue, thereby making the previous inference circular. However, it 
seems that this challenge can be met.  
                                                 
16 The relation between possessing concepts and being able to find compelling certain inferential 
schema has been investigated by Peacocke 1992 see also Millar 1991a. 
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A subject comes to believe that an object looks a certain colour because she 
realises that, despite what she sees, she is not in the position to judge that the object 
has that colour. However, in order to realise this, she does not require having beliefs 
about her own colour experiences. She might withdraw the assent to her belief that 
the object is a certain colour given that this belief contradicts other beliefs she has 
already acquired about the colour of the object. In the case where she is seeing the 
red car under the yellow light, she might not believe that “the car is blue” because 
from past experiences she acquired the belief that the car is red. It seems plausible 
that she can withdraw her assent to the belief “the car is blue” and endorse the 
weaker “the car looks blue” without knowing anything about her experiences. She 
might just adduce as the reason for having the belief that “the car looks blue” some 
puzzling change in the surface of the car. Thus, knowing that her experiences are 
involved in determining the colour the object looks to have would be informative 
for her.  
Having illustrated how DPM might explain the introspective knowledge of 
experience, we have now to consider whether this account requires endorsing a 
representational theory of experience.  
5.4 Representationalism and Introspection 
In this section I will illustrate that the general intuition involved in the DPM does 
not require endorsing a representationalist account of introspection. In fact, I will 
argue that this account is consistent with a non-representationalist account of 
experience.  
Dretske's account of introspection involves two main assumptions. First, colour 
experiences are typed by their representational content. Thus, two colour 
experiences are of the same type when they have the same representational content. 
Second, our introspective beliefs about experiences take into account this typology 
of experiences. According to Dretske, in self-ascribing a type of colour experience 
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we have to think about it as a type of representational state.  Let us assume, for 
instance, that Mary sees a red object. On this account, Mary should have a belief 
about her colour experience expressible as:  
(1) I am having a colour experience that represents that something is  
red.17
The quale Q is the property of “being the representation that an object looks red”. In 
fact, according to Dretske, experiences are typed by their representational content.  
However, representationalism is a debated position. Thus, it might appear that 
assuming DPM in the clarification of how Mary acquires her new beliefs about 
colour experiences might require the demanding defence of representationalism. If 
we renounce representationalism, then introspective beliefs about experiences 
cannot individuate experience as representations nor type them in terms of their 
representational content specified by basic perceptual beliefs.  
Thus, we can endorse the idea that introspective beliefs derive from an 
inferential procedure starting from certain beliefs that do not concern the 
experiences themselves but their objects. Having this grasp of the “skeleton” of 
DPM, let us see how the “flesh” of a non-representationalist account of experience 
can be added. 
Christopher Peacocke has formulated influential arguments for the conclusion 
that experiences, besides having their representational features, have properties he 
calls sensational.18 According to Peacocke, the main tenet of externalist 
representationalism is what he calls the Adequacy Thesis (AT). This principle states 
that a complete characterisation of an experience can be given by prefixing an 
operator  “It visually appears to the subject that ….” to some complex condition 
                                                 
17 In a subsequent paper, Dretske claims that the type of colour experience can be specified as the 
experience that has the property of “being awareness of the property of being red”, Dretske 1999, pp. 
112-114. 
18 Peacocke 1983. 
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concerning physical objects stated propositionally. If, for instance, subject S has an 
experience of red, the content of the experience is completely characterised by “It 
visually appears to S that there is a red object”. Let us examine one of the examples 
he advances to argue against AT. 
Peacocke asks us to consider two trees of the same size that are at a distance of 
one and two hundred metres respectively from an observer. The observer sees the 
two trees as having the same size. According to the adequacy thesis, the 
representational content of the observer's perception is that the two trees coincide in 
size. However, it is also true that there is a sense in which we can say that the closer 
tree occupies a larger part of the observer's visual field than the one occupied by the 
more distant tree and this difference is reflected in the phenomenology of the 
experience. According to Peacocke, this is a phenomenological difference 
determined by a sensational feature of the experience.19
Peacocke maintains that sensational properties have a role in the classification 
of colour experiences. In his view, two experiences having the same (or similar) 
sensational properties are of the same type. Therefore, a sensational feature 
determines the type to which an experience belongs. In particular, he argues that 
sensational properties and representational features determine two different 
categorisations of experiences. He formulates arguments for the existence of 
experiences that match in representational content and differ in sensational 
properties and vice versa. This shows clearly how his account departs from the 
representationalist account of experience. However, the role he assigns to 
sensational properties in the categorisation of experiences has another important 
implication for our discussion of Mary's belief that experiences have qualia. 
                                                 
19 This conclusion is accepted here for the sake of the argument. A reply to it can be found in 
Carruthers 2000, p. 117. 
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It has already been stressed that one of the roles assigned to qualia is that of 
being properties of experience that determine our classification of colour 
experience. It is clear that Peacocke's sensational properties satisfy this feature of 
qualia. Thus, we might think that Mary's supposed new belief concerns the fact that 
the experience she is having has a certain sensational property.  
Determining whether DPM can account for the formation of introspective 
beliefs that our experiences have sensational properties will answer this question. If 
sensational properties of experience exist, we should be able to think introspectively 
about them. Our task is now to see whether such introspective beliefs and the 
resulting categorisation of experiences might result from an inferential procedure as 
suggested by DPM. Determining how introspective beliefs about sensational 
properties are formed requires investigating how we can acquire concepts referring 
to sensational properties.  
Peacocke has provided an account of how to conceptualise sensational 
properties. He thinks that: 
The sensational properties of an experience, like its representational 
properties, have reliable and publicly identifiable causes. (Peacocke 
1983: 305) 
In particular, Peacocke suggests a way of individuating the sensational features of 
colour experiences that renders perspicuous the relation between thinking about 
these features and our beliefs about their causes. Using primed predicates to 
indicate the sensational features of experiences, he suggests that we can fix the 
reference of red' to the relative sensory property in term of this description: “Red' is 
the property of the visual field in which a red thing is presented in normal 
circumstances”. Let us see how this way of fixing the reference to sensational 
property can be used to provide a DPM account of our introspective knowledge of 
the type of experiences we have. 
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Given the sensationalist account of colour experiences, certain introspective 
beliefs about the type of experiences we are having might be analysed as “I am 
having an experience with sensational property P'“ where P' stands for a sensational 
property like red', green' etc. Thus, in order to have an introspective belief we need 
to possess the concept of an experience of a certain type. In turn, if the 
sensationalist account of experience is correct, we need to possess a way of thinking 
about sensational properties.  
We have seen that, according to Peacocke, we can think about sensational 
properties in terms of certain reference fixing phrases concerning objects of the 
relevant type that cause certain experiences. Such relations of dependence in the 
possession of these concepts suggest a way of spelling out the introspective 
knowledge of experiences in terms of the DPM. Let us consider, for instance, the 
sensational property being elliptical’. This is the sensational property normally 
caused by an object presenting an elliptical aspect to the observer.  We learn to 
ascribe such a property to our experience by noticing elliptical aspects. For 
example, let us assume that I believe that the experience I have, as I look at my 
coffee mug, has the sensational property of being elliptical’.  Having this belief can 
only be based on the fact that I notice that the mug rim presents an elliptical aspect 
from my point of view. Then I assume that its doing so affects the character of my 
experience. Similarly, we can apply this account to the sensational properties of 
colour experiences. Let us assume that a subject comes to believe that his 
experience has a certain sensational property red’. It seems plausible that the 
subject forms this belief by noticing that an object looks red to him in the given 
observational conditions.  
To sum up, we can regard introspection as indirect awareness of experiences. 
Specifically, we can formulate this idea without having to choose between 
representationalism and sensationalism. We have now to consider whether this 
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account of introspection is specific enough to describe how Mary comes to know 
that experiences have qualia.   
5.5 The Content of Mary’s Belief 
The DPM explains how we ordinarily form beliefs about colour experiences when 
we see coloured objects. Moreover, this account clarifies how these beliefs amount 
to knowledge. The DPM does not require endorsing a particular view on the nature 
of colour experiences. This doctrine is based on a plausible claim concerning our 
introspective capacities. According to this general principle, subjects can categorise 
colour experiences introspectively only if they have two capacities. Firstly, they 
have to form beliefs about colours that objects look to have to them. Secondly, they 
should possess a typology of colour experiences that relate a type of colour 
experience to the colour (shade) that they are seeing. This section considers how 
endorsing DPM affects our evaluation of the knowledge argument.  
According to the upholder of the knowledge argument, upon her release, Mary 
discovers what it is like to have a type of colour experience. This discovery 
involves propositional knowledge concerning the type of colour experience that she 
has when she is seeing a coloured object. This means that when Mary sees a 
coloured object she discovers that the scientific description of the type of colour 
experiences she is having is incomplete. There is a property left out by her scientific 
knowledge. As some authors illustrate this point, there should be a discovery that 
Mary can formulate as follows:  “Aha, this is what it is like to see red!”.  
To make such a discovery, Mary should have two capacities. First, she has to be 
able to determine which type of colour experience she is having. This means that 
she has to recognise that her current colour experience is of a type characterised by 
scientific knowledge. Second, she has to discover the characteristic of this type of 
colour experience that she could not know before her release. It appears that the 
DPM explains how Mary can have these capacities.  
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We can account for how Mary recognises that her current colour experience 
belongs to a certain type that is described in scientific terms. Before her release, 
Mary can describe what it is to look red.20 Firstly, Mary possesses a schematic 
notion of looking a certain colour. By seeing black and white objects, she is able to 
understand that objects can look to her to have certain colours. Moreover, she can 
describe red in scientific terms. Given our account of Mary’s scientific knowledge, 
she can describe red as a certain position P in the complete colour space. Thus, she 
understands red as the feature that satisfies certain relations of similarity to the other 
colours. Alternatively, she can characterise red as the colour of a certain paradigm 
stimulus seen in certain conditions. Moreover, she can describe red as the colour 
that objects look to have to people when they are in a certain brain state. Whichever 
scientific description Mary uses to characterise red, let us indicate it with Reds. 
Accordingly, let us use the expression Reds-type experience to indicate a description 
that Mary can use before her release to describe a type of colour experience. 
Namely, this is the description: “The type of colour experience someone has when 
something looks Reds to him”. 
The DPM account suggests a plausible explanation of how Mary acquires 
introspective beliefs concerning the type of colour experience she is having. Let us 
assume that Mary sees a red rose. On this account, Mary should be able to draw the 
following inference:  
(1) The rose looks Reds to me. 
(2) The rose would not look Reds to me unless I were having a Reds-type 
experience. 
Therefore: 
                                                 
20 Of course, here I am not assuming that such a description is satisfactory. 
 
The Content of Mary’s Belief  127
(3) I am having a Reds-type experience. 
It seems plausible that Mary can know (1) and (2). Before her release, Mary can 
know that roses look Reds to normal individuals in certain visual conditions.21 
When she sees the rose in the appropriate condition, she will recognises that it is a 
rose. Thus, she can conclude that the rose looks red to her. Moreover, nothing bars 
Mary from knowing principles such as (2). Before her release, she can possess the 
concept of visual colour experience. By seeing black objects she can infer that she 
is having a black-type colour experience. This means that she can form the belief 
that she is having the type of colour experience people have when things look black 
to them. Thus, she can master both a “schematic” notion of colour experience and 
that of looking a certain colour to her.  
Thus, we can understand how Mary can self-ascribe a type of colour experience 
as described by her scientific knowledge. Clearly, the knowledge argument is not 
meant to raise a problem concerning this self-ascription. Instead, this argument is 
intended to show that, by seeing a coloured object, Mary learns something about 
this type of colour experience that escapes her scientific knowledge. Let us, then, 
consider this issue.  
The DPM clarifies how Mary forms a belief that might plausibly amount to the 
knowledge of what it is like to have a certain type of colour experience. By seeing 
the rose, Mary comes to believe something else beside (1). In fact, she can also 
acquire the belief that: 
(4) The rose looks this colour.  
Moreover, given the belief that (1), Mary can form the belief that:  
(5) Something looks Reds when it looks this colour. 
                                                 
21 A suggestion of this type is formulated in Perry 2001, p. 96.  
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Finally, she can form a belief about the Reds-type experience that she is having. 
Namely, she can believe that: 
(5) A Reds-type experience is the type of colour experience one has 
when something looks this colour to her. 
Thus, it might be suggested that (5) is a plausible candidate for the type of belief 
that should figure in the knowledge of what it is like to have a certain type of colour 
experience. Moreover, this account suggests a characterisation of the quale that 
Mary comes to know. On this account of introspective knowledge, Mary comes to 
know that her colour experience has the property of  “being the type of colour 
experience one has when something looks this colour to her”. 
 The upholder of the knowledge argument might object to such a revision of the 
concept of quale. In fact, our characterisation introduces a description of qualia that 
cannot figure in the original setting of the knowledge argument. There are two lines 
of reply to this objection. The first reply is that the suggested interpretation derives 
from the account of introspection that was defended in the previous sections.22 
Therefore, the burden of proof is on the promoter of this criticism. He has to show 
that this account of introspective knowledge is implausible.  
The second reply to the supporter of the knowledge argument is that our 
revision of the notion of quale does not undermine the knowledge argument. The 
intuition that Mary learns something about her experience is preserved. On our 
account, Mary learns something new about the type of colour experience she is 
having, only if she learns something about the colour Reds. In fact, the notion of the 
quale of the experience under discussion here is formulated with reference to 
whatever Mary learns once she has the demonstrative belief (4).  Moreover, there is 
a plausible intuition that, in knowing (5), Mary learns something. First, as we saw in 
                                                 
22 See sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
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chapter 3, although Mary knows the precise position of the colour in a system of 
relations of similarity she cannot recognise that the rose looks Reds to her just by 
seeing the rose.23 Clearly, if we want to trick her and we show her a blue rose she 
would believe that this rose looks Reds to her. Similarly, she will not be able to 
determine amongst different randomly coloured patches which one is Reds.   
Thus, the upholder of the knowledge argument might argue that these new 
recognitional and discriminatory capacities depends on the instantiation of non-
physical properties. For instance, he might maintain that Mary’s discovery that 
objects that look Reds have some properties that she did not know before her 
release. Thus, she is able to recognise or discriminate by sight Reds things in virtue 
of her awareness of these properties. The upholder of the knowledge argument 
might argue that in seeing the rose Mary comes to know something new.  
To sum up, the central problem we have to face in evaluating the plausibility of 
the central step in the knowledge argument is now clear. We have to establish 
whether, by seeing a coloured object, Mary acquires a new belief concerning the 
colour that the object looks to have to her. In fact, this is a central requirement for 
Mary acquiring a new true belief about the type of colour experience that she is 
having. Moreover, only if the upholder of the knowledge argument can prove this 
claim, he can then proceed in arguing for the conclusion that there are facts that 
Mary’s scientific knowledge cannot accommodate. 
                                                 
23 I avoid considering the other types of scientific description that Mary might use to characterise 
Reds. It seems that similar considerations apply in the case that Mary uses them. If for example she 
describes something that looks Reds as looking the colour of a certain paradigm stimulus, she will 
not be able to recognise that the rose looks Reds. Similarly, this will happen for any physical 
specification of the nature of the stimulus or of the brain states she might use to articulate the notion 
Reds.   
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5.6 Conclusion 
When considering the content of Mary’s new knowledge, Jackson and other 
commentators claim that she comes to know about qualia as features of her 
experiences. However, the thought experiment alone cannot support this conclusion. 
Conversely, I have argued that Mary is directly aware of the objects of her 
experiences and their features. Moreover, we have an account of how she can think 
about her colour experiences when she sees coloured objects. This model does not 
affect the idea that upon her release Mary might learn about new facts and 
properties. 
 
 
 6 Resisting the Ontological Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
We have to establish whether a modified version of the knowledge argument raises 
a difficulty for the hypothesis of modest reductionism. The knowledge argument is 
based on the claim that knowing what it is like to have a colour experience escapes 
Mary’s scientific knowledge.  
The previous chapters elucidated the two kinds of knowledge of colour 
experiences that are involved in this version of the knowledge argument. The third 
chapter presented an account of Mary's scientific knowledge. This knowledge relies 
on a descriptive apparatus that we can intelligibly grasp as a generalisation of 
models employed in contemporary science.  
The fourth and the fifth chapters investigated the knowledge that, according to 
the supporter of the knowledge argument, Mary acquires upon her release. 
Specifically, I offered an account of the belief that figures in Mary’s knowledge of 
what it is like to have a colour experience.      
This chapter considers the central inferential step involved in the knowledge 
argument. This step can be expressed as an instance of modus ponens. Namely: if, 
by seeing coloured objects, Mary acquires new propositional knowledge about 
colour experiences, then there are facts concerning these mental states that her 
scientific knowledge cannot accommodate. Moreover, Mary acquires new 
propositional knowledge about colour experiences.   
Firstly, I will evaluate whether the latter claim is true. This claim requires that 
Mary’s knowledge of what it is like to have a colour experience is based on new 
true beliefs. This means that Mary could not have these beliefs about colour 
experiences before her release. In the previous chapter, we established that Mary 
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acquires new beliefs about her colour experiences, only if she acquires new beliefs 
about the colours that objects look to have. Thus, we have to consider whether the 
antecedent of this conditional is true.  
Section 6.2 begins this investigation by discussing the ability reply to the 
knowledge argument. According to this criticism, by having colour experiences 
Mary simply acquires a set of abilities or forms of knowing how. However, she does 
not acquire beliefs about colour experiences. Therefore, she does not acquire new 
beliefs. Section 6.3 shows that this reply might be effective against the idea that 
Mary gains new propositional knowledge about colours. In section 6.4, I argue that 
an evaluation of the ability reply requires possessing a criterion for the 
individuation of beliefs. Then, I show that the upholder of the knowledge argument 
can evade the ability reply by endorsing a certain criterion for the individuation of 
beliefs. Consequently, we can concede that Mary acquires true beliefs about colour 
experiences that she lacked before her release. 
The remainder of the chapter considers whether making such a concession 
requires accepting the conclusion of the knowledge argument. This means 
establishing whether, if we assume that Mary acquires new propositional 
knowledge, we must accept the existence of facts concerning her colour experiences 
that science cannot account for.  
Section 6.5 illustrates an objection to this conclusion that I call the two ways of 
thinking reply. The supporters of this reply assume that the premises of the 
knowledge argument are consistent with the possibility that Mary acquires, upon 
her release, a new way of knowing facts about colour experiences she already knew 
before her release.1 This means that although all the premises of the argument might 
be true the conclusion that there are non-physical facts does not follow. Therefore, 
                                                 
1 Recent versions of this strategy against the knowledge argument are pursued by Carruthers 2000, 
Horgan 1984, Lycan 1995, Rey 1992, Tye 2000, Papineau 2002, Sturgeon 2000, Perry 2001, Loar 
1990. 
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the knowledge argument is not valid. Section 6.6 shows that such a reply requires 
the existence of certain concepts, usually called phenomenal concepts, concerning 
colour experiences.  
6.2 The Ability Reply 
The knowledge argument requires that Mary acquires new true beliefs and 
knowledge about colours by seeing coloured objects. Only if this condition is 
satisfied, does Mary acquire new knowledge about colour experiences. Moreover, 
only if this latter claim is true, the upholder of the knowledge argument can draw 
her conclusion. Namely, there are facts concerning colour experiences that Mary’s 
scientific knowledge cannot account for.  
This section illustrates the ability reply to the knowledge argument proposed by 
Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis.2 They argue that Mary does not acquire new 
beliefs about her colour experiences once she sees coloured objects. Instead, she 
gains certain abilities. 
The ability reply is an attempt to block the crucial step in Jackson’s knowledge 
argument. This criticism aims to show that if Mary learns something new, the 
existence of non-physical facts does not follow. The strategy involves showing that 
knowing what it is like to have an experience is not knowledge that requires that 
certain facts hold. Two main premises are involved in arguing for this conclusion. 
The first premise is that, by seeing colours, Mary acquires only a set of abilities or a 
form of knowing how. Let us call it the ability hypothesis. The second premise is 
that propositional knowledge and knowing how are different kinds of knowledge. 
Knowing how does not involve acquiring beliefs whose truth requires that certain 
facts hold. Thus, there is no reason to conclude that Mary acquires beliefs about 
                                                 
2 Nemirow 1980, Nemirow 1990, Lewis 1983, Lewis 1990. Mellor 1993 provides a similar account 
of knowing what it is like to have an experience, but without defending physicalism. 
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facts that she could not know before her release. Let us consider these premises in 
more detail. 
The ability hypothesis states that Mary, by seeing colours, simply acquires 
certain abilities. Nemirow, for instance, advances the ability hypothesis as the 
following equation: 
Knowing what it is like is the same as knowing how to imagine having 
the experience. (Nemirow 1990: 495) 
He maintains that knowing what it is like to have a colour experience is correlated 
with imagining the sight of a colour. According to Nemirow, Harry cannot honestly 
affirm that he knows what seeing chartreuse is like if he cannot imagine the sight of 
chartreuse. Similarly, Nemirow claims that: “It would be nonsense for Harry to 
insist that he can easily visualise chartreuse, but does not know what seeing it is 
like”.3 Nemirow suggests that this correspondence should be taken as the 
manifestation of an identity. He maintains that the ability hypothesis should be 
endorsed for its explanatory powers. In particular, he thinks that this equation 
explains the central intuitions involved in the knowledge argument in terms 
compatible with physicalism.4 However, before investigating whether this is the 
case, let us consider another formulation of the ability hypothesis. 
Lewis formulates the ability hypothesis with a more extensive list of abilities: 
… knowing what it is like is the possession of abilities: abilities to 
recognize, abilities to imagine, abilities to predict one's behaviour by 
imaginative experiments. (Lewis 1983: 131) 
Besides the ability to imagine suggested by Nemirow, Lewis adds both the ability to 
recognise and to make certain predictions. According to Lewis, once we have an 
                                                 
3 Nemirow 1990, p. 493. 
4 Nemirow 1990. 
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experience we acquire the ability to recognise it again. If we taste a certain food, we 
acquire the ability to recognise whether on another occasion something tastes the 
same way and thus that we have the same experience. Moreover, having a certain 
experience enables us to predict how we would react if we were to have a similar 
experience. For example, if we taste a disgusting food, this experience enables us to 
predict that we will avoid such a gustatory experience in the future.5
The second premise of the ability reply is the endorsement of the distinction 
between propositional knowledge and knowing how.6 Propositional knowledge 
involves true beliefs. A belief can be regarded as subjects' attitude towards a 
proposition. Propositions are representations of reality that can be either true or 
false. Thus, a belief can be said to be true (false) when the relative proposition is 
true (false). Moreover, it is plausible to assume that implicit within the knowledge 
argument is the idea that the obtaining of facts renders propositions and beliefs true. 
Given this characterisation of propositional knowledge, we can appreciate the main 
difference between this kind of knowledge and knowing how. Possessing abilities, 
such as knowing how to swim, catch a ball or to play musical instruments, is a form 
of knowledge. However, knowing how to do something is not to believe that the 
world is a certain way. Thus, this knowledge does not involve propositions that can 
be either true or false. From this, it follows that this knowledge does not concern 
facts. In order to exercise the relevant ability, certain conditions in the world have to 
be satisfied. Nevertheless, having these abilities does not amount to knowing that 
certain facts occur. 
The upholder of the ability reply offers a direct response to the knowledge 
argument. By seeing coloured objects, Mary acquires abilities and these abilities 
qua knowing how do not involve new beliefs. Without these new beliefs about 
                                                 
5 Lewis 1983, p. 131. 
6 A classical analysis of the differences between knowledge that and knowing how is given in Ryle 
1949, pp. 26-60. 
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colour experiences, there are no facts concerning properties that her scientific 
knowledge cannot accommodate. At the same time, the supporter of the ability 
reply can explain the intuitions exploited in the knowledge argument. First, she can 
explain why knowing what it is like to have an experience requires having that 
mental state. Seeing a colour is a condition for acquiring the ability to imagine, 
recognise and remember the relative colour experience. Second, she can account for 
the intuition that, upon her release, Mary learns something new. Before her release, 
Mary has knowledge that might be acquired just by being told about certain facts. 
However, simply being told about facts does not give her the abilities that constitute 
knowing what it is like to see a colour. Consider someone who is told all the facts 
involved in swimming. This would not give him the ability to swim; he needs 
practice. We have now to consider whether the ability reply is relevant for 
establishing whether Mary acquires a new belief about objects looking the same 
colour. 
To sum up, the ability reply denies that Mary acquires a new propositional 
knowledge about colour experiences. On this view, she just acquires certain 
abilities. Now we should consider whether this reply might apply to our version of 
the knowledge argument.   
6.3 A Version of the Ability Reply 
This section shows how the ability reply applies to our version of the knowledge 
argument. According to the ability reply, when Mary sees a coloured object she 
acquires amongst others abilities a recognitional ability. This is the ability to 
recognise a type of colour experience when one has it again. I will show that if 
Mary acquires this ability, it can be shown that she cannot acquire a new true belief 
concerning the quale of her colour experience.  Before doing this, however, we 
need some preliminary clarifications and assumptions. 
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In the previous chapter, I characterised what might be the quale that upon 
release Mary supposedly ascribes to her colour experience. Let us assume that Mary 
sees a red rose. In addition, we can use Reds to stand for Mary’s scientific 
description of red. Finally, Reds-type experience is an abbreviation for “the type of 
colour experience that people have when something looks Reds to them”. Therefore, 
by seeing the rose Mary acquires (supposedly) the knowledge that the Reds-type 
experience has a quale. I suggested that Mary can regard this quale as “the property 
that determine the type of colour experience that one has when something looks this 
colour to him”.  
There are two plausible assumptions we have to consider. First, if Mary comes 
to have the new true belief that a type of colour experience has a quale, then, in 
certain circumstance, she will acquire other new true beliefs. She will have new true 
beliefs when judging that two colour experiences are of the same type. For the 
supporters of the knowledge argument assume that qualia are properties that ground 
the ordinary typology of colour experiences. On this view, two colour experiences 
are of the same type when they have the same quale. The second assumption 
concerns the capacity to judge that two colour experiences that one is having are of 
the same type. This requires judging that the objects one sees look the same colour. 
Clearly, this follows from our DPM account of introspective knowledge. We are 
now in the position to consider how the ability reply can be used against our version 
of the knowledge argument. 
Let us suppose that Mary, before her release, is allowed to study a coloured 
patch A without seeing its colour. In particular, Mary knows the physical properties 
of the light reflected by A and the kinds of responses subjects have to it as described 
by her scientific theory. Thus, she can locate the evoked response to A in the 
complete colour space. Therefore, she can know all the relations of similarity that 
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this response has with all the other responses to light stimuli.7 Moreover, she can 
explain in neuroscientific terms why the response evoked by seeing A occupies that 
position it does in the colour space.  
In particular, Mary can predict which stimuli are metamers of the light stimulus 
relative to A. Metamers are physical stimuli that evoke judgements of colour 
matching. Metameric stimuli can differ completely in their wavelength 
composition.8 In particular, for any stimulus at a certain wavelength it is possible to 
determine a second stimulus of different composition that will produce a matching 
colour response. This second stimulus has to be composed of appropriately chosen 
wavelengths and intensity. Moreover, it is already possible to predict whether two 
light stimuli are metamers once their wavelength composition and intensity are 
known.9
Having granted that Mary knows all the relevant scientific facts about the 
coloured patch A, let us now consider two stories about Mary. In the first one, Mary 
is released and we show her a patch B whose reflected light is a metamer of the 
light reflected by A.  However, she is not allowed to see the colour of the patch A. 
In addition, Mary is not allowed to study B using her scientific instruments.  
In this case, it seems that Mary cannot determine, just in virtue of seeing B and 
her knowledge about A, whether A and B look the same colour and that they are 
thus metamers. In fact, she cannot infer that A and B look the same colour from her 
scientific knowledge of the properties of A and the mathematical procedure used to 
determine the metamers of A. First, she cannot conclude that the two patches look 
the same colour from the premise that they both look a certain colour as described 
                                                 
7 See on colour spaces section 2.3 at p. 48. 
8 Usually, metamers are defined with respect to a certain observer under certain viewing conditions. 
Given that this specification does not affect my exposition, I have omitted it. On metamers see 
Hardin 1988, pp. 27-28. 
9 These predictions are based on mathematical procedures involving certain models called 
wavelength mixture spaces. These models concern the response functions of the receptors in the 
retina. See Clark 1993, pp. 37-42.  
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in the colour space. In fact, just by experiencing B, she cannot determine the 
relations of similarity that B’s colour has with all the other colours. 10 The patch 
might occupy all her visual field, and thus she might only know about the relations 
of similarity that the colour of the patch has with white and black. Second, Mary 
will recognise neither the physical properties of B nor the brain states involved in 
seeing it. She has never had colour experiences and she cannot know, just by 
experiencing B, how the colour she sees relates to these physical properties.11 We 
can now consider a second story about Mary. 
As in the previous case, Mary knows the features of patch A in terms of her 
scientific knowledge. But after her release, we show her patch A and then patch B. 
It seems that now she is in a position to recognise that A and B look the same 
colour. Thus, Mary can express her belief by affirming that “patch A and B look the 
same colour”. Moreover, it seems that Mary can acquires this belief by having a 
colour experience. Specifically, the only difference between these two stories is that 
in the second one Mary can see patch A. Therefore, it has to be the case that seeing 
patch A has a role to play in Mary’s coming to believe that “A and B look the same 
colour”. Consequently, and this derives from the DPM account of introspection, 
seeing A should enable Mary to have thoughts about the fact that in seeing both A 
and B she has the same type of colour experience. 
The upholder of the knowledge argument can explain why seeing A enables 
Mary to judge whether or not she has the same type of colour experience. In fact, by 
seeing A she comes to know the quale of that type of colour experience. Therefore, 
when she sees B, she recognises that the current colour experience has the same 
quale. However, it seems that the upholder of the ability reply can respond to this 
explanation.  
                                                 
10 Here it is assumed that the colour space describes the colours that Mary can discriminate. 
11 See the arguments given in section 3.5, at p. 74.  
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It can be replied that Mary has in fact the same type of scientific beliefs about 
objects looking the same colour as she had before her release. The only difference 
lies in the fact that now she can arrive at these beliefs thanks to the abilities she has 
acquired by having colour experience. Let us illustrate this reply in more detail.  
Let us indicate the light composition reflected by patches A and B with ψ1 and 
ψ2 respectively. Now, if Mary can study A and B in the laboratory, she will be able 
to draw this inference: 
(1) Composition of the light stimulus relative to A is ψ1. 
(2) Composition of the light stimulus relative to B is ψ2. 
(3) The compositions ψ1 and ψ2 determine a colour match. 
Therefore, Mary comes to believe and know that: 
(4) A and B look the same colour. 
We now can describe Mary's epistemic progress after her release. In the 
following, C stands for the colour that the patches look to have. On the account 
under consideration, this is what happens when she leaves the laboratory:  
(5) Mary sees A as looking C.  
(6) Mary sees B as looking C. 
Therefore, Mary comes to believe that: 
(7) A and B look the same colour. 
The proponent of the ability reply can account for a difference between the 
situation in which Mary believes (4) and that in which she believes (7). Mary 
reaches the belief that (4) is the case inferentially by applying logical rules to what 
she knows about A and B.12 On the other hand, the supporter of the ability reply can 
                                                 
12 By means of certain mathematical procedures involving models called wavelength mixture spaces, 
it is already possible to predict whether two light stimuli are metamers from their wavelength 
composition. See Clark 1993, pp. 37-42.  
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maintain that Mary comes to believe (7) in virtue of a recognitional ability. She 
acquires such ability in seeing A and then she exercises it when seeing B. 
Therefore, seeing coloured objects does not give Mary new beliefs about qualia that 
ground a typology of colour experience. The only difference is that the post-release 
beliefs she uses to classify colour experiences are based on a new recognitional 
capacity. 
To recapitulate, it can be shown that, upon her release, Mary can come to judge 
two colour experiences as being of the same type by judging that objects look the 
same colour to her. However, Mary could possess such beliefs before her release. 
The only difference now is that she can arrive at these beliefs in virtue of her newly 
acquired abilities. We have now to consider whether the upholder of the knowledge 
argument can escape this objection. 
6.4 Resisting the Ability Reply 
The previous section showed how a version of the ability reply could be used to 
deny that Mary acquires new beliefs about colour experiences.  
This section considers whether the supporter of the knowledge argument can 
escape the ability reply.13 I will argue that this can be done if one advances a 
principle for the individuation of beliefs. This principle is required to show that, 
after seeing colours, Mary’s beliefs about colour experiences are not the same as the 
ones she had before her release. 
The upholder of the knowledge argument should establish that Mary acquires 
new beliefs about objects looking the same colour. Determining whether Mary 
                                                 
13 Defenders and opponents of the knowledge argument have attacked the ability reply. Some have 
criticised the distinction between knowing how and knowing that. See Crane 2001, pp. 94-95.  
Others have focussed on the ability hypothesis. These criticisms show that the abilities suggested by 
Lewis and Nemirow are neither necessary nor sufficient for knowing what it is like to have an 
experience. See Lycan 1995, pp. 244-249; Loar 1990 pp. 607-608; Levin 1985, p. 479; Nida-
Rümelin 1995, pp. 235-237; Tye 2000, Conee 1994; Raymont 1999, Papineau 1993, Bigelow and 
Pargetter 1990, p. 146, Seager 1991, pp. 155-56.  
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acquires these new beliefs requires specifying a principle of individuation for 
beliefs. This principle will state under which conditions two beliefs are the same. 
Moreover, if such conditions do not obtain, we can establish that the beliefs differ.  
Usually beliefs are taken to be mental states consisting in having an attitude 
towards a certain content. If John believes that the snow is white, John has the 
attitude of believing toward the content expressed by the sentence “the snow is 
white”. The difference we are investigating cannot depend on Mary's attitudes.14 
Instead, we are interested in whether it can be maintained that she learns something 
about objects looking the same colour. Thus, the upholder of the knowledge 
argument needs an account of the individuation of contents. 
Two types of conditions individuate the content of beliefs.15 In one sense, we 
can maintain that the content of a belief is individuated by the fact that renders it 
true. Thus, the belief that London is a town is different from the belief that dogs 
have tails. In fact, these beliefs are true when different facts obtain.  
The upholder of the knowledge argument cannot use this account. In fact, 
showing that Mary acquires new beliefs would be equivalent to showing that there 
are new facts that these beliefs are about. However, this would mean to assume the 
conclusion of the knowledge argument. 
However, this way of individuating beliefs seems to fail when we want to 
explain certain differences between beliefs that depend on what subjects know or 
believe. For example, someone might not know that Tully is identical to Cicero. 
Thus, he can believe that Cicero is an orator without believing that Tully is an 
orator. It can be suggested that the subject fails to have both beliefs because they 
                                                 
14 Mary's degree of confidence that two things look the same colour might vary according to the 
method she has used to reach this conclusion. For example, she might think that seeing coloured 
objects provides less certain results than using scientific instruments. 
15 The debate on the nature of content intersects with that on the nature of meaning of linguistic 
expression, which constitutes a central issue in contemporary philosophy. This determines an area of 
research whose extension and depth cannot be addressed here. Useful introductions to the 
contemporary discussion on content are given in Peacocke 1994 and Papineau 1994. 
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differ in their content.  In the following, I will investigate how we can individuate 
contents when they are understood in this latter sense. Differences in the 
informativeness of beliefs depend on the concepts exercised in having them. 
Believing that the snow is white requires having the concepts [snow] and [being 
white] (I use square brackets to designate concepts). Just as the words “snow” and 
“white” are constituents of the sentence “the snow is white”, the concepts [snow] 
and [white] are the constituents of the content expressed by that sentence. Two 
contents differ when they have different constituents. Therefore, differences 
between the content of beliefs are based on differences between the concepts that 
constitute these contents. 
These intuitions concerning how concepts determine the cognitive content of 
beliefs can be expressed precisely. Christopher Peacocke provides the following 
principle for the distinctness of concepts: 
Concepts C and D are distinct if and only if there are two complete 
propositional contents that differ at most in that one contains C 
substituted in one or more places for D, and one which is potentially 
informative while the other it is not. (Peacocke 1992: 2) 
Clearly, this principle individuates concepts in terms of what a subject might find 
informative. If Tully and Cicero are the same person, then someone might not know 
this fact and thus he will find it informative that “Tully is Cicero”. That “Tully is 
Tully” is not informative in this way. Let us now consider how this criterion is 
relevant for our discussion of Mary's case. 
The upholder of the knowledge argument has to determine whether the concept 
of looking the same colour that occurs in Mary's belief before and after release is 
the same. Let us consider someone who lacks scientific knowledge of colour vision. 
It seems that this person can determine when two patches look the same colour and 
believe that “A and B look the same colour”. Now the concept of having the same 
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colour which Mary uses before her release is the concept of the relation two stimuli 
have when their physical features, like reflectance, determine, in certain observers 
in certain conditions, similar discriminatory responses. Let us name this concept 
with the expression [looking the same colour]s  where the subscript s stands for 
“scientific”. It seems that the person who has no idea of the physical properties of A 
and B, cannot believe that A and B look-same-colours. Let us consider the 
propositional content expressed by: 
(1) A and B look the same colour if and only if A and B look the same 
colour. 
Substituting in (1) an occurrence of the concept [looking the same colour] with 
one of the concept [looking the same colour]s, the resulting content is informative 
for this subject. Given the criterion of distinctness of concepts introduced above, the 
two concepts of looking the same colour differ. Consequently, given that concepts 
determine the cognitive content of beliefs, the beliefs where these concepts occur 
also differ. 
Thus, the upholder of the knowledge argument can argue that the notions of 
looking the same colour, available to Mary before and after her release differ. These 
notions play a fundamental role respectively in the scientific and in the introspective 
categorisation of colour experiences. In scientific terms, types of colour experience 
are individuated in terms of the notion of looking the same colour based on 
statistical elaboration of discriminatory responses to physical stimuli. On the other 
hand, the upholder of the knowledge argument can argue that the ordinary way to 
type colour experience is based on different beliefs about objects looking the same 
colour. 
Therefore, the supporter of the knowledge argument can argue that the best 
explanation of why Mary has these new beliefs about looking the same colour, is 
that when Mary sees a coloured object she acquires a new belief about the colour 
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she is seeing. Thus, her belief that “the object looks this colour” would give her 
information about the object that she sees. This is information that she could not 
acquire before her release. 
To sum up, it has been argued that the upholder of the knowledge argument has 
a resource against the ability reply. She can claim that there is a difference between 
the propositional knowledge that Mary possesses about objects looking the same 
colour before and after her release. I showed how she can base this difference on a 
difference in the concepts of looking the same colour. However, if this is the case, it 
seems plausible that Mary acquires new beliefs about the colours object look to 
have. Therefore, she acquires new beliefs about the type of colour experiences that 
she has.  
Thus, the upholder of the knowledge argument can rehabilitate a central 
assumption in his reasoning. When Mary sees coloured objects, she acquires new 
beliefs and so her knowledge is new propositional knowledge that was not available 
to her before her release.  
6.5 The “Two Ways of Thinking” Reply  
I have conceded to the upholder of the knowledge argument that when Mary sees 
colours she acquires new true beliefs about her colour experiences. Therefore, while 
Mary is still in the laboratory, she cannot infer these beliefs from her complete 
scientific knowledge. This section begins to examine whether this assumption 
implies the ontological conclusion that there are facts that Mary’s scientific 
knowledge cannot accommodate.  
The first aim of this section is to consider one of the implicit premises within 
the knowledge argument that leads from the assumption that Mary has new 
knowledge to the conclusion that there are non-physical qualia. This is the 
assumption that necessarily different true beliefs are made true by different facts. 
The second aim of this section is to endorse the two ways of thinking reply to the 
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knowledge argument that targets this principle. The main idea of this objection is 
that knowing what it is like to have a colour experience is just a new way to know 
facts that Mary already knew while she was in the black and white laboratory. By 
endorsing this reply, I will argue that Jackson’s ontological conclusion does not 
follow from the claim that Mary acquires new true beliefs about colour 
experiences.16  
The inference from the assumption that Mary acquires new knowledge about 
colour experience to the conclusion that there are non-physical qualia is based on 
three deductive steps. The first of these steps leads from the premise that Mary has a 
new true belief about what it is like to have a certain colour experience to the 
conclusion that there is a fact involving the occurrence of a quale. The second 
deductive step shows that this fact is a new fact that Mary could not know before 
her release. The third and final step aims to prove that the quale involved in this fact 
cannot be a physical property.   
I investigated the premises involved in the first and third inferential step in the 
previous chapters.17 Here I recall them briefly. The first step involves some 
principle that bridges true beliefs and facts. I argued that both a conception of the 
content of beliefs, or the notion of truth as correspondence, might provide such a 
principle. The third inferential step is justified by the conception of physical fact 
involved in the knowledge argument. According to this principle, if a fact about 
colour experiences is physical then it is known or knowable by Mary. Therefore, if 
there are facts about colour experiences that she does not know while in the black 
and white room, these facts cannot be physical. Let us now consider the remaining 
inferential step. 
                                                 
16 Some philosophers, instead of considering facts, distinguish between two types of information; 
see, for instance, Horgan 1984 and Lycan 1995. Although this might reflect their different 
approaches to the content of beliefs, these authors use a strategy similar to that used here, which is 
articulated in terms of facts. 
17 See, for the first step, Chapter 4, p. 88. For the third step, see Chapter 2, p. 47. 
 
Resisting the Ontological Conclusion 147
If it is assumed that different beliefs are made true by different facts, then the 
ascription to Mary of a new belief about her colour experience implies the existence 
of a new fact. The reasons for this are as follows. From the premise that Mary 
acquires new knowledge, and thus a new true belief, we have to conclude that there 
is a new fact she did not know before her release. Given that by seeing a coloured 
object Mary has a true belief, there should be a fact that makes this belief true. 
Now, we have to establish grounds for the conclusion that this is fact is a new one 
that Mary did not know about before her release. The assumption that Mary has a 
new belief appears to provide such grounding. Clearly, this requires the following 
principle for the individuation of facts: 
(1) Facts F1 and F2 are distinct if they make true distinct beliefs B1 and 
B2 respectively. 
The discussion of this principle is at the core of two ways of thinking reply. In 
particular, this objection’s starting point consists in revealing that the notion of 
‘fact’ in (1) is ambiguous.  
The two ways of thinking reply to the knowledge argument hinges on the 
distinction between two ways of understanding facts.18 According to one reading, a 
necessary requirement for establishing the identity of facts is the identity of 
concepts used to represent these facts. For example, Peter Carruthers calls this a 
thin notion of fact: 
Facts in this sense are just true thoughts, or the mirror-images of true 
propositions; and they differ whenever the concepts out of which those 
                                                 
18 In certain formulations of the two ways of thinking reply, this distinction concerns different types 
of belief contents or kinds of information. These terminological differences might reveal deeper 
theoretical divergences. However, these issues appear not to be relevant at the level of generality of 
this presentation.  
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thoughts or propositions are built are different from one another. 
(Carruthers 2000: 33)19
The individuation conditions of thin facts depend on the ways in which we think 
about their constituents. For example, the thought that “the glass contains H20” and 
the thought that “the glass contains water” involve different ways of representing a 
state of affairs in the world. While the former thought involves the concept [H20] 
the other involves the concept [water]. Therefore, the thin facts associated with 
these thoughts differ.  
There is an understanding of facts alternative to the thin notion. Following 
again Carruthers, we can call this a thick notion of fact.20 This way of thinking 
about facts is used: 
… to characterise what is there in the world considered as distinct from 
our modes of representation of it. Here one and the same fact can be 
represented by many different thoughts. (Carruthers 2000: 33) 
This understanding of facts stresses their independence of certain ways of 
conceptualisation. In order to distinguish thick facts it is not sufficient to determine 
that we have beliefs about these facts that involve different ways of thinking. In 
particular, different beliefs can be about the same thick fact. Consider, for instance, 
the belief that “the glass is full of water” and the belief that “the glass is full of 
H20”. Arguably, these beliefs involve different thoughts that represent the same 
thick fact.  
                                                 
19 Michael Tye, in offering his version of the two ways of thinking reply, advances a similar account 
for what he calls “fine-grained facts”: “Facts are sometime taken to be as fine grained in their 
individuation conditions as the contents of the propositional attitudes. […] What distinguishes these 
facts are the different conceptual modes of representation they incorporate.” (Tye 1995: 172) 
20 Similarly, Tye maintains that: “There is another, more coarse grained view, of facts that identifies 
them outright with states of affairs that obtain in the objective world, regardless of how those states 
of affairs are conceived.” (Tye 1995: 173) 
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The distinction between thin and thick facts might be regarded as depending on 
a distinction between different types of properties. In general, facts can be taken to 
be structured entities that involve the instantiation of a property in a certain object. 
Therefore, individuating facts requires as a necessary condition individuating the 
properties whose instantiations constitute them. Using Peter Carruthers’s 
terminology, we can distinguish between thick and thin conceptions of properties.21 
According to the thin conception, properties are individuated as finely as the 
concepts that refer to them. Thus, conceptual differences determine differences in 
the relative thin properties. On the other hand, thick properties are not so 
individuated. For example, the concept [H20] and [water] pick out the same thick 
property – that of being H20. However, there is a difference between the thin 
properties “being water” and “being H20”. Let us see how the distinctions between 
thin and thick facts and properties apply to Mary's case.  
Mary comes to know about new thin facts concerning the colours objects look 
to have. In the previous chapter, I argued that Mary, upon release, acquires new true 
beliefs about the colours that objects look to have. Therefore, by seeing a red object 
she might come to acquire the new true belief: 
(2) This object looks red. 
The concept [red] contained in the thought expressed by (2) differs from any of the 
scientific concepts that Mary could use in her room. This implies that Mary's new 
concept individuates a thin property of red, and that there is a new thin fact that 
Mary comes to know. This has consequences for Mary’s knowledge of colour 
experiences. 
Mary comes to know about a new thin fact concerning her experience. The 
ascription (or self-ascription) of a type of experience is based on the ability to have 
                                                 
21 Carruthers 2000, p. 35. 
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thoughts about the colours objects look to have. In particular, this derives from the 
account of introspection as a form of displaced perception defended in the previous 
chapters. Therefore, once Mary believes (2) by seeing a coloured object she can 
conclude that: 
(3) I am having the type of colour experience one has when something 
looks red to her. 
Having such a belief means that she can conceptualise a property of her experience 
in virtue of a description that involves the concept [red]. Thus, she comes to know a 
thin fact that was not available to her before her release.  
The existence of thin facts about experiences is not problematic for 
physicalism. There is no reason to assume that Mary should know all the thin facts 
about colour experience before her release. Thin facts are determined by the ways in 
which she can conceptualise her colour experiences. However, there is no 
requirement that a complete scientific knowledge of colour or colour vision should 
provide knowledge of all the possible ways of conceptualising the phenomena that 
this knowledge describes and explains. Therefore, proving the existence of thin 
facts concerning experience is weaker than the conclusion the upholder of the 
knowledge argument intends to prove. Let us consider how to characterise this 
stronger conclusion. 
The supporter of the knowledge argument must prove that Mary comes to know 
new thick facts about colour experiences. The following reasons can show this 
point. Let us assume that by seeing colours Mary acquires a new true belief about a 
colour experience made true by a new thick fact. Then, she comes to know about a 
new fact concerning a colour experience that is independent of the way of thinking 
about it that she might acquire by seeing colours. If a fact concerns colour 
experiences and is knowable independently of seeing colours, Mary should know it 
before her release. In fact, in the knowledge argument it is assumed that Mary’s 
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scientific knowledge concerns all the facts concerning colour experiences that can 
be known independently of having these experiences.22    
The existence of new facts cannot follow logically from our attribution to Mary 
of new beliefs about her colour experiences. This ascription of new beliefs to Mary 
is based on the conclusion that she acquires new concepts about her experiences. 
However, this is consistent with the possibility that these new beliefs concern old 
thick facts she knew before her release.  
To sum up, the two ways of thinking reply shows that the knowledge argument 
is unsound. While it is true that Mary acquires new true beliefs about her 
experiences, it is possible that it is false that these belief concern non-physical facts. 
For we cannot exclude that Mary's new beliefs concerns thick facts she knew before 
her release. In particular, we cannot exclude the possibility that qualia are physical 
properties.  
However, the viability of this reply to the knowledge argument requires 
tackling two issues. First, we have to make clear which are the old thick facts that 
Mary comes to know in a new way after her release. This issue will be considered 
in the next chapter in section 7.5.23 In fact, now we have to deal with a more 
pressing difficulty. The second problem is providing a detailed account of how 
Mary's new beliefs about colour experiences constitute a new way of thinking about 
colour experiences. In particular, this requires an account of the concepts that figure 
in these new beliefs. The next section will investigate this second requirement.   
6.6 Requirements on Phenomenal Concepts  
We have seen that our ascription of certain new beliefs to Mary upon her release 
might be consistent with the falsity of the knowledge argument's ontological 
                                                 
22 In the present context, there is no need to establish whether Mary’s scientific knowledge concerns 
facts that are independent of any conceptualisation. Instead, the problem is to establish whether there 
are facts about colour experiences, that vision science cannot conceptualise.  
23 See at p. 181. 
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conclusion. This results from adopting the two ways of thinking reply. This reply 
has to account for the truth of the following claims. First, Mary cannot know what it 
is like to have a colour experience before her release. Second, the existence of this 
knowledge does not imply the existence of non-physical facts or properties. We 
have seen that this reply explains both phenomena with the assumption of a 
conceptual difference that is not mirrored at the ontological level. Thus, a worked 
out version of this response requires an account of Mary’s new concepts about 
colour experiences. 
This section illustrates that the two ways of thinking strategy faces a problem. 
This difficulty emerges when we consider the requirements that this strategy places 
on Mary’s new concepts about colour experiences. Adopting a now customary 
expression, I call these phenomenal concepts.24 I will show that the two ways of 
thinking reply is viable only if phenomenal concepts satisfy certain requirements. 
However, it can be objected that assuming the existence of concepts with these 
features is an ad hoc manoeuvre. What is required is some independent justification 
for the idea that these concepts satisfy these requirements. 
The two ways of thinking strategy places important conditions upon 
phenomenal concepts. First, possessing phenomenal concepts requires having 
colour experiences. While Mary is still in the laboratory, she refers to the colour 
that an object looks to have to a certain individual S in condition C as a certain 
position in the colour space. Let us assume that she uses a certain expression P as a 
shortcut for such a description. She can describe the experience that S is undergoing 
as follows: 
                                                 
24 Recent versions of this strategy are pursued by Carruthers 2000, Horgan 1984, Lycan 1995, Rey 
1992, Tye 2000, Papineau 2002, Sturgeon 2000, Perry 2001, Loar 1990.  
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(1) S has the type of colour experience that individuals have when 
things look P to them.25
The concept [P]s, that occurs in the content of belief (1) differs from the concepts 
[P] she acquires by experiencing coloured objects. Consequently, her concepts 
about type of colour experiences will differ. As Papineau puts it, the concept of 
experience she will acquire by seeing a coloured experience will be: 
Ways of referring to conscious experiences which are standardly 
available to human beings only after they have actually undergone the 
experience in question. Their possession is standardly consequent upon 
some earlier version of the type of experience they refer to. (Papineau 
2002: 96) 
Let us consider a second requirement. 
Phenomenal concepts are not a priori connected to scientific concepts of colour 
experiences. A concept A is a priori connected to a concept B when, if a subject S 
knows that A (a), then, without further evidence provided by experience, S can 
come to know that B (a). For example, if I know that John is the husband of Mary, 
then I can know without further evidence that John is married. Thus, the concepts of 
being a husband and being married are a priori connected. However, the 
phenomenal concepts [red] and the scientific concept [red]s are not a priori 
connected. In fact, we have seen that Mary, from knowing while she is in the 
laboratory that a certain object looks [red]s to someone, she cannot infer that the 
object looks [red] to that person. Similarly, although while she is still in the 
laboratory she can know that other individuals have the type of colour experience 
one has when something look [red]s to him, she cannot know that they have the type 
of experience in virtue of which things look [red] to them. 
                                                 
25 Of course, she might even know that S has a brain state. This is the state that realises the sort of 
experience that individuals have when something looks P to them. 
 
Resisting the Ontological Conclusion 154
An objection to physicalism, considered by J.C.C Smart, illustrates the 
importance of another requirement on phenomenal concepts.26 He maintained that 
experiences are identical to brain states.27 He coupled this metaphysical claim with 
the assumption that statements reporting experiences, although they involve 
reference to brain states, have a different meaning from the sentences used in 
neuroscience. Clearly, this appears to be a central intuition that operates in the new 
way of thinking reply. Amongst many objections to his type-identity theory, Smart 
reports one offered by Max Black.28  
Black observed that two co-referential expressions provide different ways of 
thinking about their referent because they characterise it as having different 
properties. Smart illustrates this point with an example: 
For suppose we identify the Morning Star with the Evening Star. Then 
there must be some property, which logically imply that of being the 
Morning Star, and quite distinct properties which entail that of being the 
Evening Star. (Smart 1959: 172) 
While the expression “Evening Star” presents its referent as having the property of 
being visible on the evening, the “Morning Star” involves the property of being 
visible in the morning. Thus, we can concede that expressions about experiences are 
co-referential with certain neuroscientific ones. However, according to Black, if 
these expressions differ in their modes of presentation, then this must mean that 
there are certain irreducible mental properties. It is in virtue of these properties that 
                                                 
26 Smart 1959. 
27 Many of the promoters of this doctrine combined the thesis that type of experiences are identical 
with type of brain states with the assumption that ordinary talk and knowledge of experience 
involves a way of thinking about physical states of the brain. See Place 1956, Smart 1959, Feigl 
1967. Feigl maintained that this idea should be traced further back to Schlick and Spinoza. He also 
claimed that type-identity theorists could provide a better formulation by using Frege’s distinction 
between the sense and the reference of an expression. See Feigl 1960. 
28 Smart 1959. 
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we can think about brain states as experiences. Nevertheless, this means that we 
have to accept a form of property dualism.   
Smart's reply to this objection cannot help us. He assumed that the descriptions 
associated with ordinary concepts of experiences involve topic-neutral 
descriptions.29 Broadly, these descriptions refer to experiences by means of causal 
role specifications. Clearly, Mary can possess these concepts before her release. 
Thus, if we want to endorse the two ways of thinking reply, we have to provide an 
account of how phenomenal concepts offer ways of thinking about physical 
properties without incurring Black's objection.  
The plausibility of the two ways of thinking reply requires that phenomenal 
concepts should satisfy certain conditions. However, do we have any independent 
and adequate reason for endorsing such a view on phenomenal concepts? So far, I 
have not provided one. Thus, there is a legitimate challenge to the two ways of 
thinking reply to the knowledge argument.30   
To recapitulate, the viability of the two ways of thinking reply requires more 
than showing that it blocks the knowledge argument. What is required is some 
deeper explanation of the special features enjoyed by phenomenal concepts. First, 
we need to explain how having colour experience provides Mary with concepts of 
colour experience that are not physical or functional. Second, we have to explain 
how Mary’s new concepts about colours provide new ways of thinking about 
properties, considered by her scientific knowledge, without referring to any non-
physical property.    
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that there is a plausible way to resist the ability reply. Thus, 
upon her release, Mary acquires new true beliefs about the type of colour 
                                                 
29 Smart 1959. 
30 Some authors think that this challenge cannot be met; see, for instance, Levine 2001, p.  86. 
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experiences that she is having. New concepts about colours figure in the content of 
these new beliefs. However, conceding that, upon her release, Mary forms new 
beliefs about colour experiences does not imply that there are facts and properties 
that escape her scientific knowledge.  
Endorsing the two ways of thinking strategy counters this implication. 
However, this strategy requires explaining why phenomenal concepts satisfy certain 
conditions. The next chapter considers whether this challenge can be met. 
 
 7 Different Ways of Thinking About Colour Experiences 
7.1 Introduction 
The knowledge argument is based on a central inferential step. The premise of this 
deduction is that Mary acquires new propositional knowledge about what it is like 
to have a colour experience. The conclusion is that there are facts involving the 
occurrence of qualia that her scientific knowledge cannot accommodate. 
This inference can be opposed by denying its premise. We have discussed two 
ways of formulating this type of criticism. The second chapter examined an 
argument promoted by Patricia Churchland and Daniel Dennett. According to them, 
Mary might imagine, or otherwise figure out, what colour experiences are like 
before her release. The previous chapter presented a second way of deflating Mary's 
putative knowledge of what it is like to have an experience. David Lewis and 
Laurence Nemirow maintain that, by having colour experiences, Mary acquires a 
form of knowing how. This is not knowledge of facts. Hence, it cannot be 
knowledge of new facts that Mary did not know before her release.  
In the previous Chapter, against these deflationary attempts, I argued that by 
seeing colours Mary acquires new true beliefs about what it is like to have colour 
experiences. Therefore, a premise in the main inferential step of the knowledge 
argument is defensible. However, we should not conclude that there are facts about 
colour experiences that escape Mary’s scientific knowledge. As we saw, the two 
ways of thinking reply blocks this inference. Nevertheless, the plausibility of this 
reply requires an account of phenomenal concepts. These are the concepts that, 
supposedly, enable Mary to have new beliefs about colour experiences when she 
finally sees coloured objects. 
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The present chapter considers whether there is an account of phenomenal 
concepts that can support the two ways of thinking reply to the knowledge 
argument. The main conclusion of this chapter is that the existence of recognitional 
colour concepts provides this grounding. Once Mary sees coloured objects, she 
acquires recognitional colour concepts. Having these concepts enables her to think 
in new ways about the different types of colour experiences. However, these 
thoughts concerns facts she already knew before her release.  
Section 7.2 presents a very articulated formulation of the two ways of thinking 
reply offered by John Perry. This account is based on the assumption that Mary’s 
new knowledge is a form of indexical knowledge based on the use of the 
demonstrative concept [this]. Perry’s account appears to match the requirements for 
a viable version of the two ways of thinking reply. However, in section 7.3, I argue 
that this account does not succeed insofar as it does not cover all what Mary comes 
to learn by having colour experiences. Section 7.4 presents what seems to be a more 
plausible version of the two ways of thinking reply. The central assumption in this 
account is that our colour concepts are recognitional. Finally, section 7.5 motivates 
the idea that Mary’s new ways of thinking about colour experience do not require 
the existence of properties of colour experiences that escape her scientific 
knowledge. 
7.2 The Indexical Reply 
In the previous chapter, we saw that the viability of the two ways of thinking reply 
requires explaining certain features of phenomenal concepts. These concepts, that 
refer to colour experiences, should have the following characteristics. First, they 
cannot be reducible to the scientific concepts (physical or functional) available to 
Mary while she in the laboratory. Second, possessing these concepts requires 
having colour experiences. Third, phenomenal concepts provide new modes of 
thinking about physical entities without involving non-physical properties. Thus, we 
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have to investigate whether the upholder of the two ways of knowing reply can 
provide a satisfactory account of phenomenal concepts. 
Some philosophers have offered a version of the two ways of thinking response 
that can be called the indexical reply. They maintain that Mary’s knowledge of what 
it is like to have a colour experience is best analysed as a form of indexical 
knowledge.1 This is knowledge that involves beliefs whose content is expressible by 
sentences containing indexical terms such as “I”, “here”, “now”,  “this” and “that”. 
The shared feature of these terms is that their referent changes according to their 
context of use. For instance, the reference of the term “I” depends on who uses this 
expression. For example, if John says “I am glad”, “I” will refer to him, if Mary 
says “I am glad”,  “I” will refer to her. Similarly, the demonstrative “this” will refer 
to the object attended to by the user.  
The aim of this section is to illustrate the indexical reply as recently elaborated 
by John Perry.2 His response to the knowledge argument is based on an articulated 
theory of the content of belief expressible with sentences involving indexical 
expressions. I will proceed as follows. First, I will illustrate the intuitive source for 
the assumption that knowing what it is like to have a colour experience is indexical 
knowledge. Second, I will consider the details of Perry's indexical reply. 
Perry thinks that realising that knowing what it is like to have an experience is 
indexical knowledge leads to a satisfactory formulation of the two ways of thinking 
reply. The upholder of this reply has to account for two main phenomena. First, she 
has to explain why, while Mary is still in the laboratory, she cannot deduce, or 
otherwise figure out in virtue of her scientific knowledge, what it is like to have a 
colour experience. Second, it has to be shown why this inability does not imply the 
                                                 
1 An explicit identification of knowing what it is like to have an experience and indexical knowledge 
is presented in Bigelow and Pargetter 1990, Horgan 1984, Ismael 1999, Perry 2001, Rey 1992. See 
also McMullen 1985 where an exploration of the analogies between these two forms of knowledge 
leads to a physicalist response to the knowledge argument.    
2 Perry 2001. 
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existence of non-physical facts. Let us consider an example to illustrate how 
indexical analysis might account for these phenomena.  
John is transported, while asleep, to a windowless room in Edinburgh.3 
Therefore, he does not know his location. However, he has a map of Scotland that 
gives him detailed information about Edinburgh and its spatial relations with the 
rest of the country. What he knows by means of the map can be specified 
completely in terms of beliefs involving descriptions of distances and the relative 
positions of different towns, villages and other places in Scotland. For example, he 
might know that: 
(1) Edinburgh is south of Inverness. 
Despite the accuracy of his map, it seems that John lacks certain knowledge about 
the position of Edinburgh before leaving the room. 
While John is still in the room, there is some indexical knowledge he cannot 
deduce from the knowledge provided by the map. For example, he cannot come to 
know:  
(2) This place is Edinburgh.  
Similarly, he cannot know: 
(3) This place is south of Inverness. 
No matter how detailed the map; if it contains only information expressible by 
means of non-indexical expressions it cannot inform John about his position.4 Only 
by escaping and recognising the town where he is, can he know (2) and (3).  
Although John cannot come to believe (3) from the beliefs he can acquire by 
consulting the map while he is still in the room, it seems that the map does not leave 
                                                 
3 See other examples in Perry 2001, 101-113. 
4 Assuming that the map represents John's position, by means of the correct “you are here dot”, 
would beg the question.  
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out any fact about the position of Edinburgh in Scotland. John's knowledge of (3) 
does not appear to involve a new fact about Edinburgh's position he could not know 
before his release. In fact, when he was still in the room he knew (1) because the 
map contains the information that Edinburgh is south of Inverness. Intuitively, it 
appears that by leaving the room and recognising the town where he is, John can 
come to think about this fact in a new way. John's example appears to have some 
similarity with Mary's case.  
Mary’s scientific knowledge comprises beliefs expressible by means of 
sentences containing scientific descriptions of colour experiences that she can read 
about in her books or screens. Now, as in John’s case, if knowing what it is like to 
have an experience is indexical knowledge, Mary cannot possess it before her 
release. In particular, it might be plausible to assume that her new knowledge does 
not concern non-physical facts. Let us now consider in detail how Perry’s 
formulates his indexical reply. 
According to Perry, before her release Mary can know to be true statements of 
the type: 
(4) Qr is what it is like to see red. 
He introduces Qr as an expression that Mary uses to refer to what it is like to see a 
certain colour while she is still in the laboratory. Given that he endorses a version of 
the two ways of thinking reply, this is a perfectly legitimate assumption. Qr refers to 
a physical state or a physical aspect of the normal experience of seeing red. On the 
other hand, when Mary comes out of her laboratory and sees a red object of which 
she knows the colour, she acquires a belief whose content is expressed by:5  
 
                                                 
5 Perry claims that Mary can recognise the object by the shape and know that type of object has a 
certain colour. For example there is no reason to deny that before her release she might know that 
tomatoes are red and that she knows how to recognise tomatoes form their shape. Perry 2001, p.  99-
100. 
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(5) Thisi is what it is like to see red. 
The demonstrative thisi is related to Mary’s ability to make epistemic contact with a 
feature of her colour experience, that he calls subjective character, in a subjective 
way.  Perry illustrates this point as follows: 
When we are attending to a subjective character in the subjective way 
and wish to communicate what we are feeling or noticing, we use our 
flexible demonstrative, “this”, as in “this feeling is the one I've been 
having. Let's label this use of “this” as an inner demonstrative: “thisi”. 
(Perry 2001: 146) 
Once Mary knows that (5), she can then discover that:    
(6) Qr is thisi subjective character. 
Therefore, Perry’s main task is to show that although (6) is informative for Mary, 
this does not imply that she comes to know about a non-physical property. 
Perry's response to the knowledge argument follows the general strategy of the 
two ways of thinking reply. First, he draws a distinction between different types of 
facts or contents related to beliefs.6 Second, he uses this distinction to explain why 
Mary cannot know what it is like to have a colour experience without implying the 
existence of non-physical facts. With respect of the first stage of Perry’s reply, the 
crucial distinction is between the subject matter and reflexive content of a belief. 
Let us clarify these two notions of content. 
Perry assumes that beliefs are structured representations obtained by the 
combination of more basic representations he calls ideas.7 Amongst these latter 
representations, notions stand for individuals such as particular persons or towns. 
On the other hand, concepts refer to universals such as properties and relations. This 
                                                 
6 Perry 2001, p. 113. 
7 Perry 2001, p. 50-51. 
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representational account of belief is coupled with a causal account of the reference 
of the constituents of beliefs. An idea stands for the entity that is causally its 
origin.8        
According to Perry, the content of a belief is assigned under the assumption that 
certain conditions about the belief are satisfied. In fact, the content of a belief is 
given by what renders the belief true. Moreover, the assignment of these truth 
conditions to a belief is relative to those facts about the belief we take as given. In 
particular, these are facts about the ideas and notions that figure in these beliefs. 
The dependence of the content of a belief on certain conditions concerning that 
belief can be illustrated with an example. Let us consider the belief b1 that:   
(1) Edinburgh is south of Inverness 
Now, b1 is true when Edinburgh is south of Inverness and this latter fact is the 
content of John's belief. The assignment of content to belief b1 depends in part on 
facts about this belief that we take as given. For example, it is assumed that the 
notion “Edinburgh” and the concept “being south of Inverness” refer respectively to 
Edinburgh and to the relation of being south of Inverness. 
Perry illustrates the dependence of a certain belief’s content on certain 
contextual facts about the same belief by means of a formula he calls the “content 
analyzer”.9 The content analyser characterises the content of a belief by specifying 
the truth conditions of that belief, given certain facts about the belief. The general 
form of this formula is:   
     CA: Given such and such, φ is true iff so and so. 
                                                 
8 Perry 2001, pp. 51-53. 
9 Perry 2001, p. 125. 
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The letter φ stands for truth-valuable representations such as cognitive states like 
beliefs or, more generally, thoughts.10 While the expression “such and such” stands 
for contextual facts about the representation φ, “so and so” stands for the content 
assigned to φ once these facts are given. Having put into place the details of Perry's 
proposal, let us now consider the distinction he draws between subject matter and 
reflexive content.  
The subject matter is the content of a belief that is assigned when all the facts 
about the representations involved in the belief are given. We can characterise this 
content by means of the content analyser. Let us consider the belief b1. Once all the 
facts about the ideas involved in b1 are specified, we obtain this instance of the 
content analyser:  
Given that the idea [Edinburgh] is of Edinburgh and the concept [being 
south of Inverness] is of the relation being south of Inverness, b1 is true 
iff Edinburgh is south of Inverness.  
The subject matter of b1 is given in Italics. In particular, we can think about the 
subject matter of a belief as the thick fact that renders the belief true. The 
characterisation of this fact does not involve the way in which the subject might 
come to think about it.    
The reflexive content of a belief is individuated when how the ideas that figure 
in the belief pick out their referents is not assumed as given. Let us use the content 
analyser to reveal the reflexive content of b1. When facts concerning how b1 is 
related to its subject matter are not given, the condition “such and such” in the 
content analyser is empty. Therefore, we obtain that:    
                                                 
10 Perry applies his analysis also to linguistic expressions, however given that his discussion of 
Mary's cases is entirely focussed on beliefs, I will consider only beliefs. 
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b1 is true iff the notion [Edinburgh] in b1 is of Edinburgh and the 
concept [being south of Inverness] in b1 is of the relation being south of 
Inverness and Edinburgh is south of Inverness.  
Now the content of b1, given in Italics, involves conditions concerning the belief 
itself, i.e. about the ideas that constitute it. This explicit reference to the belief 
explains why this content is named reflexive. Clearly, the reflexive content involves 
not just the fact that Edinburgh is south of Inverness but equally mentions the ideas 
that constitute the belief. In particular, the requirement that the conditions that make 
an idea stand for a certain entity are satisfied is itself made explicit.  
Perry maintains that two beliefs can have the same subject matter and different 
reflexive contents.11 In particular, this might happen when one belief involves 
indexical representation and the other does not. This case can be illustrated by 
considering John's beliefs. We have already seen the subject matter of belief b1. Let 
us now consider the subject matter of John's belief b3 whose content is expressible 
by the sentence: 
(3) This place is south of Inverness. 
According to Perry, determining the subject matter of a belief such as b3 requires 
that we take as given a relation of attachment between this belief and John's visual 
perception.12 In fact, b3 is related to John's perceiving a certain place. The subject 
matter of this belief depends on which place he is perceptually attending to. Thus, 
the content analyser has the following form: 
Given that the perception attached to b3 is of Edinburgh and the concept 
[being south of Inverness] in b3 is of the relation being south of 
Inverness, b3 is true iff Edinburgh is south of Inverness.  
                                                 
11 Perry 2001, p. 113. 
12 Perry 2001, pp. 120-121. 
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The subject matter of belief b1 and b3 is that Edinburgh is south of Inverness. 
However, their reflexive contents differ. The reflexive content of b3 is given in 
Italics in the following instance of the content analyser: 
b3 is true iff the perception attached to b3 is of Edinburgh and the 
concept [being south of Inverness] in b3 is of the relation being south of 
Inverness and Edinburgh is south of Inverness. 
The reflexive content of b1 and b3 involves references to different entities. In 
particular, the reflexive conditions of b1 do not mention the perception involved in 
John's attending to Edinburgh that is involved in the reflexive content of b3. 
According to Perry, the reflexive content of beliefs is central to an 
understanding of the roles that beliefs play in motivating subjects’ inferences (or 
actions). Thus, reflexive content is relevant for the cognitive roles of beliefs. It is 
important to notice that Perry recognises that reflexive content does not explain 
directly why individuals can have different attitudes towards the same subject 
matter. Subjects do not usually have explicit beliefs about the reflexive truth 
conditions of their beliefs.13 In particular, we can exclude the suggestion that 
explicit knowledge of reflexive contents explains why someone might have 
different attitudes to thoughts about the same subject matter.  
To illustrate this point, let us consider again John’s case.  We can assume that 
he has never heard about states of perceptual attention, or about linguistic notions 
such as “term” or semantic notions as “reference”. Still, it makes sense to say that 
before his release he believes (1) without believing (3). But, as Perry points out: 
Nevertheless, the reflexive content, the truth-conditions our content 
analyser give us when we do not take the contextual facts as given, is 
                                                 
13 Perry 2001, p. 132, p. 135. 
 
Different Ways of Thinking About Colour Experiences 167
essential in understanding the motivation for making the statements and 
what is involved in understanding them. (Perry 2001: 129)  
Thus, we have to consider what kind of account of the cognitive role of beliefs this 
content provides.   
According to Perry, explicating the reflexive content reveals the different ways 
in which certain expressions or certain mental representations refer to certain 
objects. In particular, the difference between notions that are “detached” and 
“attached” to perception is revealed.14 Perry would maintain that the notion 
[Edinburgh] that John has in the room is about Edinburgh because there is a certain 
causal relation that renders Edinburgh the origin of that notion.15 For instance, we 
can imagine that John’s notion [Edinburgh] is linked to Edinburgh by a series of 
causal connections. This causal chain might involve the effects on the cartographer 
that determined the original drawing of the map, and John’s use of the map. Thus, 
John is able to think about Edinburgh in virtue to this causal connection. However, 
his notion is not attached to his current perception of Edinburgh. On the other hand, 
certain notions are attached to this perception. When John leaves the room and 
comes to believe (2), he attaches his notion [Edinburgh] to the perception that 
supports his ability to attend to Edinburgh. Now, according to Perry, attaching a 
certain notion to a perception determines a “flow of information” from the 
perception to the ideas associated with the notion. It is in virtue of this flow of 
information that John can come to believe (3). Thus, it seems that Perry's account 
has all the resources to explain why a difference between indexical and non-
indexical knowledge does not imply an ontological difference at the level of subject 
matter. We can now consider Mary’s case.  
                                                 
14 Perry 2001, p. 124. 
15 Perry 2001, p. 51. 
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Perry argues that the knowledge argument is based on the subject matter 
fallacy. One commits this fallacy when one believes that:  
… the content of a statement or a belief consists in the conditions that 
the truth of the statement or belief puts on the objects and properties the 
statement or belief is about. (Perry 2001: 20) 
However, we have seen that besides the subject matter of a belief there is its 
reflexive content.  Now, Mary’s discovery that: 
 (6) Qr is thisi subjective character. 
is made possible by “a new fact at the level of reflexive content”16 and not by a fact 
at the level of subject matter. The belief that (6) is true: 
iff the act of inner attention to which it is attached is of the subjective 
character of the experience of seeing red. (Perry 2001: 148)  
Before her release, Mary lacked an “informational link” between her “detached” 
notion of a physical property of the brain and her “attached” notion of the 
qualitative feature of seeing-red sensations. 
Perry's account of Mary's case satisfies the two fundamental requirements of the 
two ways of thinking reply. First, he can explain why she cannot know what it is like 
to have an experience. This is because her scientific beliefs, and those involved in 
this knowledge, have different reflexive content. Second, he can argue that such a 
difference does not logically imply that these beliefs concern different facts as 
assumed in the knowledge argument. In fact, an indexical belief and a non-indexical 
one can have same subject matter. 
Moreover, Perry's account appears to explain the different requirements that the 
two ways of thinking strategy places on phenomenal concepts. First, phenomenal 
concepts are not reducible to Mary's scientific concepts because they are 
                                                 
16 Perry 2001, p. 159. 
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demonstratives. According to Perry, Mary's scientific knowledge does not involve 
such demonstrative concepts. Moreover, indexical concepts cannot be reduced to 
non-indexical ones. Second, phenomenal concepts require having experiences 
because it is only by having these mental states that a subject is put in a position to 
attend to their subjective character and thus form demonstrative concepts and 
thoughts about it. Finally, it seems that Perry can evade Max Black's objection.  
The main upshot of our discussion of this objection was that phenomenal 
concepts cannot be descriptive.17 In fact, this would result in a dilemma for the 
upholder of the two ways of thinking reply. Either these phenomenal concepts 
would be available to Mary before her release, or they would refer to non-physical 
properties. Perry thinks that his proposal fares very well in this respect, given that 
he maintains that indexical concepts are not descriptive.18 Demonstrative 
expressions refer directly to their referents. However, demonstrative concepts 
contribute to the cognitive content of the thoughts, where they occur, without 
involving way of thinking specified by a description.  
To recapitulate, it appears that Perry offers a promising and articulated 
justification of the two ways of thinking reply to the knowledge argument. 
Specifically, he explains the requirements that this response places on phenomenal 
concepts by means of an independently motivated account of the content of 
demonstrative thoughts. The next section investigates whether we should accept 
Perry’s proposal.    
7.3  Against the Indexical Reply 
In this section, I argue that Perry's indexical account of Mary’s knowledge of what 
it is like to have a colour experience is unsatisfactory. Firstly, Perry bases his 
                                                 
17 See Section 6.6, at p. 151. 
18 The non-descriptive nature of indexical ways of thinking has a central role in his sustained 
criticism of Fregean semantics, for he takes it that Fregean modes of presentation involve 
descriptions. See Perry 1977. This latter statement has been forcefully resisted in Evans 1982. 
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account on a model of introspection that was rejected in Chapter 4.19 Secondly, 
even a reformulation of Perry’s indexical reply that avoids this problem has to face 
a general difficulty. Namely, Mary's new knowledge about colour experiences 
involves more than indexical knowledge. 
The notion of an act of inner attending to a feature of experience is central in 
Perry's account of Mary's case. According to him, having colour experiences 
enables her to have beliefs she could not have before her release. These beliefs 
involve the demonstrative concept thisI that refer to the subjective character of 
experience. This demonstrative identification is based on an act of inner attending 
to the subjective character of the experience. In particular, Mary must be related by 
this act of inner attending to the subjective character of her experience in order to be 
able to think about this property in a new way that is not available to her before her 
release. Therefore, determining the nature of this inner act is of central importance 
in the evaluation of Perry's proposal. 
According to Perry, the act of attending to the subjective character of an 
experience requires having that experience. Clearly, this explains why Mary lacks 
demonstrative knowledge about this feature of experience. However, having the 
experience is not sufficient to ground the demonstrative identification.    
This act of attending to the experience is quite different than the 
experience itself. (Perry 2001: 49) 
In fact, experiences have their qualitative character, or what is like to have them, 
independently of our attending to them. Thus, we can have an experience with a 
distinctive character even if we do not notice it.20 However, by having colour 
experiences we are also in a position to enter into a certain epistemic relation with 
these mental states. In particular: “we can attend to their subjective characters”. 
                                                 
19 See sections 4.4, p. 96, and 4.5, p. 100.   
20 Perry 2001, p. 49. 
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Another psychological state should detect the subjective character of the 
experience. This state should enable Mary to have certain demonstrative thoughts 
not available to her in the black-and-white room. Let us consider what account can 
be provided of this act of inner demonstration.  
Perry seems to assume that we have direct access to our experiences and their 
features. He states that the act of inner demonstration, which is required for the 
knowledge of what it is like to have a colour experience, is not a perceptual process. 
Nevertheless, he assumes that, as it happens with the things we perceive:  
We can be aware of our experiences. We can attend to their subjective 
characters. We can pay more or less attention to them. We can mentally 
demonstrate them (“This sensation…”), and communicate facts about 
them to others. We can notice what there are like, and anticipate what 
they will be like. (Perry 2001: 47) 
Thus, it seems that Perry assumes that, in particular, the ability to think 
demonstrative thoughts about the subjective quality of a colour experience depends 
on attending to the colour experience. However, this appears to create a problem for 
his account. 
There is no such direct access to our experience. In fact, this access would 
require the capacity to have true demonstrative thoughts about these mental states. 
However, I argued that neither perception nor introspection offer such a capacity.21 
Moreover, I have suggested an alternative model of the epistemic access to colour 
experiences and their features. In accordance with this account, we determine the 
type of colour experiences we are undergoing by paying attention to the way in 
which coloured objects look to us. An attempt at avoiding this objection might lead 
to a reformulation of Perry's proposal. 
                                                 
21 See, respectively, See sections 4.4, p. 96, and 4.5, p. 100. 
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Perry’s account can be adapted to Mary’s new beliefs about the ways in which 
coloured objects look to her. Thus, we might think that upon her release Mary 
discovers that:   
(1) Red is this  
where “this” picks out the colour that the object she is attending looks to have to 
her. Moreover, the term “red” expresses the scientific concept [red]s that Mary uses 
to refer to the colour red. In this case, Mary’s new thoughts about the red-type 
colour experience derive from what she learn when she comes to believe (1). 
Specifically, the Displaced Perception Model (DPM) of introspection can explain 
how her new beliefs about the red-type experience can be “parasitic” on the 
discovery expressed by (1).22 Thus, we have a version of the indexical reply that 
does not require the capacity to attend introspectively to the properties of colour 
experiences. However, it seems that even such an account is not satisfactory. 
According to our version of Perry’s account, on her release Mary acquires a 
new way of thinking about colours when she can demonstrate them. Specifically, 
she can attach, by means of demonstrative beliefs, her scientific concepts of colours 
to her perceptions of these properties. Thus, Mary’s having new beliefs about 
colours derives from her capacity to point with the demonstrative “this” to the 
colours objects look to have to her. In fact, if the two ways of thinking strategy is 
correct, then Mary can have demonstrative thoughts about the colours objects look 
to have before her release. In fact, colours are properties that her scientific 
knowledge can characterise completely. Thus, for instance, by using a certain 
instrument, she can form the belief: 
(1) Red is this colour. 
However, this demonstrative thought is based on her perception of a certain 
instrument and not on directly seeing a red object. If the indexical reply to the 
                                                 
22 See, section 5.5 at p. 125. 
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knowledge argument is correct, there should be some difference between this 
demonstrative way of thinking about red and the one available to her when she sees 
coloured objects.23 But how can we capture this difference just by considering 
Mary’s demonstrative thoughts?  
As some authors have pointed out, it seems that the indexical reply provides a 
too “thin” characterisation of the content of Mary’s new beliefs.24  The difficulty of 
the indexical account is that is seems that it requires that when Mary has a certain 
colour experience she is able to refer to the colour she is seeing as “this quality” 
without really knowing what she is pointing at. Joseph Levine states this problem 
clearly; Mary might be using “demonstrative pointers”:  
…with little substantive conception of what sort of thing we are 
pointing at – demonstrative arrows shot blindly that refer to whatever 
they hit. (Levine 2001: 84) 
This accusation is clear once we remember a central requirement in the two ways of 
thinking places on Mary’s new concepts. Namely, they cannot be descriptive 
concepts. Now, interpreting her new demonstrative thought as mere pointing can 
satisfy this requirement. But it leaves unspecified what Mary comes to know about 
colours. 
Some might reply that we should not consider what is at the “demonstrative 
end” of Mary’s beliefs about colours. Instead, these beliefs are new in virtue of their 
relation to her egocentric perspective.25 Some philosophers have found attractive 
the idea that indexical thoughts can be framed as subject-centred.26 The central 
intuition of this idea is that: 
                                                 
23 See for a similar line of criticism of the idea that phenomenal concepts are demonstratives, Tye 
2000, p. 25-26. 
24 See Tye 2000, p. 26, Chalmers 2003, Levine 2001. 
25 This line of reasoning is put forward by Michael Tye, see Tye 2000, p. 25. 
26 See McGinn 1983, Lewis 1979.  
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Very roughly, we can say that to think of something indexically is to 
think it in relation to me. (McGinn 1983: 17) 
In particular, a demonstrative concept such as [this] has a special relation with the 
person who uses it. If someone can use this, then he knows a priori that the object 
he demonstrates is the thing that he is attending to. Thus, it might be assumed that 
this relation with the indexical concept [I] is central in contributing to the cognitive 
content of the belief where the demonstrative occurs. Let us illustrate how this 
might work in the case of Mary. 
It might be suggested that Mary's new demonstrative beliefs about colour 
experience differs from those she had before her release because these latter were 
detached from her egocentric perspective. When she was in the laboratory, she 
could not formulate a belief whose cognitive content involves a certain direct 
relation she has with the colour the object looks to have. In fact, she could not have 
a thought expressible by: 
(2) Red is the property to which I am now directly attending. 
Nevertheless, it can be maintained that she can acquire such a belief by seeing a red 
object. Thus, it can be argued that the only difference is that, now, she can relate 
herself to the colour of the object. In other words, now, she can think about this 
property as the one to which she is directly attending. Given this new thought, she 
can then acquire a thought about the type of experience that she is having. She will 
come to believe that she has the type of colour experience people have when they 
attend to the property to which she is attending now. Let us see why this proposal is 
not satisfactory. 
The novelty of Mary's demonstrative beliefs does not depend on their relation 
with her egocentric perspective. When Mary sees a coloured object, she appears to 
learn more than the fact that she is attending to some property. One reason for this 
claim is as follows. When Mary is still in the laboratory, she can formulate 
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demonstrative thoughts about the way in which colours appear to her. In fact, 
Jackson concedes that she can see black, white and the shades of grey. Thus, she 
would be already able to have thoughts relative to her egocentric perspective on 
certain colours.  
There is another reason that shows that Mary’s egocentric perspective is not the 
main ingredient in her new thoughts. When she sees different colours she acquires 
different new thoughts, but her egocentric perspective is the same. Let us assume, 
for instance, that, upon her release, Mary sees a blue and a red object. Given that 
she is informed about the colours of these objects, she comes to believe:   
(1) Blue is this colour. 
(2) Red is this colour.  
Now, according to the two ways of thinking reply, (1) and (2) express discoveries 
made by Mary. Moreover, it seems intuitively plausible that these are different 
discoveries. However, in both cases Mary’s two thoughts are based on what she is 
attending to. Michael Tye has expressed this clearly with regard to the concepts that 
Mary acquires:  
Each phenomenal concept is thus tied to a particular-experience specific 
perspective occupied by the possessor of the concept. As the 
experiences vary, so too do the phenomenal concepts. (Tye 2000: 26) 
Thus, it seems that we cannot account for Mary’s new knowledge in indexical 
terms. 
To recapitulate, we have seen that Perry’s account of Mary's new knowledge is 
not satisfactory, as it depends on his endorsement of a wrong account of 
introspection. However, even if we formulate his suggestion without assuming such 
an account, certain difficulties remain. In particular, it seems that Mary learns 
something more substantial than just the mere ability to point to a certain property 
by means of a demonstrative concept. 
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7.4 Recognitional Concepts 
The two ways of thinking reply appears to provide a plausible answer to our version 
of the knowledge argument. However, the tenability of this response depends on an 
account of phenomenal concepts. These are concepts concerning colour experiences 
that Mary supposedly acquires by seeing coloured objects. The indexical analysis of 
the knowledge of what it is like to have a colour experience fails to provide a 
satisfactory account of Mary’s phenomenal concepts. Thus, we have to account for 
these concepts.  
The present section’s main thesis is that we can formulate a plausible version of 
the two ways of thinking reply. This account is based on the assumption that 
ordinary colour concepts are purely recognitional. First, I will illustrate the main 
features of this class of concepts. Second, I will show how the hypothesis that 
ordinary colour concepts are purely visual recognitional offers a plausible account 
of Mary’s case that is consistent with the requirements of the two ways of thinking 
reply. Finally, I will illustrate how the account of phenomenal concepts here offered 
differs by other accounts that articulate the two ways of thinking reply by invoking 
purely recognitional concepts.  
A plausible account of phenomenal concepts to support the two ways of 
thinking reply should satisfy the following requirements. First, phenomenal 
concepts should not be a priori connected to any of the scientific descriptions 
available to Mary before her release. Only if this is the case will the new 
introspective beliefs, that Mary forms once she sees coloured objects, contain 
thoughts she could not have or express when she is in the laboratory.  
Second, phenomenal concepts do not constitute two ways of thinking in virtue 
of involving descriptions not available to Mary before her release. I illustrated the 
reason for this requirement in discussing an objection raised by Max Black to the 
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type identity theory.27 The upshot of that discussion was a dilemma for the 
supporter of the two ways of thinking reply if he assumes that those phenomenal 
concepts are descriptive. Either these descriptions are available to Mary before her 
release, or they require the existence of properties her scientific knowledge cannot 
account for. 
The third requirement is that Mary can acquire these concepts concerning 
colour experiences by seeing coloured objects. Finally, these new concepts refer to 
properties that figure in Mary’s scientific account of colour experiences. It seems 
that assuming that Mary acquires purely recognitional colour concepts can satisfy 
all these requirements on phenomenal concepts.  
It has been observed that certain concepts are recognitional. These concepts can 
be applied on the basis of perceptual or quasi-perceptual acquaintance with their 
instances. Thus, someone has a recognitional concept [book], when she is able to 
judge, on the basis of what she sees, whether what she sees is a book. Moreover, it 
has been argued that there are concepts that are purely recognitional. These 
concepts can be characterised as follows. 
A concept is purely recognitional when its possession-conditions (in the 
sense of Peacocke 1992) make no appeal to anything other than such 
acquaintance. A concept is purely recognitional when nothing in the 
grasp of that concept, as such, requires its user to apply or to appeal to 
any other concept or belief. (Carruthers 2002: 4)  
Let us now consider how to use this notion in the discussion of Mary’s case. 
The central thesis defended here is that Mary acquires new recognitional 
concepts concerning colours.  We have seen that Mary might acquire new beliefs 
about her colour experiences only if she acquires new beliefs about the colours that 
                                                 
27 See Section 6.6, p. 154. 
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objects look to have. Thus, we might consider whether Mary acquires purely 
recognitional concepts about the colours that objects look to have. If this is the case, 
she can also acquire new ways of thinking about the types of colour experiences she 
is having. 
Colour concepts appear to be purely recognitional. Let us consider the 
description “looking the colour of a rose”. We saw that Mary may know what 
“looking the colour of __ ” means and know what “a rose” means. However, she 
does not know which colour is referred to by the phrase “colour of a rose”. Now 
Mary knows that roses have physical properties such that in normal lighting 
conditions they elicit from normal observers, who have a mastery of the meaning of 
“red”, and who are asked to name the colour of the rose, the response, “it is red”. 
Moreover, she can think about red as the colour that has a certain position in a 
system of relations of similarity described by the complete colour space.   
We have already seen that Mary would not be able to recognise which colour is 
red upon seeing coloured objects.28 The scientific information she possesses about 
“being red” does not enable her to pick out which is the colour of the rose. This 
suggests that the concept of being red is essentially visual-recognitional in that only 
those who can pick out by sight the colour possess full mastery of the concept.  
Now, if the concept of red is purely recognitional, then, before her release, 
Mary cannot have certain beliefs. These are the beliefs where the recognitional 
colour concept of red figures. In fact, her scientific knowledge provides her with 
descriptions of red. In particular, if the concept “red” is essentially visual-
recognitional, then Mary acquires a concept of  “looking red” that she cannot 
possess before her release. In fact, it seems that someone cannot possess the concept 
                                                 
28 See Section  3.5, at  p. 74. 
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[looking red] without having the concept [red].29 We saw that, in order to possess 
the notion of looking red, someone has to be capable of judging that something 
looks, to him, as a red object would look in certain circumstances.30  
If [red] is a purely recognitional concept, then Mary can acquire a new belief 
about the type of colour experience that she is having. She can discover that she has 
the type of colour experience people have when something looks red to them. In 
this case, red is the new purely recognitional concept that she acquires by seeing 
coloured objects. 
It seems that assuming that, by seeing red objects, Mary acquires the purely 
recognitional concept [red], satisfies the requirements of the two ways of thinking 
reply. First, it is clear why Mary needs to have a certain type of colour experience in 
order to acquire a new concept about it. By seeing a coloured object, she acquires a 
new description about the type of colour experience that she is having. However, 
this description is not available to her before her release because the purely 
recognitional concept “red” figures in it.  
This point can be illustrated if we consider the recognitional concept of a 
certain person. Someone can know that John is the father of Henry. Moreover, 
without having ever met Henry, this person can know Henry by means of a certain 
description, say as “the owner of a certain car”. However, when the person acquires 
a recognitional concept of Henry, then he would be able to use a new way to 
describe the father of Henry. He might use the expression the “father of Henry”, as 
the father of a person he his able to pick out thanks to his perceptual acquaintance 
with him.   
                                                 
29 Here I am assuming that the concept [red] is cognitively prior to [looking red]. This means that no 
one could possess the concept [looking red] without possessing the concept [red]. However, this is 
independent of the question of how understanding the relation between the property red and having 
the experience that something looks red. See Peacocke 1984, pp. 61-63.  
30 See Chapter 5, p. 118. 
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This version of the two ways of thinking reply differs from other accounts that 
refer to recognitional concepts. In fact, many authors have assumed Mary’s new 
purely recognitional concepts refer to colour experiences.31 On this view, Mary 
acquires new ways of thinking about colour experiences because she can now 
recognise, without any mastery of other concepts or having other beliefs, that she is 
having a certain type of colour experience. Instead, I maintain that the novelty of 
Mary’s thoughts about her colour experiences derives from acquiring new purely 
recognitional concepts about the colour of objects. According to this doctrine, the 
ordinary introspective capacity to self ascribe colour experiences requires the 
capacity to judge the colour objects look to have. Moreover, this introspective 
capacity requires the mastery of some principle that connects having colour 
experiences of a certain type to the fact that something is looking to us to have a 
certain colour.  
Thus, the concepts we ordinarily use to refer to types of colour experiences 
cannot be purely recognitional.32 However, the descriptions that we ordinarily use 
to self-ascribe types of colour experience involve as one of their constituents purely 
recognitional colour concepts. It is in virtue of the dependence of the ordinary 
typology of colour experience on purely recognitional colour concepts, that Mary 
acquires new ways of thinking about colour experiences. 
To sum up, once we assume that Mary acquires recognitional concepts of 
colours, she then acquires new ways of thinking about her colour experiences. 
Within these new thoughts figure description of the types of colour experiences. 
These descriptions involve the occurrence of a visual recognitional concept of 
colour. However, the existence of these thoughts, that Mary could not have before 
                                                 
31 See Tye 2003 and Loar 1990.  
32 Despite this, there might be ways in which we learn to use concepts of colour experiences in a 
recognitional way.  For example, a doctor can learn to recognise visually a tumour from an x-ray 
photograph. However, possessing the notion of tumour requires mastering certain theoretical 
knowledge.   
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her release, does not imply that Mary comes to know new facts. She can now think 
about her colour experiences in a different way. Such a way of thinking is grounded 
on her possession of purely recognitional colour concepts. 
7.5 Old Thick Properties 
We have seen that we cannot exclude the possibility that when Mary sees colours 
she comes to know about facts she already knew before her release. This is enough 
to reject the knowledge argument. However, it can be asked legitimately which 
facts Mary comes to know in a new way. 
This section aims to answer this question. As a preliminary clarification, I will 
introduce the notion of thick property. Properties of this type are not individuated in 
terms of the concepts used to refer to them. I will argue that determining which 
thick facts Mary comes to know requires establishing which thick properties her 
new concepts of qualia refer to. Then, I shall argue that these latter concepts refer to 
thick properties referred by Mary’s scientific concepts. 
 In order to argue for this conclusion, I will proceed as follows. First, I will 
argue that the identity of thick properties is a function of the causal powers these 
properties endow objects with. Second, I will argue that the concepts of qualia refer 
to properties that determine certain causal powers. Finally, I will maintain that there 
are properties referred to by Mary's scientific concepts whose instantiations 
determine the same causal powers of qualia. Therefore, I conclude that qualia are 
identical to these natural properties. 
Establishing which old thick facts Mary comes to know requires determining 
the properties picked out by the concepts involved in her new true beliefs. This is 
the case for the following reasons. Thick facts are structured entities that involve the 
instantiation of a property in a certain object. Therefore, individuating facts 
requires, as a necessary condition, individuating the properties whose instantiations 
constitute them.  
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Endorsing the two ways of thinking reply implies that the properties referred to 
by Mary’s new concepts are thick. Using Peter Carruthers’s terminology, we can 
distinguish between thick and thin conceptions of properties.33 According to the thin 
conception, properties are individuated as finely as the concepts that refer to them. 
Thus, conceptual differences determine differences in the relative thin properties. 
On the other hand, thick properties are not so individuated. The two ways of 
thinking reply requires that Mary’s new introspective beliefs about colour 
experiences concern the instantiation of thick properties. For we have determined 
that Mary acquires new concepts she did not possess before her release. Thus, this 
difference would determine a difference between the properties to which these 
concepts refer.  
Some philosophers have suggested that thick properties are responsible for the 
causal powers of objects. Objects have causal powers specified by means of 
conditional statements connecting circumstances in which the object might be 
involved and certain effects. For example, stating the following conditional can 
specify the causal powers of a knife: if its blade is applied to a piece of butter in 
normal conditions, then the butter will be cut. Many philosophers think that the 
manifestation of objects’ causal powers depends on their possessing properties that 
ground these powers.34 In particular, it can be maintained that objects have certain 
causal powers because they have properties that will cause, in the appropriate 
circumstances, the manifestations of such powers. In this sense, it can be 
maintained that these properties play a certain causal role.35 For example, we can 
think that in certain conditions the knife cuts the butter given the fact that it has a 
certain shape, size, and it is made of steel. In particular, we can say that the 
                                                 
33 Carruthers 2000, p. 35. 
34 See Shoemaker 1980. 
35 Lewis 1986, Prior 1985, Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson 1982. 
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occurrence of these properties is causally responsible for the manifestation of the 
causal powers of the knife in the different circumstances.  
The previous considerations suggest that thick properties are individuated in 
terms of the causal powers they determine. The general form of this individuation 
principle is well stated by Sidney Shoemaker:  
If under all possible circumstances properties X and Y make the same 
contributions to the causal powers of the things that have them, X and Y 
are the same property. (Shoemaker 1980: 234) 
This criterion is incompatible with the claim that necessarily properties differ when 
the concepts used to refer to them differ. Although the concept of being [H20] and 
that of being [water] differ, what casually derives from being [H20] derives from 
being [water]. This way of individuating thick properties gives us a way of 
establishing when two concepts refer to the same thick property. Two concepts refer 
to the same thick property when we can judge that the properties to which they refer 
play the same causal role. Let us turn back to the discussion of Mary’s case.   
The notion of quale that is involved in Mary’s introspective beliefs has two 
main features. The first feature is that a quale is a property that determines the type 
of colour experience she is having. The second is that Mary is not directly aware of 
the quale. In fact, we have seen that in seeing coloured objects Mary can formulate 
the following belief about her colour experience:  
I am having the type of colour experience that one typically has when 
things look this colour. 
While Mary is aware of the ways in which coloured objects look, she is not directly 
aware of the properties of her experiences. She determines the type of experience 
she is having in virtue of judgements about the colours that objects look to have. 
However, it seems that we can provide a more substantial account of the property 
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enjoyed by the colour experience a subject has when an object looks a certain 
colour to her. 
Qualia are properties of experiences whose occurrence is responsible for 
subjects’ visual discrimination, when stimulated under certain conditions, of the 
colours that objects looks to have. It is in virtue of having a colour experience with 
a certain quale that a certain object looks red to Mary when she is affected by 
certain stimuli. This means that when Mary thinks introspectively about the 
property that determines the type of colour experience she has, she refers to a 
property responsible for a certain causal power.36 This gives a clear indication of 
what thick properties are referred to by Mary’s concepts of qualia.  
There are scientific concepts that refer to properties that are responsible for the 
discrimination of colour stimuli. As we saw, psychophysics aims to describe the 
discriminatory capacities of subjects.37 This discipline determines the dimensions 
along which subjects discriminate the different colour stimuli on the basis of their 
responses. Thus, we can assume that for each colour an object looks to have this 
science can refer to a property that is causally responsible for the fact that the 
stimulus looks a certain colour to Mary. Therefore, we can think that the quale 
Mary ascribes to her colour experience is a certain thick property of the nervous 
system that are responsible for discriminating the colours that objects look to have.  
It might be objected that this account of qualia is inconsistent with the 
assumption that Mary learns something on her release. In fact, before her release, 
Mary knows all the causal roles that a certain property of the nervous system play. 
So, when she sees a coloured object she should be able to recognise the quale of her 
experience. But this criticism fails to acknowledge that by seeing colour objects 
Mary acquires a different way of thinking about her qualia.  
                                                 
36 This is characterisation of qualia that has been promoted by functionalists and other philosophers, 
see Armstrong 1981, Lewis 1972.  
37 See, section 3.3, at p. 63. 
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When Mary sees colours she can refer to qualia in virtue of her new way of 
thinking about the colours that objects look to have. Before her release she can 
observe other people’s discriminatory responses to certain stimuli. However, she is 
not directly aware of the features that they discriminate. She knows that when lights 
of a certain type stimulate the visual system of these subjects, they have certain 
discriminatory responses. However, she is not directly aware of the ways in which 
these stimuli look to these subjects. In her laboratory, she can only infer these 
features by means of certain statistical procedures that determine the colour space. 
Accordingly, she refers to colours as determinate positions in the colour space. On 
the other hand, when she is released, she becomes directly aware of the colour 
objects look to have. Therefore, she can formulate thoughts about the type of colour 
that object looks to have in virtue of being directly aware of these features. Thus, if 
she faces a red object she can think about the qualia of her red-type experience as 
the property that is causally responsible for the fact that the object looks red to her.  
To sum up, I have suggested that a quale is a property of an experience that 
determines its causal powers. In particular, this is the power to produce certain 
discriminatory responses when certain stimuli conditions are given. These 
properties are referred to by the scientific concepts Mary possesses before her 
release.  
7.6 Conclusion 
In the present research I have offered reasons for resisting the strategy involved in 
Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument. This is an extremely influential argument in 
support of the claim that conscious experiences have properties that are beyond the 
scope of scientific knowledge. 
My conclusion is based on four main distinctive results. Firstly, I have offered a 
plausible formulation of the claim that science can accommodate colour 
experiences. By taking into account recent discussions within philosophy of science 
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and philosophy of mind, I have formulated this claim as the hypothesis of modest 
reductionism.  
Secondly, I have shown that the strategy involved in Jackson’s version of the 
knowledge argument can be used to target the modest reductionism hypothesis. 
Many commentators have focussed their attention on what Mary supposedly comes 
to know by seeing colours. Instead, I have shown that we have to take seriously the 
challenge, posed by Daniel Dennett and Patricia Churchland, of specifying what 
Mary’s scientific knowledge might be. I have answered to this objection by offering 
an account of this knowledge in terms of contemporary psychophysics and 
neuroscience. The resulting formulation of the knowledge argument is weaker than 
Jackson’s. However, it appears to threaten the modest reductionism hypothesis. 
Thirdly, I have argued that the plausibility that knowledge argument must rely 
on an account of introspective knowledge. In particular, this account should explain 
the transition from Mary’s seeing a coloured object to her holding a belief about the 
type of colour experience that she is having. I have maintained that the Displaced 
Perception Model of introspection, elaborated from an account proposed by Fred 
Dretske, offers this explanation.  According to this model, Mary’s capacities to self 
ascribe types of colour experiences, in virtue of seeing colours, requires certain 
capacities. First, she has to master colour concepts and the notion of looking a 
certain colour to her. Second, she has to know the systematic relations holding 
between things looking a certain colour to her and having a certain type of colour 
experience.  
Finally, I have motivated a version of the two ways of thinking reply to the 
knowledge argument. As many opponents and supporters have recently started to 
realise, this strategy might be charged with being ad hoc. I offered a distinctive 
justification of this reply to the knowledge argument. Assuming the account of 
introspection mentioned above, the existence of visual recognitional colour 
concepts might justify this strategy. A person possesses these concepts when she is 
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able to determine the colours of objects simply by having visual experiences. On 
her release Mary acquires these colour concepts.  Having these concepts, she can 
then think in new ways about the type of colour experiences she is having. 
However, the typology of colour experiences that she can master after her release 
does not require the existence of qualia that her scientific knowledge cannot 
describe or explain. 
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